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
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KOSSUTH

AND THE

HUNGARIAN WAR:

CONTAINING

A Complete History of the late Struggle of the
Hungarians for Liberty:

WITH SKETCHES OF THE

LEADING CHIEFS AND STATESMEN

WHO DISTINGUISHED THEMSELVES IN DECISION AND IN THE FIELD.



WITH AUTHENTIC PORTRAITS AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

PHILADELPHIA:
H. O. PECK & THEO. BLISS.
1861.





Louis Kossuth.

Laird

KOSSUTH

1851-39

AND THE

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
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PREFACE.

A NARRATIVE of the Hungarian war and its heroes is demanded by the American people. They sympathized with that noble band, which strove for freedom and national independence, and expressed their enthusiastic admiration of its leaders in the council and in the field. They traced, with satisfaction, many features of resemblance between the Hungarian revolution and their own, and between Kossuth and Washington, and Klapka and Wayne. When "treason, like a blight, came o'er the council of the brave," and Hungary lay prostrate at the feet of the savage Haynau, a feeling of sorrow and indignation was universal in the United States. Congress ordered a national vessel to be sent to convey Kossuth and his fellow exiles to our happy shores. In all quarters, the dastardly conduct of Austria towards the vanquished was bitterly censured.

The work now offered to the public is as complete as circumstances will admit at the present time. The authorities relied on were "Schlesinger's War in Hungary," various historical papers by Francis Pulszky, Klapka's *"Memoirs of the War of Independence,"*

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and the "Memoirs of an Hungarian Lady," by Teresa Pulszky. The authors whom we consulted had the best means of obtaining accurate information, though, being partisans, they may colour or misrepresent. Max Schlesinger is generally impartial; awarding due praise to the courage and constancy of the Austrian troops, and to the gallantry and skill of their officers. His enthusiasm for the Hungarian cause, which occasionally gives his history the tone of the pleading of an advocate, is pardonable at this time. The cool and correct Pulszky is the best moderator of Schlesinger, and from his store of facts we have liberally drawn.

The biographies in the latter part of the work are necessarily incomplete. Bem excepted, all of their subjects remain, in the maturity of life, prepared, if occasion serves, to fight the battle over again; and, perhaps, the greatest achievements of their lives have yet to be performed. But enough is related of the career of Kossuth, Görgey, Dembinski, and others, to give a clear conception of their characters and capabilities. It will be seen that the Hungarians possessed statesmen and generals equal, at least, to those of any other country in point of talent, and filled with that energy which an enthusiasm for freedom alone can give. The careful study of the lives of such men cannot but increase our veneration for greatness, *and our love of free institutions.*

KOSSUTH

AND THE

HUNGARIAN WAR.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION—OUTLINE HISTORY OF HUNGARY TO THE REVOLUTION OF 1849.

THE most ancient history of the Hungarian people is buried in darkness. But one thing is certain, that that people belongs to the same family of nomadic tribes which sent forth the Huns, Avars, Kumans, the Usi, and the Polowzi. The original country of these tribes is old Turan, that immense tract of territory extending from the lake of Aral, from the Oxus and Jaxartes, to the frontiers of China and the desert of Gobi.

Among those rudiments of nations which were taking shape from the commencement of the decline of the Roman Empire down to the fifteenth century, the Hungarians play a conspicuous and interesting part, from the fact that they alone, of all migratory tribes, succeeded in weathering the rocks which threatened those most who drifted most headlong in a current of conquest. They had sufficient strength to resist the enemies whom they stirred up by the conquest of their new country, and by those frequent

predatory expeditions which are of common occurrence in the first historical epoch of conquering nations, without finding themselves compelled to sacrifice their domestic liberty to the arbitrary sway of one man.

The history of Hungary, from the ninth to the twelfth century, is consequently full of interest for the political philosopher. In the first years of that period, we see the Hungarian people, worried by foreign enemies, and hurried on by those migratory instincts which are peculiar to nomadic populations, leave their homes in Central Asia, and proceed to the Caspian, and thence to the Black Sea; thence they direct their steps to the Danube; for a legend is rife among them of a land of promise, belonging to the inheritance of Attila, Prince of the Huns, and kinsman to their tribe. Obedient to the advice of the Chazars, their neighbours, we behold the chiefs of the clans assemble for the election of a prince; but, jealous of his influence, they limit the extent of his power. They make a State, and that State stands alone in history; for it originated in a "social contract," the provisions of which were not only enacted, but also observed. Thus united into a nation, the Hungarian tribes proceed, toward the end of the ninth century, to conquer their present country. The conquest is an easy one. Fortune favours them; they become overbearing, and begin to devastate the neighbouring countries. They make inroads upon Southern Germany, Upper Italy, and the northern provinces of the Byzantine Empire. Some detached parties visit even the south of France, and advance to the walls of Constantinople, until the hero Botond—thus runs the Hungarian legend—*breaks the gates of that city with his club.*

The people of Western Europe prayed at that time

in this litany: "O Lord! preserve us from the Hungarians!" and dreadful rumours were current of the Hungarian barbarians, who, it was said, delighted in eating the hearts of their enemies. Neither the Byzantine nor the German emperors could resist their inroads; all they could do was to conciliate them with gifts. The two emperors did, indeed, all they could to break the power of their new and formidable enemies; and the manner in which they severally attempted that object is characteristic of the distinguishing features of the East and West of Europe. Henry of Germany (Henricus Auceps) bribed the Hungarians into an armistice of nine years, and during this time he built fortified cities and strongholds, and recruited his armies, so that when the Hungarian hordes advanced, they suffered several grievous defeats. The unwarlike Prince of Byzantium, on the other hand, purchases peace under the same conditions as Henricus Auceps; and, as a pledge of the good faith of the Hungarians, he takes several of their chiefs as hostages, and conducts them to Constantinople. Here they are converted to the Christian religion, and when they finally return to their country, the Byzantine emperor sees that they are accompanied by the Bishop Hierotheos, for he is well aware that the Christian religion will change the barbarous manners of the Hungarians.

Christianity, thus transplanted into Hungary, had at first but an indifferent success. It was only after two generations that the real conversion of the Hungarian people took place. They adopted the forms, not of the petrified Grecian church, but of the Romans. Still, the reminiscences of the first Byzantine attempt at their conversion remained in the Hungarian lan-

guage. To this day, the Grecian doctrine is called the old creed, (*o hit*.) and the Greek Christians are proud of the *old faith*.

While in this manner the predatory excursions become less frequent and formidable during the tenth century, we see the princes of Hungary intent upon strengthening their small modicum of central power, and defending it against the encroachment of the chiefs of the clans. They invited foreign colonists and cavaliers to settle in the country, and granted them the rights and immunities enjoyed by the native chiefs. The people meanwhile begin to settle, and to build villages and cities; indeed, the vast numbers of prisoners from all parts of Europe, brought from their predatory excursions, the aggregate number of whom exceeded that of their conquerors, familiarized the latter, by degrees, with the manners and customs of the West and the morals of the Christian population of Europe. Prince Geiza, a grandson of Arpad, the conqueror of Hungary, was favourably inclined to the Christian creed.

Geiza's son, Stephen, justly denominated "the Saint," was the greatest man of his time. He lived and acted for a twofold purpose. He endeavoured to introduce Christianity into his kingdom, and to establish the royal power on a firm basis, without curtailing the liberties of the people: for with him Christianity was the twin sister of freedom. He cannot possibly effect either purpose unless his reforming plans are protected by the sacred power of religion. In furtherance of his object, he invited the chiefs of his people to his court; for three years he was a *zealous preacher* and a living example of the truth of *the gospel*. He sent Archbishop Astricus to Rome,

to inform the Pope Sylvester (Gerbert) of the voluntary conversion of the Hungarian people, and of their homage to the pope as their spiritual prince. In return for this important service, Stephen solicited Sylvester's blessing on the crown, and his sanction of the ecclesiastical arrangement in the country, and the confirmation of the bishops whom Stephen had appointed. The pope was agreeably surprised by this good news. He sent Stephen a crown of gold and the cross of the patriarch, as the symbols of royal power and of the privilege of an ecclesiastical jurisdiction, (*potestas circa sacra*.) Besides this, he sent him the pallium for two archbishops; for, faithful to the system of papacy, Sylvester was unwilling to let any one country remain under a single ecclesiastical chief.

Stephen was solemnly crowned in the year 1000. He convoked several diets, and revised the constitution, which had never been altered since the days of Arpad. The influence of the Hungarian chiefs was neutralized by the bishops and foreign courtiers; tithes were introduced; the rights of the nobility fixed, and the foundation laid for a system of defence and taxation. These innovations were not carried without serious opposition and even resistance. But King Stephen suppressed with equal energy and good fortune all insurrections which occurred. Thus he continued, as the apostle and champion of constitutional liberty, to administer justice and to civilize his country. At once king and priest, like Melchisedek, he was the "beau ideal" of a mediæval sovereign. He resigned his crown to his nephew Peter, and died, (A. D. 1036,) with the firm conviction of the stability of his work, because it was holy; his human reason, indeed, had sufficient cause to doubt the continuance

of institutions which were still in their infancy, and which he left in weak and reluctant hands. But St. Stephen's faith—he is not only canonized by the church, but to the present day every Hungarian considers and reveres him as the founder of the State)—St. Stephen's faith, we say, was borne out by future facts. His institutions conquered not only the difficulties which the dying king's boding mind foresaw, but they stood firm and unshaken in storms which were fatal to other nations and countries.

Peter, the successor of Stephen the Saint, surrounded himself with foreigners. He was not bred among the people which he was called upon to govern; he longed for the splendour and gayeties of the West, and he treated the Hungarians with scorn and contempt. At length, the people rose against him. They rallied around the brother-in-law of the deceased king, and expelled Peter, (A. D. 1041.)

But the Emperor Henry III. offered to replace Peter upon the throne if he would consent to hold Hungary as a fief of the empire. Samuel could not withstand the German army; he was defeated in the first encounter, captured, and assassinated, (A. D. 1043.) But Peter did not enjoy his throne in peace. A formidable insurrection occurred; the German emperor was tardy in sending aid, and the king was defeated. He died in 1047, and was succeeded by Andreas, his cousin. The emperor now threatened the Hungarians with slavery or extermination. But they retreated before his army, cut off his supplies, and so harassed him that he was compelled to recross *the* frontier. Thus Hungary became independent. *Andreas* was defeated, and killed by his turbulent brother *Bela*, in 1060.

Bela seized the sceptre, and wielded it with a strong hand. He published a general amnesty, reformed many abuses, and gained all hearts by strict and impartial justice. A friend of liberty beyond the comprehension of the eleventh century, he convoked a general diet at Stuhlweissenburg, for which he arranged the elections on the broadest possible basis. He displayed great activity and creative power in civilizing his people. This great king came to a sudden death in 1063, and was succeeded by his son Solomon. The reign of this king was very turbulent. Two or three times was he in danger of losing his crown and his life. To protect his kingdom, he was compelled to acknowledge himself the vassal of the German emperor. At length, the treacherous conduct of Solomon alienated the affections of his people. He was driven from Hungary, and his brother Geiza proclaimed king. Geiza died in 1072, and was succeeded by Ladislav, who ought to be called the Great, as the church has called him "the Saint." Having secured himself against foreign wars, he devoted himself to the improvement of the condition of his people. He introduced a code of civil and criminal laws, and directed and arranged the affairs of civil life, during the transition from the life of herdmen to agricultural occupation. He governed Hungary with energy and wisdom for eighteen years, extending her limits from the Adriatic to the confines of Red Russia. So much were his valour, ability, and Christian spirit respected, that, in 1095, the command of the first body of crusaders was offered to him. But he died a few months afterward, amid the tears of his people.

Ladislav was succeeded by his nephew, the ugly, but strong-minded and learned Koloman, nicknamed

"Book Koloman." This monarch displayed his ability in arms by suppressing an insurrection of the Croats, and protecting his kingdom against the marauding hordes which accompanied the crusaders. But he was violent, jealous, and ungenerous in some portions of his career, and excited much hatred in his neighbours. He improved the diet and the laws, being the last legislator of the time of transition from Asiatic to European civilization. Koloman died in 1114. From that time until 1205, Hungary was chiefly under the influence of Byzantium. That empire was then seized by a family of clever and cunning princes—the Comneni, who covered the young state of Hungary with the net of their intrigues, gaining its princes for their policy by marriages, by wars, and by subsidies. The Hungarian kings of this period are unlike their predecessors. Among them we find no legislator, no hero, and no statesman. The kingdom declined under the influence of the intrigues and the extravagance of its rulers, who were unequal to the task of continuing the work of Stephen, Ladislas, and Koloman. In the history of this period, there is nothing interesting to the philosophical inquirer.

In 1205, Andreas II., a weak, extravagant, and ambitious monarch, ascended the Hungarian throne. He engaged in expensive wars to extend his dominions; and to pay the cost, he was compelled to resort to extraordinary means. By deteriorating the coin, he disarranged the commercial relations of the country; by selling, mortgaging, and finally doing away with the castle domains, he enraged the aristocracy, and *they* opposed him in all his measures. Insurrections *occurred*, and the king appealed to the pope for aid; *but the pope saw proper to threaten the king with an*

interdict if he continued to oppress his people. At length, in 1217, Andreas, to secure the pope's favour, made a crusade to Palestine. There he was unsuccessful, and returned to find his kingdom in confusion, the treasury empty, and the people groaning under oppression. Bela, the king's eldest son, backed by the lower nobility and the garrisons of the castles, demanded a restoration of the old constitution and a reform of the financial measures. A civil war was on the point of breaking out, when the whole clergy, obedient to the command of the pope, joined the reform party, and negotiated a peace, the conditions of which, known by the name of the Golden Bull, came to be the most important pillar of Hungarian liberty. In that document, the king acknowledged and confirmed the people's old and hereditary rights. Andreas died in 1235.

Bela, the fourth of that name, who, as heir-apparent, had taken the lead of the reform movement, remained faithful to his principles when he ascended the throne. He broke the power of the magnates, and protected the great men of the nation against aristocratical encroachments upon their rights, while the magnates exerted the last remnants of their legal power to undermine the king's authority. It was, therefore, a great satisfaction to Bela that Kuthen, king of the Kumans, immigrated into Hungary with forty thousand of his people, (1239,) and subjected himself and his followers to Bela's authority; for that prince hoped to find a new source of strength in the sudden arrival of this kindred nation. The Mongols, who broke loose from the East, under the guidance of Batu Chan, had expelled the Kumans from their settlements. These people, though they became willing converts to Christianity, were far less civilized than the Hungarians;

they had no clear idea about landed property, and hence they were in perpetual conflict with the Hungarians. This state of things engendered suspicion and ill-feeling, and was finally attended with very serious consequences.

In 1241, the Mongols assembled an army of five hundred thousand men, and threatened to invade Europe. Bela invoked the assistance of the Duke of Austria, Frederick of Babenberg, and he even promised to recognise the German Emperor Frederick as his feudal lord, if that potentate would oppose the Mongols with the whole of his power; but the German emperor refused to assist Bela, and the Duke of Austria, who came to the rescue, was accompanied by a few knights only: he was prepared to act as a spectator, but not as an ally. Both the German emperor and the Austrian duke had no objection to see Hungary humiliated and maimed, for they anticipated that it would afterward be an easy prey. The Hungarian magnates, too, were very slack in preparing for the defence; they protested, that since the king had restored the old constitution of the country, which was asserted to be sufficient for any defensive war, they saw no reason why they should put themselves to any extraordinary expense to succour him. The consequences might have been foreseen. The Mongols defeated the palatine's troops in the Carpathian defiles, and their outposts advanced to the vicinity of Pesth, where the Duke of Austria, instead of leading the Hungarians to battle, was busy in inflaming them against the Kumans, whom he represented as allies and spies of the Mongols; and heading a furious mob of fanatics, he attacked and wounded Prince Kuthen. Upon this, part of the *Kumans fled from the country*, part of them surren-

dered to the Mongols, and only a few of them remained with the Hungarians. At length, King Bela assembled his troops and advanced against the invaders, who retreated to the river Theiss, when a decisive battle was fought at Mohi. The Hungarians were defeated, and the Mongols had the country in their power. Kolo-man, the king's brother, died from his wounds; and the king sought refuge in the first instance with Frederick of Austria, who, instead of offering him hospitality, arrested him, and only released him under the condition of his resigning the border counties of Hungary. After his escape from the hands of the Austrians, King Bela fled into Croatia, and at length, being still pursued by the Mongols, he sought refuge on the Dalmatian island of Veglia. The Mongols devastated Hungary during one year and a half; they burned and sacked villages and cities, and slaughtered their inhabitants; but when the news came to them that Oktai, the Great Khan of the Golden Tribe, was dead, Batu and his followers left the country, and returned to Asia to vindicate Batu's rights to the succession.

King Bela returned in 1242. Hungary was a desert—a *tabula rasa*. The king was called upon to found a new empire. He rebuilt the cities, and gave them ample privileges, and the most perfect self-government, to increase their population. He renewed the title-deeds of the landed proprietors, but in doing this he changed the *allods* into feudal holdings; he encouraged the construction of mountain-fastnesses, and transplanted the Kumans from Bulgaria, whither they had fled, to the plains between the Theiss and the Danube. In four years, the country had so far recovered that Bela was enabled to make an expedition

of revenge against Frederick of Austria, for the purpose of recovering the three counties which that prince had forced him to resign. Fortune favoured at first the arms of the Austrian prince; but, in the battle of Wiener-Neustadt, he fell, pierced by the arrow of the Count Frangepani, a friend of King Bela, the same who had hospitably received him at Veglia.

Although victorious over the Mongols, Bela had to contend with a formidable party of the magnates, headed by his ambitious and energetic son Stephen, and his last years were embittered with domestic strife. He died in 1220. Stephen and Ladislas, his successors, effected nothing of importance. One died early, the other abandoned himself to pleasure. Andreas III., the last king of the house of Arpad, died of poison in 1301.

Foreign princes now occupied the throne of Hungary. Feudal laws and institutions were introduced, and the kingdom became more warlike than ever. Charles Robert of Anjou, a grandson of the King of Naples, and the daughter of Bela IV., received the Hungarian crown in 1309 from the diet. The new king was not of a very warlike disposition, and strove to found the greatness of the country upon the arts of peace. But he was compelled to contend with powerful and turbulent vassals. He did not like diets, and only once convoked the states of the realm to ratify some barbarous penalties inflicted upon an enemy. He liked to meddle with foreign affairs. Extending his influence far beyond the limits of his kingdom, he set an example, rare in those violent times, of avoiding war by arbitration. Charles Robert *died in 1342, after a long reign, under which the country had attained a considerable degree of prosperity.*

His son, Louis the Great, was seventeen years of age when he was crowned, amidst the thundering cheers of the Hungarians, six days after the interment of his father. Of Hungarian education,—beautiful, chivalrous, and endowed with extraordinary talents,—he was the favourite of the Hungarian nobility. His military exploits gained him the surname of the Great,—he extended the limits of Hungary to three seas,—he was a great statesman, but his policy was more of a foreign than of a domestic character, for the aim of his policy was the extension and lustre of his country, and not its liberty.

His first war was adventurous. He proceeded to Naples to revenge the murder of his brother. King Robert of Naples had died there without male issue, (1343.) The crown belonged to the Hungarian branch of the Anjous, and in order to prevent any possible dispute, Charles Robert had concluded a treaty with his uncle Robert, in virtue of which Andreas, the second son of Charles Robert, was to marry Jane, Robert's grand-daughter, and share with her the royal dignity of Naples. But the profligate Neapolitan princess despised her weak husband, Andreas, who was no more than sixteen years old, and she would by no means recognise him as King of Naples, but only as Prince of Salerno. She ordered him at length to be strangled with a silken cord, by her cousins, the Princes of Tarento and Durazzo in Aversa. No sooner had King Louis received these tidings than he applied to the pope, Clement VI., and demanded from him, as liege lord of Naples, the deposition of Jane, the murderess of her husband. The pope hesitated, but the king conducted an Hungarian army, under a black banner, throughout Italy. Naples

surrendered, and Jane fled to Avignon, which was an inheritance of her family, with Louis of Tarento, with whom she had married. Charles of Durazzo was the only murderer of the unhappy Andreas who fell into the hands of the king; he was executed in the same room in which Andreas had been strangled.

Louis now took the title of King of both Sicilies, and after having left in Naples an Hungarian garrison, and Stephen Laczkovics as viceroy, returned to Hungary, without ceasing to urge the pope to pronounce a verdict on Jane. As the tidings reached her that King Louis had left Naples, she sold her rights over Avignon to the pope, and returned to Naples, where the small garrison of the Hungarians was pressed very hard by an insurrection. Louis was therefore compelled to proceed, (1350,) a second time to Naples. He took Canossa, Salerno, and Aversa by storm, and conquered the country again. Yet he was soon convinced that the Neapolitans would never willingly bear the yoke of foreigners. In the mean time, Pope Clement had pronounced the sentence, that Jane had been bewitched into the murder of Andreas, and should consequently keep the realm, and only indemnify Louis by three hundred thousand gold florins for the expenses of the war; Louis left Naples, and forgave the beautiful sinner the expiatory sum.

This was the result of the adventurous war of the Hungarians in Naples. Its immediate consequences to Hungary were, that the king allotted for ever, to the nobility in the diet of 1351, the ninth part of the whole agricultural produce of the peasantry, as an indemnification for the sacrifices of the nobles in that war. *This is the origin of the Ninth, a tax greatly injurious to industry, and abolished only so late as the*

year 1848. Also feudalism was legally introduced in the above-mentioned diet. The free disposal of landed property was taken away from the proprietor; the family was declared sole proprietor, and the individual became only usufructuary. Thus landed property was fettered and immobilized, but feudalism could not be carried so far as to exclude female succession: first, because the king had no sons, and willed the crown to fall on a daughter; next, the Hungarians were accustomed to female succession; the daughter could therefore by no means be excluded from the heirship of the land.

By the introduction of feudalism, the castle system of baronies ceased to form the basis of the Hungarian military system; therefore, the garrison of the castle, which besides belonged to the freemen, were ennobled by the king. As they had but small landed property, they became the ancestors of the latter peasant nobles, (*Nobiles unius Sessionis*.)

Louis waged many wars during his reign of forty years, and distinguished himself by his generosity, as well as by his bravery. He vanquished in single combat Keystutt, Prince of Lithuania, who had invaded Galicia during the Neapolitan war. After having disarmed his enemy, the king released him, under the condition that he would accept the Christian faith. The heathen prince pledged himself to do it, but it was only his son who redeemed his word. In the war against the Venetian republic, Louis beleaguered Treviso, in Friaul. During the siege, the Doge Gradenigo died, and Delfino, the commander of the fortress, was elected in his stead. The Venetians requested a free retreat for their new duke; Louis granted the request, and Delfino, proved his gratitude by the immediate

conclusion of a peace with the chivalrous king. The Hungarians got by the treaty the coast of Dalmatia, while the supremacy of the republic over the Dalmatian isle was recognised by Hungary, and commercial privileges were insured to the Venetian merchants. In the East, King Louis forced Bazarad, the Prince of Wallachia, to acknowledge again the superiority of Hungary. After the death of Casimir, King of Poland, who was the uncle of Louis by the mother's side, he was called to the throne by the Poles, and crowned at Cracow, (1370.) The affairs of Hungary forbade him to remain long in Poland; he therefore appointed his mother Elizabeth, sister of the late King Casimir, regent of the country, and returned himself to Visegrad. But the great task of his life was less the aggrandizement of his realm than the propagation of the Romish creed among his subjects. He not only converted the heathen Kumans, but likewise succeeded in persuading the Ruthenians of the oriental creed, who at that period had settled in Hungary, to submit to the authority of the pope. His endeavours in the same direction proved fruitless with the Wallachs in Hungary and Transylvania. It was in vain that he removed their oriental clergymen, and replaced them by Catholic priests from Dalmatia; the Wallachs steadily kept to their creed. At last, many of them could no longer bear their oppression, and emigrated to Moldavia. But the king pursued them even to their new country; here too they could not escape his sway, yet he protected them against external enemies, and defeated the Crimean Tartars between the Bug and the Dnieper when *they* extended their plundering incursion as far as into *Moldavia*. Altomos, the Tartar prince, was killed by *the king in single combat*, and his son was compelled

to adopt Christianity. Louis died in 1392; his death prevented the execution of his great design to unite firmly the kingdoms of Poland and Hungary; thus to create a powerful realm, which, in the east of Europe, would occupy the same position which France had obtained in the west, and would take the lead of Christianity and civilization in the east. But the misgovernment of Elizabeth made in Poland every regency unpopular. The Poles claimed a king for themselves. The beautiful Hedviga, daughter of King Louis, became Queen of Poland, and yielding to political reasons, she married Uladislas Jaghello, Prince of Lithuania, who, after having been baptized, united his own duchy to the kingdom of his wife.

In Hungary, Maria, the elder daughter of the great Louis, was crowned queen; her royal consort, Sigismund of Luxemburg, subsequently Emperor of Germany, and King of Bohemia, received the title of "Guardian of the Realm." It was now, for the first time, that a woman wore the sacred crown of St. Stephen. But to the wo of the country, neither she nor her mother Elizabeth, who greatly influenced her, was adequate to her important duties. Uladislas Jaghello took possession of Galicia; Dalmatia and Croatia revolted against the queen, and the Ban Horvathy, Palisna, the Prior of Vrana, and Laczkovics, the valiant companion of King Louis in his Neapolitan campaign, invited the King of Naples, Charles Martel "the Little," to the throne of Hungary, as he was the next male to King Louis.

The queen was unpopular, and Charles Martel was received with enthusiasm and proclaimed king without opposition. But the partisans of Maria invited Charles to a conference, and then treacherously slew him.

Hungary once more acknowledged Maria, though unwillingly. In 1387, Sigismund, "guardian of the realm," took advantage of the general wish for an energetic sovereign, to assemble a diet and have himself chosen king. The most important event of his reign was the encounter with the Turks under Bajazet, in 1396, at Nicopolis. Sigismund was defeated, and his army totally destroyed. This king's reign was the longest in the Hungarian annals. He became King of Bohemia and Emperor of Germany, and ruled about half a century. Prodigality and treachery were the prominent features of his character. The first caused him to be constantly involved in financial difficulties, and the second drew upon him the determined hatred of many powerful personages. He neglected the internal affairs of Hungary, though he sanctioned several wise regulations touching municipal rights, projected by others. Sigismund died in 1437.

Albert, Archduke of Austria, and son-in-law of Sigismund, succeeded him upon the throne of Hungary. His powers were greatly restrained by the Hungarian diet. Albert was elected emperor, and marched against Sultan Murad, who had attacked Servia; but the expedition of the king was an unfortunate one. The Hungarians were beaten, and, decimated by ravaging sickness, were forced to retire. Albert died on his retreat, in 1437.

During the minority of his successor Uladislas, John Hunyady, the famous warrior, routed the Turks in several great battles, took five fortresses, and compelled the sultan to acknowledge the supremacy of Hungary over all the Danubian principalities. *Uladislas, the young king*, upon the representations of *Cardinal Julian Cesarini*, broke the treaty, and took

up arms to endeavour to crush the power of the Turks. In 1444, relying upon the promises of aid from the army of the famous George Castriot and the Genoese fleet, the king crossed the Danube with only twenty thousand men. The Turks, under Murad, met him at Varna, and an obstinate and bloody battle ensued. The impetuous Uladislav was killed, his forces routed, and the heroic Hunyady made prisoner. The latter, however, soon regained his liberty, and was elected Governor of Hungary, until the posthumous son of Albert, Ladislav, should become of age. For ten years did this hero sway nobly the destinies of his country, defending its frontier, and vigorously administering affairs at home. The Turks never had a more formidable foe. Ladislav ascended the throne in 1453. In 1456, Hungary was attacked by Mohammed II., who marched up to Hunyady's fortress of Belgrade. The king sent no forces to the assistance of the old hero. But Hunyady raised an army at his own expense, and on the 14th of July, attacked the army of the sultan, and gained a glorious victory. He died twenty days after the battle.

Upon the death of the weak and cruel Ladislav, in 1457, the people elected Matthias Corvinus, Hunyady's second son, King of Hungary. Matthias reigned thirty-one years, distinguishing himself as a king, a general, a statesman, and a friend of liberty. The position and circumstances of the country, and his own warlike character, involved him in frequent wars, and his talent triumphing over obstacles, he became the parent of modern strategy. He was the first to establish a standing army upon the modern basis, and thus was always prepared for his enemies. *The Turks were defeated by Matthias in several battles,*

and compelled to keep within their limits. He then became involved in a contest with the treacherous and vindictive Emperor Frederick of Austria. Matthias conquered the majority of the Austrian cities in 1472, and then consented to an advantageous peace. The emperor violated the treaty, and Matthias renewed the attack in 1480. In 1485, he besieged and conquered the city of Vienna. Matthias introduced great order into the administration of the affairs of his kingdom, encouraged science and the arts, founded a university at Pressburg, and collected a valuable library. He died at Vienna in 1490.

Under the successor of Matthias, Uladislas II., the power of the oligarchy steadily increased, until the king's powers were very limited. Various insurrections occurred, and the factions of Bathory and Zapolya occasioned much violence. The strength of the kingdom declined rapidly. Diet followed diet, in quick succession, each one withholding from the king the means of defending the kingdom, and striving to bind his hands still tighter. During the minority of Louis II., the aristocratic party became almost absolute. When the king at length seized the sceptre, he showed a morbid desire, but wanted strength to rule. The Queen Maria, sister of Charles V., was more daring and able, and she took measures of resistance to the power of the magnates. While this struggle was going on, the middle class, the main strength of every country, rose in opposition to the magnates, and promised the king, if he would accede to their demands of reform, they would assist him in throwing off the fetters imposed upon him by the diet. But the *weak king* countenanced the court party instead, and *that party triumphed*.

In the mean time, a mighty storm was gathering in the south. Solyman the Magnificent determined to invade Hungary with an army whose numbers and discipline seemed irresistible. The king and the magnates trifled the time, until the sultan had crossed the Danube and Drave.

At length the king took the field, and encamped at Mohats with a small force of twenty thousand men; but messengers had come from Szegedin to tell him that Zapolya was advancing to the rescue with fourteen thousand men, and he prayed that the king would not engage in a battle until his force was in the field. A similar message was brought from Christoph Frangepadi, who approached from Croatia, with fifteen thousand men. But the court party would not condescend to owe the salvation of the country to the hated Zapolya, and they urged the king to attack the Turks. Tomory, the Archbishop of Kaloesa, who had formerly resigned his sword for a cowl, and who had sworn to doff his pallium for the sword, had been appointed commander-in-chief of the king's forces. Tomory was eager to begin the fight. Many of the ancient officers were aware that twenty-five thousand men had no chance against the superior forces of the Turks; but they all, following the impulse of the careless haughtiness and martial resolution which characterize the Hungarians, joined their voices with the clamour of those who advised the king to attack the Turks. Only Francis Perenyi, the Bishop of Grossvardein, remarked, that "since Bishop Bradarish had been ambassador at Rome, he thought the best plan would be to send him back to the pope, to entreat his holiness to canonize the twenty thousand Hungarian

martyrs, who were to lay down their lives for the cause of Christendom."

The Hungarian battle-line leant on the swamps of Mohats. Solyman attacked them on the 29th of August, 1526. His forlorn hopes were driven back, and the Hungarians advancing, made an onset on the sultan's artillery, which consisted of two hundred cannons. The fire of the Turks mowed them down by rank and file; but the files in the rear advanced with a fatal determination, and the combat came soon to a close, because none of the Hungarians were left to continue it. Tomory, Perenyi, and six bishops, George, the brother of John Zapolya, twenty-eight bannerets, five hundred members of the aristocracy, and twenty-two thousand soldiers were killed in this most bloody battle. The king fled, but his horse fell in the rivulet of Csele, and Louis II. ended his inglorious life by being drowned when flying from the field of battle. None escaped but the Palatine Bathory, Peter Perenyi, Francis Batthyanyi, and the Bishop Bradarish, with three thousand of the pope's mercenaries.

Solyman advanced to Buda without meeting with any resistance. He sacked that city, and devastated the districts on the other side of the Danube; but he returned to his empire, carrying with him a fabulous amount of booty, and seventy thousand captives; and, although he did not extend his dominion across the Save and Drave, the power of the Hungarians was not the less effectually broken.

When Solyman quitted the country, after his predatory incursion, the diet unanimously elected John Zapolya king. The powerful aristocrat, who had so *often defied the kings*, became a feeble monarch, *deficient in energy and determination*. Instead of at

once crushing the partisans of his rival Ferdinand, he allowed them to intrigue and increase in strength until, on the 1st of January, 1527, they succeeded in getting Ferdinand recognised as king by the states of Croatia. Then Zapolya offered to negotiate, instead of taking the field. The wily Ferdinand accepted the offer, but suddenly broke off negotiations, attacked and defeated the unprepared Zapolya, drove him from the kingdom, took the oath to the constitution of Hungary in November, 1527, and was solemnly crowned king.

Zapolya, driven to extremity, applied for aid to Solyman. The great sultan was ever ready for an invasion which promised booty and power. He entered Hungary in 1529, and met with no resistance. In September, he was under the walls of Vienna. Here he was repulsed, and as winter approached, he raised the siege, delivered Hungary to Zapolya, and retired within his own dominions. Scarcely had the Turks retired, when Ferdinand again entered Hungary and continued the war against John Zapolya. The latter, hard pressed, again applied for and obtained the aid of Solyman, (A. D. 1532.) The sultan again entered Hungary. The great object of this invasion was Austria, as it was not apprehended that Ferdinand could make a stand. But the progress of the Turks was checked by a band of seven hundred heroes under Jurissich, in the fortress of Güns, and, after wasting the neighbouring country, the sultan retired. By the peace of Grosswardein, made in 1538, the kingdom was divided between John and Ferdinand. John died in 1540. His son, John Sigismund, a child in the cradle, was acknowledged king by Solyman.

As Ferdinand did not respect the treaty, the sultan

entered Hungary for the fourth time, and left Turkish garrisons in Ofen and other fortresses. This was the beginning of the Turkish rule in Hungary. A conflict was maintained between those who held the government for John Sigismund and Ferdinand, until 1564, when Ferdinand died. During this time, the power of the Turks in Hungary rapidly increased. Maximilian, the successor of Ferdinand, is usually represented as a noble and tolerant prince. But the Hapsburg policy was so uniform and consistent toward Hungary, that even the noble nature of Maximilian was warped and tarnished in its pursuit. He gave the same assurances as his father had given, and kept them with no better faith. The laws of the country were continually violated. He soon fell into a strife with John Sigismund, but could not conquer him, and was obliged to conclude a peace. In 1566, Solyman made his last campaign in Hungary, and it had nearly proved fatal to Austria. But after crossing the Danube, the Turks were arrested by Nicholas Zrinyi in the fortress of Szigeth. The siege of this place cost the enemy twenty thousand men; and in the mean time, the emperor collected an army. But when he heard that Solyman the Magnificent had died before Szigeth, and that the Turks were retiring, he also disbanded his forces. John Sigismund died in 1571, and Maximilian in 1574. Neither of them did any thing for Hungary.

Under Rodolph, the successor of Maximilian, the Reformation spread over Hungary, its doctrines being adopted by all classes. The chief aim of Rodolph's life seemed to be the eradication of these doctrines, *and a constant war was waged against those who held them.*

The history of Hungary from 1576 to 1604 has none of the grandeur of former epochs. The Turks constantly gained ground in consequence of the weakness of the emperor's measures. The country was in a deplorable condition. Rodolph seemed to consider it as a storehouse, which he should exhaust, rather than a community which he should strengthen and improve. Oppressions of all kinds were the portion of the Hungarians. But at length, in 1604, their patience was exhausted, when the emperor forbade any discussion in the diet upon religious matters, and ordered any one who should intrude such questions upon the diet to be punished as a pernicious reformer. This violation of the constitution at once excited an insurrection, in which the malcontents, headed by Stephen Boeskey, were everywhere successful. In 1606, a peace was negotiated. Rodolph promised perfect religious freedom and the strict maintenance of the Hungarian constitution. He also acknowledged Boeskey as Prince of Transylvania and lord of a portion of Hungary.

Upon the abdication of Rodolph, the Hungarians readily elected his brother, Matthias, king, (1608.) Matthias strove to strengthen the Catholic cause in Hungary, and was assisted by several able churchmen. But the doctrines of the Reformation had taken too deep a root. Matthias died in 1619, and was succeeded by his brother, Ferdinand II., the author of the Thirty Years' War.

The pupil and friend of the Jesuits, he had in 1600 made a vow at Loretto to restore the Romish Church to its ancient glory and power upon the ruins of Protestantism. To this object he subordinated every other purpose in life: with foreknowledge and intent he kindled the bloodiest of all religious wars; every means

was in his sight justifiable to obtain his purpose; cunning and cruelty, dissimulation and open force, the sword and the scaffold. His most faithful servant and counsellor in Hungary was Peter Pazman, first a Jesuit and afterward Archbishop of Gran—learned, adroit, eloquent, disinterested, the most dangerous enemy of the Protestants, but devoted to his native country, and more conscientious than his master on the throne, in the choice of the means by which he achieved his aims.

Niklas Eszterhazy soon joined Pazman, the grandson of an insignificant nobleman, but who soon distinguished himself by his talents, and rose step by step to the dignity of Palatine. He understood his countrymen perfectly; his judgment was cold and decisive; he loved his country, and regulated his passions; but he was especially the man of the moment, prompt to assist in escaping from every embarrassment. Selfish as he was, he never forgot the interests of his family, and amassed that immense property by which his house was at a later period distinguished.

Opposed to these three champions of Catholicism, stood Gabriel Bethlen, Prince of Transylvania, as distinguished in the field as in the cabinet. An Hungarian like Pazman, a statesman like Eszterhazy, and a Jesuit like Ferdinand himself, he devoted his life and his talents to the noblest idea—the maintenance of political and religious freedom in Hungary. It was not Protestantism, but toleration, for which he struggled; he supported Catholic churches in Transylvania, and did not even expel the Jesuits from his principality, although he took the field against their intrigues in Hungary.

Even before the death of Matthias, Ferdinand came

forward openly against the Protestants; but his ordinances everywhere aroused rebellion. Count Thurn surprised him at the head of the confederate Protestant estates of Austria, Moravia, and Bohemia, in the palace in Vienna, and was on the point of confining him prisoner in a convent, when the Dampierre regiment of cavalry, joined by the students and citizens of Vienna, rescued him and dispersed the insurgents. Ferdinand suppressed the Austrians, and after a short campaign, in the battle of the White Mountain, defeated the Bohemians, in 1620, who had declared him to have forfeited the throne. After the victory, the work of the executioner commenced; twenty-eight of the most distinguished Bohemians were publicly decapitated; thousands were thrown into prison; the property of the Bohemian aristocracy was confiscated, and distributed among the officers and favourites of the emperor; the constitution of Bohemia was abrogated, and Protestantism suppressed.

In Hungary, the plans of Ferdinand were defeated by the genius of Bethlen Gabor. Here likewise the Protestants rose when Ferdinand, against religious liberty, began to circumscribe the Vienna peace. The arms of Bethlen were victorious; the prince was ever ready for war, but not less inclined to peace. Bethlen was elected King of Hungary at Neusohl, in 1620; but he received this act of the diet only as a homage rendered to his efforts by the Hungarians, and would not be crowned, although the crown and three-fourths of the country were in his power. Ferdinand, in spite of his vow at Loretto, was compelled, in 1621, to conclude a peace at Nikolsburg, which was ratified as the law of the land in 1622. The peace of Vienna and *religious freedom* were again confirmed, and a part of

Hungary was ceded to Bethlen. But as Ferdinand, taking advantage of the fortune of war in Germany, neglected to observe the articles of the peace, Bethlen rose a second and third time, and, by his skilful conduct of the war, won in Gyarmath and Pressburg new conditions of peace. In these wars, in which he never lost a battle in person, he seldom resorted to the assistance of the Turks; and, after having concluded a peace, he also mediated the same continually between the emperor and the sultan. It appears, too, that he had formed the plan of uniting Moldavia, Wallachia, Transylvania, and Eastern Hungary in one kingdom; but death overtook him in 1629, and interrupted his efforts, by which Transylvania was raised up anew.

Bethlen's widow, Catharina, Princess of Brandenburg, had been secretly converted by the Jesuits to the Romish church, and entered upon negotiations with Ferdinand to deliver up Transylvania to him; but, upon the discovery of her intrigues, the rich and avaricious George Rakoczy was elected Prince of Transylvania, who soon entered into an alliance, as a Protestant prince, with Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, the champion of Protestantism. Ferdinand was obliged, in 1633, to ratify the former articles of peace, and to recognise Rakoczy as Prince of Transylvania. In Hungary, however, Ferdinand's decree, by which the exports of the country into Austria were subjected to high duties, created great dissatisfaction; and as the emperor was seeking, during his own life, to secure the succession to the throne for his son, afterward Ferdinand III., he could not come forward here so openly against the Protestants as he did in *Bohemia* and *Austria*. Ferdinand III. was at length *elected and crowned King of Hungary* in 1636; the

old king died a few months afterward, and his wise counsellor, Peter Pazman, did not long survive him.

Ferdinand III. was actuated by the same principles as had involved his father in the interminable religious war; but he was more moderate, and not so obstinate. What Pazman had been to Ferdinand II., the Palatine Niklas Eszterhazy was to Ferdinand III. He exhorted him frequently to adhere to his promises, to respect the Hungarian constitution, and not by continual evasions to arouse the mistrust of the country. Peace could only be maintained by yielding; for Rakoczy, who even in Transylvania was rendered unpopular by his avarice and mistrustful character, was only dangerous in Hungary when the just grievances, which were submitted to the diet, remained unheeded. But Eszterhazy's voice could not prevail; Rakoczy invaded Hungary in 1644; the war lasted until 1645, characterized more by skilful marches of the troops than by sanguinary battles, until at length Ferdinand, who also earnestly desired to bring the war in Germany to a close, yielded in Hungary, and again concluded a peace with Rakoczy at Linz, in which the conditions of the peace of Vienna and Mikolsburg were not only ratified, but extended.

Like his predecessor, Ferdinand III. endeavoured to settle the succession to the throne during his lifetime. The Hungarians fulfilled his wishes; first the emperor's son, Ferdinand IV., and, upon his death soon afterward, Leopold I., were in turn chosen king. Ferdinand himself died in 1657; his monument is the peace of Westphalia and that of Linz, by which he terminated the long war in Germany and Hungary.

The government of Leopold I. continued for nearly *half a century*, from 1657 to 1705, a period of terror

and oppression to Hungary; and yet Leopold's personal character was not dissimilar from that of his ancestors: proud, narrow-minded, upright in private life, but in public life continually breaking every pledge and promise, like all the sovereigns of his house who had ruled Hungary before him. He was far less blood-thirsty than the fanatical Jesuit, Ferdinand II.; but under no King of Hungary in ancient times—not even under Sigismund—were so many scaffolds erected, so many distinguished houses spoiled of their possessions, so many patriots banished, as under Leopold; and all this because he had no Pazman, no Niklas Eszterhazy at his side, who might have taught him to respect covenants and to observe the oath which he had sworn to the constitution. His only advisers were Germans and Bohemians—the Porzias, the Lobkoviczes, the Hochers, the Kollonics, enemies of the Hungarians and of all constitutional freedom. It is true, that at a later period Paul Eszterhazy, an Hungarian, the first prince of that name, enjoyed the confidence of the emperor, but only because he stifled every patriotic feeling within him, and became a willing tool of court intrigue.

The emperor had the good fortune, in his war against the Turks, to have three great generals, one after another, who, by their humanity, won the hearts of the Hungarians—Duke Charles of Lorraine, the Margrave Ludwig of Baden, and Prince Eugene of Savoy. All the lustre which brightens the tragical government of Leopold emanates from these three names.

The war with the Turks began in 1664. Niklas Zrinyi, equally great as hero, statesman, and poet, the *grandson of the hero of Szigeth*, attacked the Turks *during the winter*, and caused them much serious loss.

But Montecucculi, the enemy of Zrinyi and the Hungarians, did not support him; he traversed the country with his army, until at length he gave the grand vizier a signal defeat at St. Gothard, whereupon the German ambassador of the Emperor Reuminger, in an inconceivable manner, concluded an ignominious peace with the Turks. Leopold engaged to furnish a present to the sultan of two hundred thousand florins, recognised the *status quo* as the basis of the peace, and promised to raze the fortress of Szekelyhida.

The Hungarians were incensed at this peace, which was concluded without their assent; but they were still more exasperated by the extortions of Leopold's German mercenaries, "which so exhausted the people that even the hated Turkish yoke seemed to be more endurable than the oppression of the Germans." In addition to this, the commanders were foreigners, while the Hungarians were everywhere neglected and excluded from the government.

At length, the grandees of the kingdom, headed by Wesselenyi, the Palatine, determined to assemble an army and force Leopold to respect his coronation oath, and select Hungarian counsellors. But the patriotic Wesselenyi died before any thing could be effected, and Peter Zrinyi then sought to employ the conspiracy for personal objects. All the plans, however, were betrayed, and the chiefs of the conspiracy were put to death without the forms of law, and their estates confiscated. An attempt at insurrection by the Protestants was equally unsuccessful. After its suppression they were subjected to a severe persecution, which caused them to flee in crowds to the Turks, who granted them protection, and made incursions into Hungary for their sake.

In the Turkish war which began in 1683, Leopold, aided by the great warrior John Sobieski, was successful. Leopold now sought to attain his ends by legal means. In 1687 he summoned a diet, the principal task of which was to abrogate the right of armed resistance in the clause of the Bulla Aurea, to abolish the right of electing a king, and to settle the succession to the throne on the male line of the house of Hapsburg, according to the law of primogeniture. The diet accepted the royal propositions; whereupon Leopold granted a full amnesty, from which Tokolyi was alone excepted, and conceded the right to the magnates of instituting the succession of primogeniture. The Palatine Count Paul Eszterhazy, who contributed greatly to these measures, was nominated prince, and Joseph, the son of Leopold, was crowned as the first hereditary king; a reconciliation was re-established between the court and the Hungarians. Nevertheless this was not complete; the religious grievances of the Protestants increased daily, and Leopold would not abandon his system of persecution against them. His generals meanwhile gained new and brilliant victories; the Margrave of Baden advanced up to the limits of Albania; Transylvania, after the death of Apaffy, yielded homage to Leopold, upon his promising to maintain the constitution; and Prince Eugene of Savoy, the valiant hero and friend of the Hungarians, annihilated at Zentha in 1697 the army of the grand vizier. But in order to achieve this victory, he had acted contrary to the command of the council of war in Vienna, and he was therefore obliged to repair to Vienna to justify himself. When called upon to *deliver up his sword*, he did so with these words, "*It is still red with the enemy's blood.*" But, however

pedantically Leopold adhered to forms, it was too repugnant a measure, even to his prejudices, that the greatest general of his time should be brought to account for a victory: he invested the prince anew with the chief command. By the mediation of England and Holland, the peace of Carlowicz was now concluded with the sultan, in which the Turks renounced all dominion in Hungary and Transylvania, and only retained the so-named Banat.

The violations of law by the court party in Hungary at length caused an insurrection, headed by Rakoczy, grandson of the beheaded Peter Zrinyi. The insurgents were triumphant. Leopold was obliged to treat for peace, and again he promised to respect the constitution. He died in 1705. He had ruled forty-eight years, and yet failed to attain his object—the destruction of the Hungarian constitution.

Joseph I., the son and successor of Leopold, was a noble and generous prince. He endeavoured to conciliate the Hungarians. But Rakoczy considered himself as the representative of his free countrymen, and demanded such guarantees for their liberties as could not be at any time violated. The war continued until 1711, when the adherents of Rakoczy accepted Joseph's terms, and a treaty of peace was concluded. Rakoczy himself repaired to Turkey, where he lived in the enjoyment of princely honour. He never confided in the house of Hapsburg. Joseph I. died in 1711, before peace had been fully restored.

Under his successor, who reigned as Charles III. in Hungary, and Charles VI. in Germany, some important changes were made in the Hungarian constitution. The changes were effected in the spirit of the eighteenth century. In the first place, the rights

and liberties of Hungary were ratified anew, and boards were instituted in the place of the independent dignitaries of state, who now presided over these boards. The Hungarian board of chancery was established in Vienna, since it was regarded as a *fait accompli* that the monarch, in spite of all his promises, should not reside in Hungary. In the country, the *Consilium Locumtenentiale Hungaricum* was instituted, which was to carry on the government; four district courts in Hungary, and one in Croatia, were in future to decide the most important civil causes; the royal table in Hungary, and the banal table in Croatia, were appointed courts of appeal for civil and criminal cases, which were invested with the power not only of judging according to strict formal right, but also of taking cognisance of matters in equity. But the most important point was the introduction of a standing army, and with this, naturally, of a new system of taxation. The nobility refused direct taxation; the peasants had alone to bear the taxes, which could not be raised high, and the court, to indemnify itself, recruited its revenues by an oppressive system of imposts between Hungary and the Austrian provinces, thereby stifling the industry of the former country. The injustice of the nobles met with its reward; from this time the country was isolated, and naturally remained behind in cultivation and industry.

In the year 1723, Charles attained in Hungary the object of his efforts, the acceptance of the so-called Pragmatic Sanction, or the recognition of the law of female inheritance, first for his line, then for that of his elder brother Joseph, and lastly for all the descendants of Leopold I. The Hungarians accepted these royal proposals without opposition, but at the same

time reasserted, of course, the rights and liberties of Hungary. The crime of high-treason was now more accurately defined, and an end was put by law to arbitrary arrests upon suspicion of high-treason. On this occasion, also, the permission was granted to the untitled nobles to institute the succession of primogeniture; but neither these nor the magnates, who had possessed this right ever since the time of Leopold I., made any frequent use of the privilege; equal partition was more adapted to the customs and usages of the nobles. While all these reforms were carried out in the interior, Charles, in the year 1716, renewed the war against the Turks. Prince Eugene, and his friend John Palfy, defeated the latter at Peterwardein and Temesvar, and in the following year at Belgrade; he took Servia and Wallachia Minor as far as the Aluta, and sought to unite again the ancient dependencies of the Hungarian kingdom with these. But the peace of Passarovicz (Posarovacz) arrested his victorious career. Charles was a dry, practical prince, who had a horror of any grand projects; he contented himself with having completely driven the Turks out of Hungary, and with possessing in Belgrade the key of Turkey. But he effected much in the way of internal amelioration; he constructed roads to the coast of Hungary, repaired the harbour of Porto Re, and granted to Fiume the privileges of a free port; for, at that period, it was not yet known that a free port, where prohibitions exist, favours only smuggling, and not commerce, and forms but a very weak corrective for the prohibitive system. In the last few years of the government of Charles a war broke out anew with Turkey; but Charles had not the courage to intrust *the command of the army to an Hungarian, although*

John Palfy was generally considered the best general of the school of Prince Eugene. The incapacity of the Generals Konigseck, Wallis, Suckow, and the diplomatist Neiperg, lost all the advantages which the sword of Eugene had won, and the peace of 1739 restored to the Turks Bosnia, Servia, with the important fortress of Belgrade, and Wallachia Minor.

Scarcely had Maria Theresa, the beautiful and talented daughter of Charles, ascended the throne in 1740, than all the continental powers of Europe stood forth against her, and contested her right of inheritance in the German provinces. The enthusiasm and devotion of the Hungarians saved her throne. The queen, with true womanly tact, took advantage of the vanity of the nation by readily carrying out all their wishes. She appointed Hungarians to the most important posts, she never neglected to mention with gratitude the sacrifices and valour of the nation, and, by manifesting confidence, she awakened a mutual confidence; thus during her government of thirty years she succeeded in those objects which the bloodthirsty tyranny of her grandfather had been unable to effect. The constitutional instincts of the Hungarians were gradually lulled asleep; Protestantism was weakened by frequent conversions to the Romish Church, German manners were introduced into Hungary, the high aristocracy became fixedly attached to the court, and yet all the while Maria Theresa remained the universally loved and adored Queen of the Hungarians. For diets she had no affection; under her, the constitution of the country was maintained outside the walls of the diet. She ordered the decrees of the highest courts to *be collected and confirmed by a commission which consisted of the members of the highest court; and these*

judgments had thenceforth the validity of law. Further, when in 1764 the diet refused to introduce a bill for the regulation of the relation of the peasant to the land-owner, she introduced, by an absolute decree, her "Urbarium" into Hungary, which, in spite of great faults and defects, was yet very liberal for that period, and contained many elements of progress; indeed, on this account, notwithstanding the illegal mode of its introduction, it was repeatedly recognised provisionally by subsequent diets. But Maria Theresa did not again summon any diet, and the dignified office of the Palatine, the guardian of the constitution, was not again filled up; yet, notwithstanding all this, the nation retained their attachment to her. She was the most statesmanlike sovereign of the house of Hapsburg.

Her son and successor, the celebrated Emperor Joseph II., the first ruler of the house of Lorraine, had not these qualities. He was a perfect specimen of a German philosopher,—imperious, intolerant of opposition, respecting no historical rights, boldly overturning the ancient order of things, but not possessing the energy necessary to carry into effect his *doctrinaire* schemes, and consequently spreading confusion and disaffection throughout the land. He would have been an ornament to any professor's chair, but for this very reason he was not the man to occupy a throne. Nevertheless, these very peculiarities gave him a great name among the unpractical German men of letters; they extolled him, and admired his principles, without considering how petty and pernicious were the results of his government. As soon as Joseph, in 1770, attained to power upon the death of his mother, he

quitted the path of government which Maria Theresa had so successfully pursued. He refused to be crowned king in Hungary, or to recognise the constitution, and he introduced a German administration into the country. All the county congregations, all the courts and government colleges, protested against this contempt of the fundamental compacts between the king and the Hungarians, and reminded him of the promises, the kingly oaths, and conditions of peace which his forefathers had made and observed. But Joseph had no inclination for historical rights; his want of public morality had already shown itself in the partition of Poland. In vain, therefore, he proclaimed toleration, in vain he studied to govern according to the principles of the law of reason; his ordinances were not respected, because he had shaken the public rights to their foundation; the municipal authorities everywhere resisted him. To maintain his consistency, Joseph thought himself compelled to abolish the municipal institutions, and to introduce a system of centralization; but he found no tools ready to forward his aims: none of the upright patriots served him in Hungary; his officials were foreigners, or men of no note or authority, and the administration was despised. To this failure were added his reverses in the war with Turkey, which he had commenced in the most inconsiderate manner; an armed insurrection had broken out in Belgium, and one threatened likewise in Hungary. Joseph, broken down in spirit and bodily health, saw at length, after a government of ten years, that all his efforts were vain. Upon his death-bed he retracted all the ordinances which he had *issued, with the single exception of the Toleration Act.* When the news of his death, in 1790, was

spread abroad, bonfires and illuminations were kindled from one end of the country to the other ; his officials were compelled to fly, and his ordinances (even the wisest, as, for instance, that relating to the measurement of the land) were burned.

Joseph's brother, Leopold II., under whose wise administration Tuscany had risen to a flourishing state, succeeded the philosopher on the throne. The ideas of the French Revolution had excited people's minds throughout Europe, and were shaking thrones. But Leopold, in this crisis, attached the Hungarians more firmly than ever to his house. His first act of government was to assemble the diet, to recognise the constitution of Hungary, the freedom of the country, and its independence of every other state or people, also to assign the right of introducing, abrogating, and interpreting the laws exclusively to the diet and the assent of the king: the country was never to be governed by imperial patents; the king himself was not allowed to interfere in the administration of justice, nor in cases of high-treason to arraign the accused before any other court than the royal table. Lastly, the edict of toleration issued by Joseph, which was indeed more limited than the peace of Vienna, of Nikolsburg, and of Linz, which did not prevent Charles and Maria Theresa from enforcing frequent encroachments by the Romish Church, was made the law of the land. Leopold was received and crowned in Hungary with enthusiasm; his son Alexander was elected Palatine; every thing augured a brilliant future, when he suddenly died in 1792, probably by poison—the effect of female jealousy.

Francis I., the son of Leopold, was a selfish, narrow-minded, distrustful prince, an enemy of science and

knowledge, and so vulgar in his tastes that he would not even learn to speak correct German. But his very Viennese dialect, and his coarse sallies against education, made him popular with the lower classes in Vienna. In Hungary he could not gain the attachment which had followed his father. At the very beginning of his government, and after the mysterious death of his brother, the popular Palatine Alexander, who lost his life at an exhibition of fireworks in Luxemburg, numerous arrests took place. The Abbot Martinovics, Count Sigray, Messrs. Laczkovics, Szent Mariay, and Hajnocy were executed for high-treason; others were sentenced to long imprisonment, and among them the most distinguished authors, upon the allegation that they had been implicated in a great conspiracy. The sentences alone were made known; the proceedings against these conspirators were carried on with locked doors, and regarded as state secrets.

As long as the French war lasted, Francis regularly held diets in Hungary, which continually voted subsidies of men and money; but when the estates, in 1807, raised their voice against the profligate administration of the finances, and declared in favour of the principles of free trade,—when they further, in 1812, refused to sanction by their assent the state bankruptcy of Austria,—they became troublesome to the Vienna ministry; and after the formation of the holy alliance, Francis sought, like his ancestors, to get rid of the inconvenient Hungarian constitution. He had soon forgotten the loyalty with which the Hungarians remained faithful to his throne, and how, when Napoleon in 1809 promised them separation from Austria and a *king for themselves*, the Hungarians tore in pieces the *proclamation*, and did not listen to the French. In

the first place, no more diets were summoned; the regular elections in the counties were no longer permitted; the lord-lieutenants filled up the vacancies in the municipal administration by provisional nominations. In 1816, a voluntary subsidy was demanded from the nobles. The nobles in most of the county congregations refused this; but, notwithstanding, at the close of the year 1822, when constitutionalism was also attacked in Italy and Spain, the taxes were raised without the consent of the diet, and a levy of recruits was ordered. All the counties protested; they saw clearly that it was not a question of taxation, but one of principle; and as the right of granting taxes alone constituted the guarantee of the constitution, this measure excited the bitterest indignation. Francis at first endeavoured to execute his will by force of arms, but his attempts were frustrated by the passive resistance of the counties. He therefore again summoned the diet in 1825, reconfirmed the constitution, and thenceforth ruled with more careful respect for the legal forms: yet he remained hostile to any reform; in his mind the words progress, education, and revolution were completely synonymous. But the spirit of the times will not admit of being resisted for any long continuance: in 1832, a reform diet, the first for a century, began to revise the single parts of the Hungarian constitution. The majority of the deputies were liberal, but the majority of the magnates and the government obstinately opposed any amelioration of the condition of the peasants, and any change or reform in the feudal institutions. Francis died during the session of this diet, unlamented by his people, to whom he bequeathed, as a remembrance of his government, *a considerable state-debt, notwithstanding that Austria*

had made three national bankruptcies under the Emperor Francis, which were especially ruinous to the middle classes.

After 1835, the stubborn, narrow-minded Archduke Louis, and the doctrinaire of absolutism, Prince Metternich, governed in the name of the imbecile Ferdinand. Louis believed that the art of ruling consisted in postponing the solution of every important question; and Metternich felt too well that he was not in a position to govern strong nations; his main object therefore was to keep down and repress the national development, or, where this was no longer possible, to incite one people against another, favouring and persecuting each party in turn, in order to destroy the strength of the people by continual party struggles.

The third statesman who exercised an important influence upon the government of Hungary was the Palatine Archduke Joseph, a man of great cleverness, a penetrating understanding, and with remarkable power of dissimulation. He entertained a true love for Hungary, which he looked upon as his native country, and was the man of quiet progress, but not possessed of the energy to make his counsels listened to in Vienna.

The diet which assembled in 1832, and continued its session uninterruptedly till 1836, fulfilled with difficulty its task of revising the Urbarium of Maria Theresa, and determining the rights and duties of the peasants. The court opposed all propositions relating to a full emancipation of the peasant, and would not consent to any attack upon the feudal institutions. The chancellor, Count Reviczky, who was an ardent *friend* to the Hungarian nationality, but only a half-*liberal* in his principles, was replaced by the reaction-

ary Count Fidel Palfy, a man without talent, who did not even understand Hungarian. He immediately caused arrests to be made, and political lawsuits to be instituted. B. Wesselenyi, Kossuth, Ujhazy, Balogh, Madarasz, and Count Raday, were among the number of the prosecuted. Those highest courts forgot their position and dignity so far as to allow the violation of the legal forms in reference to the defence; when, therefore, the sentence of Wesselenyi, Kossuth, and some young men, found guilty of high-treason, was published, the indignation of the whole country was excited against the government and the highest courts. Count Palfy, Count Cziraky, and Mr. Somssich, the chancellor, and the presidents of the highest courts, had not the courage to await the assembling of the diet: they entered the German-Austrian state service. Count Antony Mailath was made chancellor—pliant, liberal, eloquent, and full of promises. His administration lasted from 1839 until 1844, and was rendered important by an amnesty in Hungary, the introduction of the statute laws concerning bills of exchange, and the recognition of religious equality. At this time the differences between Croátia and Hungary began to grow bitter: the Croátians wanted in future to keep the Protestants out of their country; and their deputies, who in society constantly spoke Hungarian, demanded never to speak any language but Latin in the public sessions. Moreover they did not at that time strive for the use of the Croatian language, but for the maintenance of the Latin: it was the last flicker of the conservatism favoured by the court, which was naturally obliged very soon to yield to a national movement.

Count Mailath was overthrown by intrigues: in hi

place succeeded Count Apponyi—young, proud, and obstinate from want of experience, yielding to Metternich, attached to centralization, and on that account opposed to the Archduke Joseph, who defended the municipal institutions of Hungary. The archduke died after having been Palatine just fifty years; his son Stephen was appointed stadtholder in Hungary. Enthusiastically received by the nation, he had the best intentions and desire to reconcile the interests of his native country with those of his family. In November, 1847, he was elected Palatine. In the diet, the opposition in the House of Representatives, under the leadership of Kossuth, obtained a majority: the magnates were almost equally divided, but the greatest share of talent was evidently on the side of the opposition, who were headed in the House of Magnates by Count Louis Batthyanyi. A general reform of the Hungarian constitution was in progress: the immunity from taxation enjoyed by the nobles was abolished, and the municipal institutions and representation of the towns were in course of revision, when the news arrived that the French revolution had broken out, and France had become a republic.

This great event shook absolutism and feudalism to their foundations, and led the masses of Europe to dare to seize that power which belonged to them of right.

CHAPTER II.

DIFFICULTIES OF METTERNICH — KOSSUTH'S ADDRESS — RISINGS
IN VIENNA AND PESTH — FORMATION OF AN HUNGARIAN
MINISTRY.

AT the commencement of the year 1848, Prince Metternich and his friends were filled with apprehensions of coming trouble. The progress of liberal opinions was rapid and obvious. A liberal pontiff occupied the chair of St. Peter, and by the reforms which he introduced or sanctioned, gave a mighty impulse to the forward movement. In Hungary, the opposition, headed by the eloquent Louis Kossuth, not only directed its complaints against burdens and grievances, but boldly attacked the old system of government under Metternich, and demanded a reorganization of the entire administration, not for Hungary alone, but for the whole monarchy. The fanciful King of Prussia had granted the form of a constitution to his people, and appeared to be desirous of heading a general movement of the liberals. In Northern Italy, a disposition to throw off the Austrian yoke was manifest. In Switzerland, the radical party had triumphed, and in France the signs of the approaching storm were visible. Metternich was embarrassed by the state of the finances in Austria, brought about by mismanagement. It was well known that the bank was in intimate connection with the state, and made advances to it in case of financial *embarrassment*. But the state of its affairs was un

known, and the people, mistrusting it, turned their notes into silver. In Hungary and Bohemia these notes were no longer taken.

Trade was stagnant, and without any assignable cause. These circumstances determined the conservative deputies of the county of Raab, on the 4th of March, to put a question in the Hungarian diet with reference to the relations of the bank. The news of the Paris revolution, which reached Pressburg on the 2d of March, had thrown every one into a state of feverish excitement. On that occasion, Kossuth made an eloquent speech, in which he boldly expressed himself in reference to the relations existing between Austria and Hungary, as follows:—

“Mighty thrones, supported by political sagacity and power, have been overthrown, and nations have fought for and won their liberty, who three months ago could not have dreamt of the proximity of such an event. But for three whole months we are compelled to roll the stone of Sisyphus incessantly and without avail; and my mind, I confess, is clouded with almost the grief of despair, at witnessing the languid progress which the cause of my country has made. I see with sorrow so much power, so true and noble a will toiling at this ungrateful and unrequited task. Yes, honourable deputies, the curse of a stifling vapour weighs upon us,—a pestilential air sweeps over our country from the charnel-house of the Viennese council of state, enervating our power, and exerting a deadening effect upon our national spirit. But while hitherto my anxiety has been caused by seeing the development of the resources of Hungary checked by this *blighting influence*, to the incalculable injury of my country,—by seeing the constitutional progress of the

nation unsecured, and that the antagonism which has existed for three centuries between the absolutist government of Vienna and the constitutional tendency of the Hungarian nation has not up to this day been reconciled, nor ever can be reconciled, without the abandonment of either the one or the other,—my apprehension at the present time is increased by other causes, and a fear weighs upon my mind, lest this bureaucratic system, this policy of fixedness, which has grown to be part and parcel of the Viennese council of state, should lead to a dissolution of the monarchy, compromise the existence of our dynasty, and entail upon our country, which requires all her power and resources for her own internal affairs, heavy sacrifices and interminable evils.

“Such is the view I take of present affairs, and regarding them in this light, I deem it my urgent duty to call upon this honourable assembly seriously to direct its attention to the subject, and to devise means of averting the danger which threatens our country. We, to whom the nation has intrusted her present protection and her future security, cannot and dare not stand idly by and shut our eyes upon events and their consequences, until our country is gradually deluged by a flood of evil. To prevent the evil is the task to which we are called; and satisfied I am, that if we neglect our duty, we shall be responsible for the ill that may result from our neglect, in the sight of God, before the world, and to our own consciences. If, persisting in a perverse policy, we allow the opportunity for effecting a peaceable settlement to pass, and neglect to make the free and loyal sentiments of the representatives of this nation heard, we may repent *it when the die has been irrevocably cast, when the*

embarrassment has proceeded so far as to leave us only the choice between an unconditional refusal, or sacrifices which no one can calculate; but repentance will then come too late, and the favourable moment, which was allowed to pass in listless inaction, will be gone for ever. As a deputy of this assembly, I for one will have no share in this responsibility, although, as a citizen of our country, I may be obliged to participate in the consequences of a tardy repentance."

The bold orator then moved an "Address to his majesty," setting forth what the country expected of the government, and the abuses which the diet proposed to reform. In that address, we find the following passage, which goes to prove that the Hungarian rebellion was not a movement for the assertion of the power of an oligarchy, but for an extension of liberty to the people:—

"One of the most important of our tasks is to alleviate the burdens of the peasantry in being called upon to quarter and provide for the soldiery. It is our belief that the political and administrative reform of the municipalities of the towns and the districts cannot longer be postponed, and we are likewise of opinion that the time has arrived when a larger extension of political rights ought to be granted to the people. The country has a right to expect measures to be carried out for raising our industrial resources, our commerce, and our agriculture. At the same time, the spirit of our constitution requires free development under a true representative system, and the intellectual interests of the nation likewise demand support based upon freedom. Our military institutions *require a thorough* reform, corresponding to the *character of the nation*, and the collective interests of the

different classes of its inhabitants,—a reform, the urgency of which is pressed upon us both by a regard to your majesty's throne and the safety of our country. We cannot longer consent to a postponement of the constitutional application of the state revenues of Hungary, and the rendering an exact account of the revenue and expenditure; for without this information we can neither fulfil the duties which the constitution imposes upon us, of maintaining the splendour of your majesty's throne, nor meet the necessities of our country."

The impression which Kossuth's speech produced was overwhelming. Even the most determined partisans of the government—men like Barbarczy and Somssich—did not venture to come forward in its support. The address was carried unanimously. Every man felt assured that Hungary was on the eve of great events, and that this speech must be followed either by a dissolution of the diet or the overthrow of the Chancellor Apponyi and his system. In Vienna the speech produced much excitement, and throughout the provinces encouragement was given for petitions for an extension of political rights.

The future policy of Austria was grave matter for discussion in the imperial family. The emperor, a good-natured, but imbecile monarch, had no voice in the decision. The Archduke Francis Charles, who was under the control of the Archduchess Sophia, and Archduke Stephen, the Palatine of Hungary, who was summoned from Pressburg to Vienna, were in favour of concessions; while Archduke Louis and Prince Metternich advocated repression. In the opinion of the latter, the diet at Pressburg ought to be dissolved, and *all assemblages of the people put down by military force.*

A great movement was resolved upon by the people of Vienna. The burghers were to go in a body to the House of Representatives, and state their demand to the committee of deputies assembled there, for the freedom of the press, religious liberty, freedom of education, trial by jury, and a constitutional government. The students of the university were to head the procession, and to speak for the rest. These arrangements were no secret; Metternich knew them as well as any of the students. In an evening party, the prince was asked what truth there was in the general rumour of an expected revolution on the 18th. The prince quietly replied, "You are wrongly informed,—it is to take place on the 13th." On the evening of the 12th, a lady asked Metternich whether there was no danger to be apprehended on the morrow. Metternich replied that there would probably be great crowds of people, but that all necessary measures had been taken to render any danger impossible.

On the 12th, the students sent their petition to the committee of representatives. On the 13th, they repaired in a body from the university to the house of assembly, followed by the burghers, men, women, and children, all dressed in their Sunday clothes, as if going to a festival. While awaiting the formal reply of the committee in front of the house of assembly, several of the students addressed the people in the Herrngasse. Count Montecuculi—the same man who afterward, as minister without a portfolio, had the task of pacifying Italy—appeared at a window, and exhorted the multitude to maintain peace.

The students now sent a deputation from their body *to the assembly*, to express the wishes of the people. *They were admitted.* The people waited for half an

hour, during which time Kossuth's speech was read aloud by one of the students amid loud acclamations. On a sudden, the rumour spread, "The deputation are detained prisoners!" The multitude immediately rushed upon the house of assembly, the doors were burst open, the furniture and seats were shivered to atoms. The soldiers on guard there, for the maintenance of order, fired upon the people, by command of the Archduke Albrecht; some persons were killed, others wounded. But the citizens did not disperse,—the firing only heightened their enthusiasm. A wounded man was lifted upon a horse, and led bleeding through the streets of Vienna. The shops were closed, and the whole city streamed forth in the direction of the Burg. Here cannon were posted; the cannoneers stood beside their guns with lighted fuses. One of the archdukes, who was present in undress, on seeing the immense press of people, gave the command to fire; but the cannoneer, who did not recognise the archduke, and, according to the regulations, could only receive orders from the officer next above him, naturally refused to obey. This was decisive for the court.

At the commencement of the tumult, the deputation of the diet had gone to the court, and petitioned for a constitution; later, a second deputation appeared, sent by the civic militia, a body on whom the government placed implicit reliance, as it consisted principally of the shopkeepers and merchants of the inner city. On a sudden came the news that the troops refused to obey orders! The court, in consternation and alarm, yielded, and promised freedom of the press and a constitution. Only a quarter of an hour before, it had *been resolved to place Vienna in a state of siege, and*

intrust the command to Prince Windischgratz : the proclamation had already been sent to the government printing-office, with orders to be placarded at the corners of the streets ; it was now withdrawn. The same panic which had seized on the French court on the 24th of February, palsied the resolution of the court in Vienna on the 18th of March. One of the deputation demanded the dismissal of Metternich, and this too was granted. The prince immediately gave in his resignation, admitting that his powers were inadequate to the crisis. In anxiety to save his life, which was never threatened, he instantly fled, and did not feel secure until he set foot on the soil of England.

The most unbounded rejoicings followed when the decision of the court was made publicly known ; the city was illuminated, the picture of the emperor borne about in triumph ; an intoxication of delight seized on the people,—they embraced one another in the streets ; there was not a thought of revenge,—the victory of the middle classes had been cheaply won, and the blood that had been shed was forgotten.

But while the inhabitants of the inner city were giving themselves up to an intoxication of delight at the grant of a constitution, scenes occurred in the faubourgs which showed that there was another class in Vienna who were not to be satisfied with the promise of one. Freedom of the press and education, a constitution, and trial by jury, were matters of which they understood nothing. Trained in ignorance under the system of Metternich, their wants and wishes now turned in another direction, and petitions were not the means by which they sought their accomplishment. *This class of men were the workmen in the manufactories, who, on hearing that their masters in the city*

Were endeavouring to obtain freedom, set to work in a more summary way, and themselves took the freedom they required without asking for it; the first and foremost sacrifice to their fury was the bars at which the tolls were taken; these were destroyed, the toll-houses burnt, and the collectors knocked down or murdered. The workmen then attacked and pulled down some of the manufactories, destroying the machinery, which, as they fancied, superseded their hand-labour and was the cause of their low wages. These mad acts of wanton violence and barbarity were a sign of warning amid the general rejoicing. They exposed to view the neglected moral condition of the people, who, destitute of education, were easily hurried into the commission of crime, when the authority of the law was undermined and disregarded.

Kossuth's speech received in Pesth the same enthusiastic echo as in Vienna. The young men in Pesth were carried away more forcibly by the ideas of time. The Opposition Club resolved that a general assembly of the people should be held on the 12th of March, to embody in petition their wishes. Paul Nyary, however, the high sheriff of the county of Pesth, and Gabriel Klauzal, one of the most eloquent members of the opposition in the diet, who had not been returned in the last election of deputies for his county, happened to be at this time in Pesth. They considered it inadvisable to embarrass the diet, in its present difficult position, with petitions from large public meetings; their eloquence and influence prevailed, and these petitions were dropped. The young men had drawn up the following circular:—

“The whole of Europe is in movement. The times have made a sudden advance of half a century. Euro

is convulsed by one great idea, a conviction that the present state of things cannot continue. The circumstances of the times do not admit of protracted deliberation or the postponement of negotiations. The ideas are ripe, and the necessities of the time require their realization. The present moments are precious to Hungary; matters which at another time might be left to gradual development, must now become law without delay. Arms are not sufficient to meet the dangers which threaten the monarchy; the only effectual means are the further recognition of constitutional principles, and the introduction of these among all the people with whom we are allied by the Pragmatic Sanction. The nation is no longer satisfied with single concessions; it cannot wait for a tardy development. We must declare the wants of the Hungarian nation: it requires—

1. Freedom of the press, and the abolition of the censorship.
2. A responsible ministry in Pesth.
3. An annual assembly of the diet in Pesth.
4. Equality before the law in all civil and religious matters.
5. A national guard.
6. Equality of taxation.
7. Abolition of the Robot system.
8. Trial by jury.
9. A national bank.
10. The army to be sworn to the constitution: the Hungarian soldiers not to be sent abroad, nor foreign soldiers brought into Hungary.
11. All state prisoners for political offences to be *set at liberty*.
12. *Transylvania* to be united with Hungary.

"We are convinced," concluded the circular, "that in these demands we express the wishes of all the friends of the constitution, the country, and the dynasty. We are ready to do all in our power to carry out these measures, and we urge upon you to forward as much as possible their realization in the diet, to the advantage and glory of our country."

Klauzal and Nyary prevented the publication of this circular, showing that it was inadequate to the requirements of the present times. On the 14th of March, the proposition was a second time brought forward in the Opposition Club; but the majority resolved that the petition should be sent to the members of the opposition in the diet, and that measures should be organized to support these demands.

Scarcely, however, had the members of the club separated, than a movement of another kind commenced on the banks of the Danube. The steamboat had arrived from Vienna, bringing the news of the revolution which had broken out in that city, and of the concessions which had been granted to the Viennese; it was reported that a constitution had been given to the Austrians, and that the censorship of the press no longer existed in Vienna. This news spread electrically; the young men all considered it a point of honour not to remain behind the Viennese. Klauzal and Nyary had indeed persuaded, but not convinced them, that respect for the law was the best guarantee of success: on every side was heard the cry, "The opportunity must not escape—we must not be stopped by points of form."

The following morning all the leaders of the young men met, joined by the students of the university;

they went down the Herrngasse and up the Hatvan-street in a long procession, the people following; the crowd increased like an avalanche, until at eleven o'clock they stopped in front of Landerer's printing-office.

Here they demanded that the petition embodying the twelve points of reform, and an improvised poem by Petöffy, a poet who had put himself at the head of these youths, should be printed without the "Impri-matur" of the censor of the press. The cunning printer retained his presence of mind; he sought to secure his own safety, happen what might, and said, "If you compel me, I must do it, but not else; the penalty for printing any thing which has not passed the censorship is the loss of my printing-license." Petöffy and the young men merely asked in what way the compulsion should be administered. Landerer thought that by laying hands on the presses, this symbolic act of compulsion would be sufficient. The document was printed.

At this moment Klauzal and Nyary made their appearance. Afraid lest a breach of the peace should lead to a collision with the military, they hastened to the spot where the multitude were collected, and prevailed upon the people by the power of their eloquence to take no hasty or illegal steps, but deliver the petition, which had been printed, to the common council, with a request that it should be transmitted to the home office, as the legal jurisdiction; by this means the object of the people would be attained, and the legal forms observed. The procession now moved on to the town-hall, and on its way Petöffy's verses were *recited aloud*.

Arise, Hungarians! hear your country's call!

The hour is come,—the hour to do or die.

Freemen to stand, or freemen still to fall—

Say, will you fight for Hungary's liberty?

By the great God of Hungary we swear,

The yoke of slaves we will no longer wear!

Our fathers' prayer for freedom was denied,

Hopeless they bore the base reproach of slaves;

For freedom lived they, and for freedom died,—

Their memory calls for freedom from their graves.

By the great God of Hungary we swear,

The yoke of slaves we will no longer bear!

Gleams not the sword more brightly than the chain,

A nobler ornament to deck the hand?

We've borne our shame—shall Freedom call in vain

To unsheathe the sword, and save our fatherland!

By the great God of Hungary we swear,

The yoke of slaves we will no longer bear!

Again shall Hungary claim her ancient fame,

Once more arise a nation proud and free—

Blot out her shame, and vindicate her name,

Land of the free—the home of Liberty!

By the great God of Hungary we swear,

The yoke of slaves we will no longer bear!

Upon our graves shall dawn a brighter sun,

Our children rise to bless their natal earth;

Here shall they kneel, and, when our course is run,

Bless the fair land that gave them a free birth.

By the great God of Hungary we swear,

The yoke of slaves we will no longer bear!

Every time the chorus of the song was repeated, ten thousand hands were uplifted, and as many voices echoed the oath. Notwithstanding the pouring rain, the people's enthusiasm was at its height; nevertheless no disorder prevailed, not an unbecoming word was *spoken*, no one bore any kind of arms; it was eviden

that this demonstration proceeded from no street mob, but from the educated classes of the people.

At three o'clock in the afternoon the common council and the electors received the petition; they all subscribed it, appointed a committee of fourteen principal citizens to preserve peace and order in a time of such excitement, and sent a deputation to the home office at Buda to demand the abolition of the censorship (which had never been legally established) in the same manner, by proclamation, in which it had been introduced; to demand further, that the state prisoner, Michael Stancsics, who was in confinement out of the country on account of the publication of a book, should be set at liberty; and to require an assurance that the troops should be restrained from interfering unless at the invitation of the civil authorities.

The deputation, headed by the Vice-burgomaster Rottenbiller, the High-sheriff Nyary, and Klauzal, crossed the bridge of boats to Buda, followed by the whole population of Pesth, who, as the rain continued to pour in torrents, all put up umbrellas. In the fortress on the hill above, the members of the home office were holding their sitting in the hall of assembly; they were not aware of what was going on in Pesth, when suddenly some one pointed out to them the shore of the Danube and the bridge of boats covered with umbrellas; no one, however, knew what was under these umbrellas. The council were no heroes; they awaited their fate in fear and trembling. At last, Nyary, Rottenbiller, Klauzal, and several other members of the deputation appeared in the hall, while the multitude could hardly find room in the fortress of Buda.

The fears of the council were soon quieted by the

peaceable appearance of the people, and they expressed their readiness to do all that was required of them. In order that the forms should in no degree be violated, the president of the council, by the advice of Nyary and Klauzal, declared the censorship abolished; but a law for the press had at the same time to be provisionally issued, in order to guard against the occurrence of any acts of unbridled lawlessness. Nyary and Klauzal immediately drew up such a project of law, and within the same quarter of an hour in which the censorship was abolished, the provisional law for the press was also published. With regard to Stancsics, it was declared, on the ground that he was confined in a military prison contrary to law, that he should be immediately liberated. An assurance was also given, that the troops should never be employed unless at the call of the civil authorities. The demands of the people were fulfilled. Evening had closed in before the negotiations with the home office were concluded; the rain had ceased, and with singing and acclamation the multitude returned by torchlight to Pesth. A splendid illumination of the city concluded the day.

All were content with the result, excepting only a few young men, who coveted the glory of heading a revolution; instead of which, in consequence of the intervention of Nyary and Klauzal, no illegal step of any kind had been set, and even the forms of law were strictly respected. But these youths were far more dissatisfied, when, three days afterward, they learned that the diet in Pressburg had, before hearing of the movement at Pesth, already obtained a responsible ministry. The Pesth "Umbrella Revolution," as it

was called, was now thrown into the background, and passed unnoticed in Pressburg.

On the 18th of March, Count Louis Batthyanyi was intrusted with the formation of an Hungarian ministry; and on the 18th of April, the ministry and the archduke returned from Vienna to Pressburg. During this time of intense excitement, law and order were not dethroned. On the 19th of March, the deputation from Pesth appeared at the bar of the house at Pressburg, and Paul Hajnik presented the petition in a neat and dignified speech. Kossuth replied to the petitioners:—

“At this moment, if ever, I would that God had gifted me with a voice that might answer to my joy— [Kossuth was suffering at the time from hoarseness]—and give utterance to my rapture, at the tidings I have just received,—the news that Austria possesses a responsible ministry. Our friends and kindred in Pesth and Buda may moreover rest assured, that we are at this very time engaged on objects corresponding to the demands of this petition, several points in which, —such as the equalization of taxation, the abolition of the system of Robot,—have already been decided, while on other points the preliminary steps have been instituted. The petition is therefore handed to the petition-committee, who will express their opinion upon its contents.”

Kossuth further remarked, that he had been informed, that the people of Pesth and Buda anxiously desired that the diet should as speedily as possible return to Pesth, the heart of the country:—“Assuredly this would afford the highest satisfaction to the diet. *But the honourable estates have declared that, amidst such grave circumstances, the present session could*

not extend their attention to the details of every question of reform; and that the session, as soon as the most important questions are decided, must be closed, in order to give place to the representatives of the whole nation. The existence of this diet can therefore naturally be prolonged only a few days. The diet is fully impressed with the importance of the session, and they hold sittings from early in the morning till late at night, in order to bring to a conclusion all affairs of importance. Under such circumstances the diet cannot occupy the short time that remains in removing its place of assembly, which would require as much time as the whole business they have to transact demands. The representatives of the people will, however, soon assemble in Pesth. But now that the functions of this diet are limited, it naturally follows that it cannot enter into any points of detail respecting the legislative code. In reference, however, to the petition of the university, an assurance of reform lies in the fact of Hungary possessing for the future an independent ministry of education. The minister will prepare the necessary projects of law, and lay them before the next ensuing diet."

Count Szechenyi, who presided at this sitting, exhorted the deputation to harmony. The Pesth citizens went away amidst loud eljens. The newspapers spread the report of these remarkable scenes over the whole country, and a belief everywhere prevailed that the diet had declared against all violent measures, and was strong enough at the same time to carry out its determinations.

The Hungarian ministry consisted of the following distinguished personages:—

Count Louis Batthyanyi, President of the Ministry.

Since the diet before the last he had been the leader of the opposition in the table of magnates, and in close intimacy with Kossuth on all occasions when a question arose of inserting any additional guarantees of the rights of man into the ancient constitution.

Prince Paul Esterhazy, a man who for a long series of years had represented the Austrian government at the court of St. James; celebrated for his colossal wealth, the elegance of his manners, and his connection with the first nobles of the monarchy,—less so for his diplomatic talents and attachment to Hungary, for which country he now for the first time manifested an active interest. He was the representative of Hungary at the court of the king, and only in this character could he be regarded as Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Bertalan Szemere filled the station of Home Minister. With a natural persevering boldness and patriotism, he remained at his difficult post after most of his earlier colleagues, trembling at the extreme consequences of the revolution, had drawn back. As an Hungarian, high-minded and self-sacrificing—as a speaker, enjoying a great reputation; but still more remarkable for his learning and acquirements; his political spirit, however, did not stretch beyond the horizon of his native country.

Francis Deak and Joseph Eotvos, Ministers of Justice and Public Instruction, both well known from former sessions of the diet, honoured and idolized: poets and preachers of general peace and happiness, endowed with a noble nature, and embracing in their hearts a love for the whole world, with its joys and sorrows,—apostles of morality and freedom, and ready *to have purchased these blessings for mankind at large with their own hearts' blood.* They were also excellent

parliamentary speakers, deep thinkers, and men of considerable influence, but not formed to throw themselves into the present struggle for the realization of their own ideals.

Louis Kossuth—Minister of Finance.

Lazarus Meszaros, Minister of War,—a thorough-going Magyar, conscientious, diligent, possessing no strategical genius, but a certain talent for organizing, which, combined with his natural activity, rendered valuable services to his country.

Gabriel Klauzal, Minister of Trade,—a sharp dialectician and clear thinker ; as a speaker full of feeling, at times bordering on sentimentality. An Hungarian liberal.

Count Stephen Szechenyi, Minister of Agriculture and Communication ; a man of genuine philanthropy, deeply versed in many branches of knowledge, of liberal views, with an aristocratical background, and indefatigable activity even amidst party animosities. Of unlimited self-devotion, enthusiastic patriotism, —loving his country above every other object, unto death, nay even to the night of madness, which assigned to him a cell next that of the unhappy Lenau. With the exception of Prince Esterhazy, whose appointment must be regarded as a concession to the nobility and court, the members of the first Hungarian ministry were mentioned everywhere and with honour by the people. Kossuth was right when he said that Hungary had not to seek her statesmen at hazard among the masses.

CHAPTER III.

SERBIAN ATROCITIES—ASSEMBLY OF KARLOWICZ—JELLACHICH AND
THE COURT—DEMANDS OF THE CROATS—PROCEEDINGS OF THE
DIET AT PESTH—DEPUTATION TO THE EMPEROR.

THE Hungarian war may be considered as springing from the sanguinary scenes of the Backsa and the Serbian assembly at Karlowicz. The most obstinate struggles of that period took place in the Banat and on the Roman intrenchments. The Roman intrenchments of such ancient origin are situated in the county of Bacs, or Backsa, which, with the Tschalkist district, lies between the Danube and the Theiss, and stretch in a line many miles. They have been strengthened in every part by modern fortification. Isolated scenes of murder perpetrated by the Serbs against the Magyars and Germans who inhabit that district led the way to a series of sanguinary atrocities, almost without parallel. The commencement of hostilities is due to the Slav-Wallachian race. Old, long-restrained hate, combined with an innate thirst for blood, marked the rising of the South-Slavish races from the first as one of the bloodiest character, in which murder was both means and end. The Serbs delighted in torturing their victims, and displayed a knowledge of the fiendish means truly astounding. The Magyars and Germans retaliated with equal ferocity, stung by the desire for revenge. All was blood, horror, and desolation.

The assembly at Karlowicz, under the presidency

of the Patriarch Rajacic, first gave to the isolated pillaging incursions of the Serbs the character of a political rising. This popular assembly immediately assumed the importance of a national diet, and laid its demands before the Emperor of Austria. These were refused, and met with no support at court, because the court party did not at that time anticipate from this quarter any support against the power of the Magyars. It was not until the other South-Sclavish races protested sword in hand against the new Hungarian ministry, that a ray of favour fell upon the Patriarch Rajacic. Thenceforth the "rebels," and their long, bloody knives, were regarded as tools not wholly to be despised.

The policy of the Vienna cabinet toward the Magyars, artfully veiled by the proclamation of high-treason against the Croat agitator, and by the repeated declarations of neutrality made by the war minister, Count Latour, in the diet at Vienna, is now clearly exposed to the world. The principles which it followed may be summed up in a few words: ostensible friendship toward the Magyars, secret support of the South-Sclaves—official denial of any participation in the South-Sclavish rising, secret subsidies to Jellachich—apparent attempts at mediation, and at the same time active agitation to render any conciliation impossible.

As long as Jellachich felt assured that his proceedings were received at Inspruck with secret satisfaction, the conferences of the Archduke John and Count Batthyanyi were of course unsuccessful. The archduke was *perhaps* himself deceived,—Batthyanyi was *certainly* deceived; and that Jellachich was at the *same time* deceived, he may at the present day acknow-

ledge to himself with bitter mortification, if the remembrance of his original schemes has not been entirely effaced from his mind by court favour.

Jellachich's first appearance was such as to command respect. In Croatia there was no pillage, but there was equipment; there was no murdering—there was arming. The ban roused his fellow-countrymen to the war against the Hungarians, with the same irresistible eloquence as that which subsequently enabled Kossuth to perform such incredible exploits; he took the field for the independence of his nation with great talents for agitation and inflammatory enthusiasm. He entered the arena of the revolution with raised visor, in a spirit of self-reliance, of confidence in the power of his race, and—their right to revolt.

The question naturally arose, why the Croats should not enjoy privileges which the Hungarians had obtained without a struggle, and which the Italians on the field of battle and the Germans in their parliament were striving to acquire? No one who does not condemn all revolutions as indefensible can consider the Croat insurrection less justifiable than those in Italy and Poland. In fact, at its commencement Jellachich met with considerable sympathy both in and out of Austria, notwithstanding that Slavism had never enjoyed any great favour in Europe.

It excited the wonder no less of his friends than his enemies, that on the 19th of June Jellachich ventured to make his appearance before the court, despite the warning of his Agram friends, that he had rather to expect a dungeon in Kufstein than a favourable reception at Inspruck. It appeared unaccountable *that he should venture to confront his judges, accompanied by a few faithful followers, and that a man*

declared guilty of high-treason could appear at court with more safety than his accusers.

As soon, however, as the truth began to peep out, that the Austrian cabinet, which had never sided with the cause of popular freedom, was actually in alliance with Jellachich, he was at once looked upon as the conscious or unconscious tool of a higher purpose—an object either of pity or contempt. The policy of the ministry was suspected of an inclination to Slavism, and the Croat rising began to be regarded with all the odium attaching to a specifically dynastic movement.

The instinct of the people at large detected the truth more readily than the moderate party in the Viennese chamber, which, partly siding with the Czechish right, supported the Wessenberg ministry. Nevertheless, the court did not as yet deem it advisable openly to declare its schemes against the Hungarians. They feared the public feeling in Vienna, distrusted the power of the South-Slaves, and had enough to occupy their attention in Italy.

Hence it was that the Croat deputies were never received in that capacity by the Emperor Ferdinand. They had an audience as private individuals, and in the petition which they presented the following points are the most important:—

1. The creation of a government under the presidency of the ban, separate and responsible, with the exception of matters relating to finance and war, which should be reserved to the ministry at Vienna.

2. The subjection of the military frontier to this government. Appointment of the Slavish tongue as the official language.

3. The *de facto* union of Dalmatia with Slavonia and Croatia.

4. The appointment of all judicial and administrative officers by the ban.

The emperor's reply, which he read upon the spot to the Croat deputies, was as follows:—"Declaring as I do the public assembly of the 5th of June, convened without my consent, to be invalid, I cannot receive you as deputies. I must at the same time express my displeasure at your efforts directed against my Hungarian crown, to which Croatia has belonged for eight centuries. I am firmly resolved to maintain this bond indissoluble, and I am the more desirous that a good understanding should prevail in these countries, as the valour of my subjects of the frontier deserves my full acknowledgment. My uncle, the Archduke John, has undertaken the mediation. You will prove your fidelity by contributing as much as possible to the establishment of such a good understanding."

This petition and the king's reply were communicated to the Hungarian ministry by Prince Esterhazy. The prince had several conferences with Jellachich. The ministry at Pesth declared that they desired nothing more than a peaceful settlement of affairs, and that the Croats had only to come forward in a constitutional manner in the national assembly, where they enjoyed equal rights, and all their reasonable desires would be satisfied.

But how could such proposals obtain a hearing, while Jellachich was at the same time secretly receiving the promise of Austrian support—a promise which led him to expect an easier attainment of his purposes than in the Hungarian diet, where at most he could *obtain only partial concessions from the majority of the Magyars?*

The commanders of the Austrian troops, who were stationed in the Serbian theatre of war, witnessed the barbarous proceedings for the most part passively; they had no instructions from the Vienna minister of war, and on the other hand could not decide how far they were responsible to the orders of the Hungarian government.

Wherever Hungarian commanders were at the head of Austrian troops, a check was put as much as possible to these disorders; but for many years past the Austrian regiments have been distributed in such a manner, that the smallest number of troops were employed within the limits of their native country.

Colonel-Kiss, the richest landed proprietor in the Banat, performed miracles of valour in the course of the summer of 1848 with a few squadrons of hussars. He fought on his own soil; he spared not his own villages and castles, whenever required to drive the enemy from any strong position, and himself gave up many of his finest estates a prey to the flames to achieve this object.

Colonel Blomberg and Major Count Esterhazy fought in the environs of Temesvar with alternate success. Sztanimirowics, who had been appointed by Rajacic political head-commissioner of the whole Wal-lacho-Illyrian frontier, fell into their hands, and perished on the gallows. Koics, the commander of the Serbs, lost a battle and his life at Werschetz. General Bechtold fought at Foldvar and on the Roman intrenchments, and kept in check the greatly superior forces of the enemy. Julius Blaskovics, the Vice-gespann of the Hevesch county, led three thousand national guards to battle, which were joined by *the guards from Lugos and Bogsan*; and they fought

together with the regular troops on the Francis Canal, until at last, from insubordination on the side of the guards, the latter fell out with the soldiery. In the battle at Werschetz, a place strongly fortified and commanding a most advantageous position, the artillery of the Arad national guards distinguished itself so nobly, that the Austrian officers were struck with admiration of its bravery and exploits. But the enemy held the strongest positions; they had ammunition and artillery in abundance; the frontier supplied them with troops and warlike stores, and the Magyars were obliged to exert all their power to restrict their enemy to the defensive. This they accomplished, but the losses they sustained in the conflict with the Serbs were frightful.

On the 30th of July the Archduke John, after a short stay, left Vienna, and went back to his post at Frankfort; and a fortnight afterwards the ban returned home. Thus the last negotiations for peace were broken off, and Jellachich did not see the metropolis again until he entered it with Prince Windischgratz.

During his three journeys to Vienna and Inspruck, Jellachich was in constant intercourse, personally and by letter, with the members of the imperial family. The secret favourable disposition of the court made amends to his vanity for having incurred the stigma of high-treason, with which he was publicly accused in the imperial proclamations: a squeeze of the hand by the archdukes fettered the free spirit of this highly-gifted man; he was the victim of court favour, as many a better man has been before.

While the Hungarian ministry were attempting the *last measures* of negotiation through Prince Esterhazy in Vienna, they were engaged in preparing Hungary

for the chance of extremities. During this period Kossuth delivered his most masterly speeches, in which the irresistible eloquence of the orator and the penetrating views of the statesman are equally wonderful. He at that time took a more correct view of the position of Austria and the rest of Europe than subsequently, when, isolated amidst a number of self-elected men, he was led to adopt many erroneous and fatal opinions. From his speech of the 11th of July, one of the most important he ever delivered, we extract the following passages, as illustrating his view of the politics of Europe :—

“No sooner had we (the ministers) entered upon office, than we opened a communication with the English government, and represented to them that Hungary had not, as many wished it to be believed, extorted rights and liberties from her king by a rebellion, but that we took our stand upon the same ground with our lord and king. We represented further to the English government, that the interests of their country and ours are identical upon the Lower Danube. The answer given by England was such as we might be led to expect from the liberal character of her policy, but at the same time from the sober regard to her own interests usually entertained by that nation. Of this, however, we may rest assured, that England will yield us her support so far as is consistent with her own interests.

“With respect to France, in spite of the general sympathy I entertain for all champions of freedom, I would not see the prospects of my country dependent upon her protection or her alliance. France has at this moment witnessed an 18th Brumaire; France *stands upon the threshold of a dictatorship.* Possible,

indeed, it is, that the world may see arise a second Washington, but not less possible a second Napoleon. Thus much, however, is clear, that France has taught us one great lesson,—the lesson that not every revolution is achieved in the service of freedom, and that a people is most in danger of bending under the yoke of tyranny when, in the struggle for liberty, they pass the strict limits of right. But, whatever form the relations of France may assume, let us not forget that France is far distant from Hungary. Poland leaned upon the sympathy of France,—she has still that sympathy, but Poland—is no more.

“With regard to Germany, I feel assured in my own mind of the truth of what I now assert. Gentlemen, the Hungarian nation is called upon to cherish mutual and friendly relations with the free German people, and in union with them to watch over the civilization of the German East. On this account, we deemed it one of our first duties, after Germany had by the assembly of the Frankfort parliament set the first step toward establishing her unity, to send two of our honourable fellow-countrymen immediately to Frankfort, where they were received with that consideration and respect which the representatives of Hungary have a right to claim.”

After sketching the position of affairs at home and abroad, Kossuth brought forward a motion to empower the government to raise the disposable war forces to two hundred thousand men, and to make an immediate levy of forty thousand troops. At the same time, he promised to lay before the house a detailed financial scheme, in the course of a few days, stating the means of raising the supplies required. Nyary was the first to raise his hand in token of

assent, exclaiming, "We grant it!" The other deputies, of all parties, followed his example; the enthusiasm of the assembly rendered any debate impossible and superfluous.

But Kossuth and his colleagues in the ministry were at this time not without opponents; it is a common error to imagine that in the House of Representatives at Pesth there was only one party, which in blind confidence in the ministry had become accustomed to yield a unanimous approval to their measures. Whoever reads the reports of the sessions will be convinced of the contrary. The majority of those men who a few months previously had formed the extreme left at Pressburg, represented in Pesth the ministerial fraction as the moderate centre. There was no right; the opposition consisted of a few dozen hot-headed men, with Madarasz and Perczel at their head. Kossuth had long been overborne by the clamour of this party, and his policy toward the court was as rashly condemned by Perczel as the conduct of the war against the Serbs under the ægis of the minister of war, Meszaros. Perczel everywhere fancied he detected treason, and gave ready and bold utterance to sentiments which the majority as yet refrained from avowing, in order not to render the breach with Vienna irrevocable.

Batthyanyi expected every thing from a final resolution of the emperor in favour of Hungary. Kossuth had less confidence in such an issue; still he wished by temporizing to gain time, in order to put the country in a state of defence; but Madarasz and Perczel would have at once embarked in a crusade against Austria. "The nation will rise as one man, and the rest will speedily follow,"—so reasoned Madarasz.

Against these hot-headed enthusiasts, who were hailed with the customary applause of the galleries, Kossuth had incessantly to contend, with arguments founded on policy and reason ; and in truth his was no easy task.

The Upper House had abandoned nearly all its influence. Many of those Hungarian magnates who by their position were bound to the court, and had sought to fly in time from the threatening storm, or had previously belonged to the ante-March Conservative party, kept away from Pesth, took long journeys, or awaited the issue of events on the romantic lakes of the Salzkammergut. Others, again, considered their presence in the diet useless, and longed to take the field, where they might be able to render more effectual service to their country.

These representatives brought forward a motion, that leave of absence should be granted to every member of the diet who felt inclined to exchange his place in the Upper House for the camp. The motion was powerfully supported by Beothy, Counts Andrassy, Palfy, Karolyi, Barons Vay, Wesselenyi, and Ujhazy ; and the number of members in the Upper House required to constitute a quorum was immediately reduced from fifty to thirty.

On this occasion the blind Wesselenyi delivered one of his noblest and most effective speeches, in which he exhorted to moderation and fresh attempts at negotiation : this was the last conciliatory speech of the grayheaded patriot.

Yet another attempt was made from Pesth to avert an open war, or at all events to obtain sure information as to the views of the court. A deputation, *consisting of one hundred and twenty representatives of the two houses*, with Pazmandy at their head, re-

paired to Vienna on September 6, (the emperor had already returned from Inspruck,) to lay at the foot of the throne the assurance of their fidelity, together with their complaints, their petitions, and their fears.

"The power that impels the movement," said Pazmandy in an audience of the emperor on the 8th of September, "which is now laying in ashes peaceable villages in the southern districts of Hungary, butchering innocent women and children in a more than barbarous manner, as well as the cause of that rising which threatens Hungary with a hostile invasion from the side of Croatia, can be no other than the reactionary attempt which aims at annihilating the lawful independence of Hungary and the freedom of the people, and violating the laws which the ancestors of your majesty and your majesty's self have sanctioned in the coronation oath. Upon the speedy decision of your majesty it depends to avert such incalculable dangers."

Pazmandy concluded his speech with these words. The Emperor Ferdinand answered, that it was at all times his firm resolve to uphold the laws, the rights, and the integrity of his Hungarian crown, in accordance with his royal oath, and that he would communicate his determination in the shortest possible time through the ministry.

With this unsatisfactory answer, which left every thing in doubt, Ferdinand dismissed the Hungarian deputation. It was the last which he received as emperor. The weak monarch imagined that he remained true to his oath, and satisfied his conscience, by voluntarily ceding his Hungarian crown to his nephew, who was personally bound by no promise and by no coronation oath. The Hungarians returned to *their own country* on the evening of the same day.

CHAPTER IV.

JELLACHICH AND HIS ARMY—PASSAGE OF THE DRAVE—MOGA—
BATTLE OF VELENTSE—JELLACHICH BEFORE VIENNA AND PRESS-
BURG—COUNCIL OF WAR.

By means of agents, Jellachich had spread alarm throughout the frontier, and at his summons Slavonia, Illyria, Croatia, and the military frontier, took up arms. Eighteen thousand regular troops, well provided with artillery and all warlike stores, assembled on the banks of the Drave; in the neighbourhood of Warasdin. These were joined by an army of thirty thousand peasants from the lower country, who were allured by the prospect of carrying off large booty from the rich land of Hungary, especially from Pesth. Of these peasants, the Seressans were by far the most formidable, from their spirit and cruelty. Their red uniforms were enough to sink the hearts of their foes, who dreaded them as they would dread tigers or hyenas. The Hungarians gave them no quarter. The common Croats were neither cruel by nature nor formidable on account of their valour. But they delighted in plunder, and would slay to reach a rich booty.

The frontier regiments formed the flower of the army with which Jellachich took the field, to detach the provinces of the south from the crown of St. Stephen. He held the command as Lieutenant-field-marshal, in the emperor's name: the majority of his *officers* were in the Austrian service; the cannon, *taken from the magazines* of the frontier, were served

by imperial artillerymen, and his cavalry consisted of the Banal hussars. Great exertions were used to raise and equip this army, whose achievements, however, make but a sorry figure in the annals of the war. As for the thirty thousand men who roved after the ban's army helter-skelter, most of them dispersed again before they had time to gain any knowledge of the world; those who remained with the army got accoutred by degrees, but were always a rapacious, worthless rabble, ready only to burn and pillage.

With this army Jellachich passed the Drave on the 9th of September, and entered upon the Hungarian soil. A man of such high cultivation of mind could not be stopped by the formality of a declaration of war,—that absurdity in the law of nations; he came with no avowed intention of detaching Croatia from the crown of Hungary, nor as an invading foe; he announced himself in the capacity of Imperial Lieutenant-fieldmarshal, come with the declared purpose of putting down the revolution in Hungary.

The fact, that up to this time there had been no trace of a revolution in Hungary, was not allowed to suggest any question or difficulty to enlightened minds; if a revolution had not taken place, one must at all hazards be provoked, in order to furnish a pretext at Vienna for interference. This task Jellachich took upon himself, like a well-trained dog, which is taught to set two bears on one another for the amusement of the spectators and the profit of his master.

Judging from his previous character and conduct, he was in the first instance a foolish enthusiast, and it was not until he had gone too far to retrace his step without wounding his vanity, that he threw himself unconditionally into the arms of Austria.

It may remain a riddle to many at the present day how the Croatian army succeeded in advancing from the Drave to the Danube and to Pressburg, and how it happened that at the commencement of the war the Magyars fought so unsuccessfully against their enemies, whom at a later period they mastered so completely. Were they not the same Serbs, Wallachs, and Croats who were afterward so thoroughly beaten whenever they encountered the Hungarians in the open field? and were they not the same Magyars?

With respect to the engagements with the Serbs, the nature of the country, which was in the highest degree unfavourable to the Hungarians, must be considered the main cause that rendered victory on the side of the Bacska so difficult. The sheltered positions, remarkably favoured both by nature and art, were capable of being successfully defended against even superior force, better organized and appointed than the Hungarian army at the commencement of the war. This important advantage was lost in the first engagements with Jellachich; nay, had the Hungarian wished to arrest the march of the enemy, they could easily have disputed his passage of the Drave.

But the first condition which Jellachich had stipulated at Vienna, in accepting a mediation, was, that the Hungarian ministry of war should withdraw their troops from the Croatian frontier. Batthyanyi, who readily listened to terms of peace which should no compromise the rights of Hungary, acceded to this demand, and the left bank of the Drave had in consequence remained unoccupied by the Hungarians notwithstanding that the Croat troops had meanwhile concentrated around Warasdin, and were actually on their march toward the frontier.

On the 11th of September, a few hours before the return of Pazmandy with the deputation, the news reached Pesth that the Ban of Croatia had passed the frontier river with his army, and entered Hungary as an avowed enemy.

The excitement both within and without the House of Representatives was great. On one point all were agreed, that the impudent invader should be repelled by force of arms; but the officers of the Hungarian army were not agreed among themselves. If when encountering the robber hordes of Serbs they found a difficulty in reconciling their feelings with their conscience, their duty to the royal and the imperial interests, this difficulty was now increased when called upon to face the Croat leader, who, armed with the sovereign powers of an imperial general, was entering Hungary at the head of Austrian regular troops under Austrian officers.

Any one even superficially acquainted with Metternich's policy, and who now sees—as the prince himself has done, and probably Count Stadion until the conviction drove him mad—that Austria can only be held together in her political aggregate by opposing her national elements to one another,—will not wonder that most of the appointments to the command of the Hungarian regiments were filled by non-Magyar officers. The same remark applies to the Italian and Polish troops. In the hussar regiments, especially, are found officers of all nations. The superiority of this magnificent cavalry has been time out of mind so universally acknowledged, that the noble and wealthy, who take pleasure in a soldier's life, eagerly seek admission into its ranks. Among these are found *Italians, Poles, French Legitimists, Germans from all the*

principalities, and not a few of the younger sons of the English nobility.

Many of these imperial officers at that time joined the cause of Hungary, for the butcheries perpetrated by the Serbs were such as to fill every honest soldier's heart with indignation: the struggle against the Serbs was righteous in the sight of God and man; for this bloodthirsty race had rushed into warfare notoriously from a mere thirst for spoil and plunder; and at that period there was no symptom of a national rising, which has something grand even in its excesses. But the struggle was moreover sanctioned by the laws of the country and the will of the king, with whose approbation the Hungarian regiments entered upon and maintained the contest.

Even at the time when Jellachich had the emperor's standard borne before the banner of Croatia, and when he and his Croats had already crossed the Drave, a large number of the imperial officers remained true to the Hungarian cause. Had not the emperor declared the ban guilty of high-treason?

That this sentence of high-treason merely masked the favour of the court—that Jellachich half unconsciously led his Croats to fight for the interest of this court—that the Vienna ministry of war rendered him every assistance, while they amused the Hungarian minister with proposals of conciliation—that in this manner Austrians were set against Austrians, in order the more successfully to oppose the Magyars by force of arms—that so cold-blooded a policy could be conceived and carried out in the burg of the “paternal” house of Hapsburg—were acts which, to the *honour of mankind* be it said, could not have been *anticipated* by the lieutenants in the army, while very

few of the generals had any certain knowledge of the truth.

Had it not been for this internal disunion, it may be doubted whether Jellachich, notwithstanding the superiority of his forces, would have succeeded in advancing as far as the county of Stuhlweissenburg. But the regiments under Moga were continually marching against the enemy, only to retreat again; projects were formed, to be rejected before they were put in execution, positions were taken up only to be abandoned, towns occupied only to be given up again, bridges constructed only to be destroyed. Not any battle of importance had yet been fought, when the alarming intelligence reached Pesth that the Croats were within one day's march of the metropolis.

. Moga held the chief command, a man grown gray in the service of the emperor. The excuse he made for his inactivity was, that he "had not yet found any spot for a battle." No spot large enough for a field of battle between the Drave and the Danube! The words are too rich not to be immortalized.

Meanwhile the landsturm, or general levy, had collected in the counties of Sumeg and Szlad, and swarmed around the Croats on all sides; for the Hungarian peasants were not, like their officers, perplexed by a divided allegiance, and they simply sought to strike the Croats dead. Similar risings were preparing in the counties of Wessprim, Weissenburg, and Pesth. The enemy was harassed incessantly day and night, and obliged to fight for every wagon-load of provisions. A considerable force was concentrated under Moga between Pesth and Stuhlweissenburg; *thousands of volunteers came flocking in from all sides; and as the enemy advanced toward the metropolis,*

the eagerness for battle increased in the Magyar ranks.

Between Stuhlweissenburg and Buda, about half a mile distant from the former town, is situated the village of Velentze, on the northern point of the lake of the same name. The Hungarians had taken up their positions between Velentze, Sukoro, Pakozd, as far as Martonvasar, Sept. 29; and here, amid vineyards which had scarcely put forth their earliest shoots, the first battle was fought, and Jellachich was defeated.

Had the Hungarians at that time possessed resolute leaders, the heroic career of Jellachich would have terminated at Velentze. The hussars besought their officers for permission to annihilate the treacherous enemy; the enthusiasm of the volunteers, after this first success, rose to the highest pitch; the landsturm were ready to cut off the enemy in their flight man by man. Jellachich begged for a truce of three days, which was generously granted him.

He now meditated an escape at any cost; for even without encountering the risk of a battle, he saw before him the destruction of his army. The Croats were beginning to suffer from want of provisions, the landsturm stopped all supplies from the south, and single bands of marauders were captured in the villages and destroyed. To escape from unconditional surrender, Jellachich *broke* the truce, and under shelter of night stole away with his army from the territory on which he had originally planned his operations, to gain the Upper Danube and the Austrian frontier, from whence he intended to slink back home along Styria. He abandoned to their fate his army of reserve, 9000 men strong, *who were taken prisoners by Perczel, together with their commanding generals, Roth and Philippovich.*

The pursuit of Jellachich was followed up tardily, and more in show than reality. The fugitive Croats reached Pressburg in the most miserable plight, and pillaging as they fled, in spite of the thousand bastinadoes which, according to his own statement, the ban distributed day after day. Here Jellachich received the first precise information of the Vienna October revolution, of Latour's murder, and the flight of the emperor.

Couriers from Count Auersperg, then commandant of Vienna, and from the court, who on their flight to Olmutz had received news of the retreat of the ban to Pressburg, brought Jellachich the invitation or command to join Auersperg's troops, in order to crush the revolution in the metropolis. This invitation could not have arrived at a better time; the ban's resolution was at once taken. He crossed the frontier of the archduchy, and encamped before the gates of Vienna; for, as imperial general, he followed the thunder of the cannon, and felt called upon to put down the anarchy in Vienna.

The idea was ingenious, it cannot be denied; nay, the Croat expedition exhibits a daring spirit of enterprise, and history will not dispute to Jellachich the fame of a bold agitator. More than this he was not; and it is questionable whether at the present day he would be able a second time to draw his countrymen from the quiet of their homes.

Jellachich has long lost the importance which attached to him as leader of the South-Sclavish movement. Cursed by the Hungarians, he is despised by the patriots of his own country; for, of all the promises he held out, and in consideration of which they followed him to the field of battle, he has fulfilled not

one—literally none. What a matter for congratulation to the Croats, that, instead of speaking Hungarian in the diets at Pesth, they will be allowed to speak German in the future Vienna parliament! In Pesth, although in a minority, they would always have possessed *some* weight; at Vienna—if indeed it comes to this—they will ever remain an insignificant band, unnoticed, if not despised, beside the Germans, Magyars, Italians, and Poles.

During the month of October, Jellachich's army lay before Vienna, encompassing the ill-fated city in a semicircle on the east. There was not much call for action; a fruitless cannonade morning and evening directed against the lines, from which the fire was usually opened,—the occasional butchering a stray student who fell into their hands, or setting fire to some neighbouring barn,—such exploits, together with alternate military exercises, and repose from the fatigues of the Hungarian campaign, filled up the time.

Jellachich deduced his authorization to enter the German-Austrian territory with Croat troops, and to lay siege to Vienna, from the same peculiar quickness of ear with which he had heard "the thunder of the cannon," and from the obligation imposed on him as imperial general to obey the commands of his sovereign. The validity of the latter reason must at all events be admitted in point of right; and if right was violated, the least share of the reproach falls to the ban. He was at liberty to exchange his position as an independent agitator for that of a submissive servant, and this liberty he exercised.

The last days of October came; the battle of Schwechat followed; Vienna fell; Jellachich at the head of a regiment of dragoons entered the metropolis, with



a dozen Seressans at his heels. Then came Windischgratz, and martial law, and the drum-head courts-martial, and the executions in the trenches of Vienna.

In the frightful scenes which were now preparing in the heart of the ill-fated city, Jellachich had no share. His Croats emulated the Bohemian riflemen in pillaging and murder, but these outrages Jellachich was unable to arrest, when the commander-in-chief made the martial law valid on one side only. History must likewise acquit him of the murderous acts which were subsequently committed by authority of the courts-martial—the imprisonments and persecutions which for months converted the gay and cheerful Vienna into a city of mourning and lamentation. Jellachich raised his voice against the mode of pacification adopted by Prince Windischgratz, but his remonstrance was unheeded.

It was in the last days of October—part of the Vienna faubourgs was already in the hands of the military, and there was no longer any doubt of the speedy surrender of the city—when Windischgratz summoned the generals of his army to a council of war at his head-quarters in Hetzendorf. He desired to hear their opinions on the measures to be adopted respecting the conquered city, to maintain future tranquillity. All the generals—whether from conviction, or a desire to please their lord and master—advocated the adoption of severe and merciless measures against the rebellious city. It was argued, that the utmost rigour of martial law, and especially the rigid maintenance of a state of siege, could alone quench the last spark of the revolution and atone for the past.

Two men alone in this military council advocated *mild and conciliatory* measures: these were the Italian

General Nobili and the Ban of Croatia. The former, a man of education and learning, who had all his life devoted much attention to philosophical studies, was, from his humane disposition, regarded by his companions in rank as a dreamer, an enthusiast, and consequently his opinion carried no weight. And Jellachich—he too was a dreamer, a poet, and a man of an unpractical mind.

The voice of humanity was overborne, its claims outweighed in the balance; the sword, shot, chain, and lash which the other officers cast into the scale turned the beam, and the fate of Vienna was decided.

CHAPTER V.

THE HUNGARIAN ARMY—BATTLE OF SCHWECHAT—MOGA AND GÖRGEY—OPENING OF THE WINTER CAMPAIGN—RETREAT—BOLNA AND MOOR—PERCZEL—REMOVAL OF THE GOVERNMENT TO DEBRECZIN—WINDISCHGRATZ AT PESTH—HARDSHIPS OF THE WINTER CAMPAIGN—WARLIKE PREPARATIONS IN DEBRECZIN.

FOR twenty successive days, the Viennese had repulsed every assault of the imperial troops. Along the whole extent of the lines of fortification, the heavy artillery played, with brief intermission, throughout the day; and when it grew dark, the ill-fated city was encompassed by a sea of fire, to which the surrounding timber-yards, barns, and villages fell a prey. The Hungarian army, encamped around Pressburg, up to the river Leytha, remained all this time inactive, in spite of repeated orders from the committee of defence to cross the frontier and advance to the relief of the metropolis. Moga contrived to excuse his dilatory tactics until, at last, Kossuth himself was despatched to inspect the position of the army and take some decisive step.

Kossuth had not been at Pressburg for seven months. In this city and its immediate environs were assembled all the forces that represented the main Hungarian army, that inspired the Viennese in their straitened position with so much hope, that embarrassed the Austrian diet, and cost the court at Olmutz many a sleepless night.

Two regiments of hussars, fourteen to fifteen thou-

sand regular troops of the line, together with a body of 20,000 untrained soldiers of the national guard and militia, about constituted the forces which had to try the fortune of war against the Austrians under Windischgratz and Jellachich.

The county of Komorn alone furnished 8000 of these militia, and Count Nadasdy, its hereditary Fo Ispan, (Lord Lieutenant,) himself led them to Pressburg. But we must not wrong the poor count: assuredly he was more led than leader. Any one acquainted with his previous conduct in the diets at Pressburg will naturally be surprised at the extraordinary change of circumstances which could render it possible for a Nadasdy to march at the head of a few thousand guards and scythemen against the residence of his king—the same Nadasdy, the same Don-Quixotte-looking figure, with his long face and hooked nose, who had been seated at the green table with the *Judex Curiaë*, a conservative of the first water, a muezzim who from the minaret of his elevated seat thrice a day called upon the faithful to maintain inviolate the Sures of the constitution (his Koran,)—a man in whose small brain-box there was but just room to lodge the articles of the Hungarian constitution, which lay there quietly side by side like the ten commandments inscribed on the parchment phylacteries of the Jews,—in a word, the most decided antagonist of Kossuth and the opposition, whose views appeared to him so chimerical that he never took the trouble to oppose them in the diet.

As Napoleon held that nothing in the world was impossible, so Kossuth would not allow that any thing came too late. In his opinion, a decisive act is always *in time*, and he adhered to this belief frequently when *it really was* too late. This was the case at the time

when the question arose of leading the Hungarian army across the Leytha. In Pesth he had urged the pursuit of Jellachich over the frontiers of the country, even at the risk of an open rupture with the imperial house; and on this point he agreed with the left in the diet, who considered a rupture with the dynasty as a *fait accompli*, and would no longer hear of terms.

All in the camp pressed eagerly forward to see the favourite of the nation, who was greeted with the loudest acclamations by the troops. The Hungarian regiments especially rejoiced at the thought of being led against the enemy; but their officers were more than ever doubtful and dissatisfied when they saw that Kossuth was resolved on their marching to Vienna.

Kossuth's reasoning prevailed in the council of war,—"it is not yet too late." If he was deceived, the fault partly rested with the deputies from the Viennese guards, legionaries, and clubs, who at the risk of their lives and in various disguises, appeared singly in the Hungarian camp, and represented the means of defence in Vienna in a greatly exaggerated light.

Had Moga followed in the track of the ban, ^{*Jellachich} and not have allowed him time to unite with Auersperg, and take up a position before the walls of Vienna, the result would have been placed beyond a doubt. The Hungarians would have marched to Vienna without encountering any material resistance, the diet and the people would have gained a better knowledge of their position and their power, the revolution would have assumed a new and imposing aspect, embracing the whole archduchy, Moravia, Galicia, and very probably Bohemia likewise; the struggle would have certainly commenced under different auspices, even if the result, *had been eventually the same, which is not probable.*

But the important opportunity was allowed to slip. The battle of Schwechat was a comedy, which at all events cost a great sacrifice of blood, and the responsibility of which rests on Kossuth's shoulders. The fault of that unfortunate event is laid to the charge of the Viennese, for having neglected to make a sally; but such reasons can only be used as a consolatory argument to the common soldier, to keep up his courage and confidence; in any other light the excuse is inadmissible. Windischgratz had forces enough assembled to have repelled any sally of a few thousand students and Mobile guards, which could only have been attended with a still greater sacrifice of human life, and no prospect of success.

The battle of Schwechat, regarded from any point of view, was a forlorn enterprise, which might have terminated fatally, had Jellachich possessed the skill to take advantage of his advantageous position. But he was too little of a general for this, and moreover under the orders of a Windischgratz, whom no one will any longer call a genius.

Moga exposed his troops in this engagement in an unpardonable manner; and the main body of the Magyar army would have been lost, had not the retreat been ordered in time. On this occasion the great talent of Kossuth displayed itself: with a keen penetration and discernment, possessed only by men of highly gifted natures, he detected among thousands the man worthy to take the future command of the army. It was Arthur Görgey who first directed Kossuth's attention to the faulty tactics of Moga.*

With the exception of the storming of the village

* Kossuth raised Görgey to the rank of general upon the field of battle, and invested him with the command the following day.



Görgey.

of Mannswarth, on which occasion the excellent Guyon won his first laurels, no military achievement of any importance occurred at the battle of Schwechat. The retreat of the national guards and militia was a shameful flight; the whole road to Pressburg was covered with shoes, which the fugitives had flung away; behind them marched the regular troops, in the best order, cursing the cowardice of their countrymen, "who were unworthy," said they, "for the Hungarian soil to bear them."

Moga was removed from the chief command by Kossuth, who acted in the name of the committee of national defence, and Görgey was invested with the rank of general. "The nation," wrote Kossuth to the House of Representatives, "has conferred on me the honour of its confidence in the direction of public affairs. May the nation likewise place confidence in a man whom I trust from the bottom of my heart, and whom I have found worthy to take the command of our army."

After the battle of Schwechat, Görgey held the chief command. The aged Moga presented himself voluntarily before the Austrian court-martial, and after an arrest of several months, during the continuance of the examination, he was sentenced to be deprived of his rank of an Austrian general, to lose his orders and titles, and to be imprisoned in a fortress for five years. On the morning of the 31st of October, Görgey was a colonel in the army,—on the 1st of November, he was general-in-chief of the Hungarian army of the Danube. Kossuth quitted the camp to return to Pesth.

Görgey allowed the inhabitants of the county of Komorn, who wished it, to return home; but those *who preferred to remain with the army were enlisted*

and armed. On the so-called Sauhaide, behind Pressburg, Slovacks were seen exercising in their köppe niks, (woollen cloaks,) Magyars in their bunda, (furred cloaks,) Jurats in their handsome attila, (laced coat,) students in their blouse, and burghers in very respectable-looking dress-coats,—in mingled, parti-coloured array. Meanwhile the main body of the regular troops kept watch along the Austrian frontier, to prevent any interruption of the practice of these recruits by the imperialists; and seldom a day passed without some skirmish or engagement taking place at the outposts. At the same time, throughout the entire district, in front and at the back of Pressburg, earth-walls were thrown up, bridges pulled down and new ones erected, footpaths stopped up, and ditches dug, as if the army intended to hold this position for the winter.

Affairs went on thus through the month of November. At length winter began to set in, snow fell, and Windischgratz set in motion his land armada. Early in November he broke up his quarters, and marched from Vienna toward the Hungarian frontier. The divisions of his army crossed it at different points, and the Hungarians everywhere retired. At Pressburg they carried off with them the bridge of boats, and doubtless the inhabitants were glad to get rid of them at such a price; they had always dreaded lest their city should become the theatre of murderous scenes, and they should be forced to act the part of heroes against their will. The Austrian white-jackets were therefore received with tears of dastardly emotion.

The Hungarian army marched past Pressburg. The *snow fell* in large flakes, the wind blew icy cold, and *the feet of the cavalry froze* in their stirrups. For

both parties, the campaign opened in no very agreeable manner. The soldiers could hardly see a hundred steps before them, so densely was the plain enveloped in a veil of snow and clouds. Encountering a few unimportant skirmishes on their route, the Hungarians came to Wieselburg, and marched thence to Raab. The fortifications were abandoned without a blow.

One division of the army passed the Danube at Komorn, and advanced to Waitzen; the other half continued its march along the right bank. Other divisions had retired previously by Oedenburg and Tyrnau. At Babolna and Moor the superior forces of the Austrians were victorious; in the latter place, especially, a battle was fought, in which the Hungarians suffered a heavy loss, notwithstanding the courage and resolution displayed by Perczel and his troops. This praise is due to Perczel on all occasions. He was not particular in the choice of his positions, and attacked the enemy or waited to be attacked as it might happen—a want of discretion for which he had to pay dearly in the Bacska; but he has on all occasions shown himself a brave soldier, and would have engaged an enemy in the middle of a morass.

The engagement at Moor is still involved in mystery. Perczel was not obliged to accept battle, for he had arrived at Kisber half a day earlier than Jellachich, and might quietly have continued his march to Buda. Perczel has been reproached by many for having fought merely in order not to turn his back on the hated Croats; nevertheless, others acquit him of the fault, and throw it wholly upon Görgey, who is said to have ordered Perczel to make a stand at Moor, where he might reckon on receiving succours from the *main army*. Perczel acted upon these orders, but the

succours did not arrive. This explanation, however, appears to be erroneous, considering the direction of the main army. There is still a third view of the question, entertained by many, which must be mentioned. Perczel is said to have received the order from Kossuth himself to arrest the enemy's march at any cost: "Every hour of delay is not too dearly purchased even with a defeat." The following is assigned as the reason for this order.

In the council of war at Pesth, it had been agreed to hold the frontier, and maintain possession of Pressburg: Görgey was not to retreat to Raab until this should be no longer impossible. He had clear and definite instructions on this point; but he did not act up to them on sound strategical grounds, and, in consequence, Pesth was afterward surrendered from absolute necessity.

On the 29th of December, the war minister, Meszaros, stated to the house that at an earlier period it had been the intention of the ministry to hold Pressburg and Raab; "but," he added, "the winter militates against us, as against the French in Russia in the year 1812. Raab, which is situated at the intersection of several roads and rivers, would have formed at any other time an excellent *point d'appui*, where we might have awaited the enemy, and defeated them, in spite of their superiority in number: at the present time the water affords us no protection, but on the contrary is so hard frozen as to form a safe passage for the Austrian cavalry and their heaviest artillery. It would, indeed, still be possible to give the Austrians battle in the outskirts of Pesth; but less would be *gained by this step* than many may be apt to believe: *regarded in the most favourable light, the country*

would be equally exposed to the enemy on all sides; and we should be stationed at Pesth, while a second Austrian army, under Count Schlik, might surround us on the north, pass the Theiss, and gain a footing in the heart of our country."

Meszaros then showed the advantages that would result from abandoning the metropolis, and transferring the government to the interior of the country. The passages of the Theiss could be defended with undoubted success; while a strong corps in the north would be able to keep in check the Austrians under Schlik. In the pure Magyar counties lay the power of Hungary; there were centred her chief resources—there her armies might be raised and trained—there would the Austrian find his grave.

It required all the weight of Kossuth's personal authority to quiet the left side of the chamber, who considered the abandonment of the metropolis as a disgrace to the Hungarian nation, and overwhelmed the minister of war with reproaches. Kossuth succeeded, and the removal of the diet to Debreczin, together with the plan of the winter campaign, were almost unanimously adopted. Szegedin and Grosswardein were also mentioned as places of retreat for the government, but the proposition was overruled.

It was further resolved to placard the result of this debate, but it is uncertain whether this was done: indeed, it was afterward asserted by merchants at Pesth, that the people had not the slightest anticipation of the near approach of the Austrians, until their first columns were actually descried on the march to Buda. Ludicrously enough, these merchants had gone at noon into the café of the Casino, close to the chain-bridge, and were engaged in reading a placard just

put out by Csanyi, entreating the citizens not to be anxious, as there was nothing to fear for the metropolis, when the advanced columns of the Austrian cavalry appeared on the other side of the bridge.

At the same time, the last column of the Hungarians marched off on the opposite side. Csanyi, it was asserted, had not left the city the next day, when Windischgratz and Jellachich made their solemn entrance. Kossuth was said to have laboured for three days and nights uninterruptedly, directing and superintending the removal of all the stores; and so little was he prepared for this retreat, that the devoted heroism of Perczel at Moor alone enabled him to carry off the banknote press from Pesth in perfect order. This was the reason, as many assert, that Perczel was ordered to arrest the progress of the enemy at any cost; and this was the cause of the battle at Moor, the issue of which is not surprising, when the numbers of the forces opposed to one another are taken into consideration.

It will ever remain a matter of astonishment, how such a multitude of stores and effects could be removed in the course of a few days: from the heaviest locomotive engine down to a simple shot-belt, all was packed up and carried away. Not a hobnail fit for use was left behind: and let the reader only consider the immense stores of ammunition and equipage which had been collected in the magazines of Buda-Pesth, first by the Austrians and afterward by the Hungarians. All the various descriptions of arms, down to their smallest pieces, which had first to be put together,—the stores of cloth, roughly cut up into pieces *to be made into uniforms*,—all had to be packed in *the best order, to be serviceable for future use*. More-

over, this had to be accomplished without much noise and bustle, which might have had the effect of exciting the people of Pesth to some mad pranks.

Such achievements Kossuth alone was capable of undertaking and carrying out. To Debreczin all these effects were safely transported, and in that town there was a general reassembling of friends. Some, however, remained behind, and among the rest Count Louis Batthyanyi, whose journey to attempt a conciliation with Prince Windischgratz is as well known as his unhappy fate. He fell a victim to the justice of his country's cause,—no less a victim to his trust in the justice of the Hapsburg dynasty.

Prince Windischgratz was now in possession of the metropolis of Hungary and the cradle of the revolution. Pesth presented a peaceful aspect. No trace of rebellion was to be seen. The prince and his officers must themselves have been surprised at having traversed such an extent of country, from Vienna to Pesth, with scarcely any opposition. Wherever he had hitherto appeared, his adversaries had retreated before him. Prague was prostrate at his feet, as soon as he announced his will and pleasure to the venerable royal city by his iron messengers: Vienna had been compelled to submit, notwithstanding the heroic bravery of her youths; and now the dreaded Magyars, avoiding any encounter with him, had quitted both their old and new metropolis, had abandoned to him without a blow the fair western portion of their country, and hidden themselves, like croaking, cowardly frogs, in the marshes of the Theiss, or like frightened chamois sought a refuge in the mountain fastnesses.

No wonder, therefore, if the vain prince overrated *his own talents*; more highly-gifted minds would per-

haps, under similar circumstances, have yielded to the same weakness, and Windischgratz is not a man of first-rate abilities. He even felt a regret that the Magyars had turned their backs so soon; a series of victories would have more flattered his vanity as commander, and shed a lustre on his marshal's baton; for the immense preparations made during the last few months must have appeared ridiculous when compared with their results. Most of his field-pieces had still a polished touch-hole, and his pontoons were unwetted by a drop of water when they reached the meadows at Buda.

Nevertheless, the march from Vienna had been a difficult one, and it was but right to allow his troops some rest. The winter had set in with unusual severity, and the army had suffered as much from the frost and snow as from the retreating enemy. Windischgratz thanked his brave troops, in an order of the day, for their courage and perseverance under all hardships; the victor without a battle modestly declared that with such an army victory was no glory to the leader. All Europe marvelled at the discipline of the Austrian army and the strategy of its general: all Europe were astonished at the Magyars, who, regardless of their ancient military glory, had hitherto tamely submitted to the reproach of cowardice.

It was no merit in the eyes of Europe that the newly-raised and undisciplined Hungarian troops had accomplished in perfect order the same arduous march as the Austrian army; for the hunted deer flying for its life will leap chasms, at which it would stop short when unpursued by the hounds. What is extolled as *courage in the huntsman*, is looked upon as the effort *of despair in the hunted*.



What was the Hungarian army at that time? who were these Honveds? how were they clad and armed, and what was their appearance? With the exception of the regular troops, mere striplings, in plain clothes, without a cloak or a glove, and almost without protection to their feet,—the thermometer standing at 16° to 18° below zero, (Reaumur,) and still lower in the night. Nevertheless, not a murmur or complaint was heard; no refractory or marauding spirit, springing from discontent, appeared; no stragglers, no desertion from fatigue and hardship. With feet half-frozen they marched over the wide plains of snow; and when disabled from pulling a trigger with their frost-bitten fingers, they trailed their muskets after them, marching on and on, ignorant how long a journey still lay before them ere they could rest for a few days.

It was not until they had gained the country beyond Pesth that they halted in their march. Between the Danube and the Theiss they found a resting-place, and a friendly reception in the villages. The surgeons were now actively busied in attending to the sick and wounded, and many a strong man was compelled to lose a limb from the effects of mortification. The ravages of the cold had occasioned sufferings which the surgeons have never since seen equalled. Still, many a poor fellow, who would have died in a camp-hospital, recovered the use of his limbs under the kind care and nursing of the women; and according to all accounts, the Austrians, notwithstanding their better and warmer clothing, suffered more from the effects of the cold than the barely-clad Hungarian troops. This circumstance may perhaps have mainly deterred the Austrian field-marshal from an immediate pursuit. *He had always been an inexorable discipli-*

narian, and in times of peace so strict, that at Prague (when military governor of Bohemia) he frequently jumped out of bed in the middle of the night, and with only his dressing-gown on, even in the depth of winter, ran from the commander's house to the barracks, two streets distant, to satisfy himself that all the men were, according to orders—snoring. But he felt all the care for his soldiers that a father does for his children, or a little girl for her dolls,—that is to say, in times of peace and at the commencement of a campaign, which had all the appearance of a field-exercise or review. At a later period, in this as in other matters, he lost his wits.

On his retreat from the Theiss to Pesth, Windisch-gratz paid no attention to the wounded, who were abandoned to their fate and the generosity of the Magyars: the wounded soldier was no longer of value in his eyes, and he left him upon the field as if already dead. His chief concern was to secure his artillery—the rest he left to Heaven and the Hungarian doctors. His soldiers have always complained bitterly of this inhumanity; and it often happened that many fell into the hands of the enemy, who in a few days would have been able to return to the ranks,—that many purposely remained behind when they might easily have followed their comrades, and that at the close of every engagement the loss was far greater than it would have been, had the general-in-chief paid due regard to his troops.

It was quite as little anticipated at Vienna as at Pesth that the war would still be protracted, that the rejoicings over the successful termination of the campaign were premature, or that the great and sanguinary drama was in preparation beyond the Theiss, the

last act of which was supposed to be already concluded. The very fact that such ignorance could possibly exist is not the least proof of the universal rising throughout the country, of the general enthusiasm, the greatness of the nation, the devoted patriotism of every man and—the want of skill in the Austrian general.

It seems almost incredible, that in Debreczin an army could be assembled by beat of drum, equipped, armed, accoutred, organized, provided with ammunition, artillery, and every requisite, without the Austrians gaining any certain information of what was in preparation beyond the Theiss. Was the town of Debreczin a *terra incognita*, isolated from the rest of the world? Did it lie in a mountainous region encircled by inaccessible rocks and hills? or was it embedded in subterranean hollows, attainable only by the practised foot of its inhabitants?

There lay Debreczin, a wretched-looking town, in the midst of a flat country, yet containing in its dirty streets, in its humble houses, all that was great in Hungary, all that was destined to make Hungary great. There are no walls and no gates; every one went in and out, the peasant with his *bunda* and the Jew with his pack, the swineherd, the cowherd, and the nobleman. An incessant hammering and labouring was going on; the shoemaker and the tailor were at work day and night, while on the plain all around military exercises and manœuvres were taking place, with muskets and pikes, cannon and rockets. Horses were driven in from every part of the country, to be trained for the cavalry service; quantities of metal were brought in, of which cannon were cast, firelocks forged, gun-barrels fabricated, gun-carriages built, *hussars' sabres* hammered. Saltpetre manufactories

and powder-mills were at work day and night; the casting of balls, saddlery-shops, manufactories of percussion-caps, all had just sprung up, and were still daily in progress. Everywhere the utmost zeal and diligence were manifested by the workmen, while Kossuth was the life and soul of the general activity, of which indistinct rumours only reached the enemy's camp.

Every day saw a new battalion ready for the field, which relieved another on the line of the Theiss, and was trained by service on the outposts for the approaching struggle. And yet the Austrian generals perceived nothing of these preparations!

Large consignments of goods for the clothing of the new battalions came pouring in from Vienna and Styria, from north and south; arms and leather were brought from Silesia and Galicia by adventurous speculators; and yet not a word of all this was betrayed to the enemy.

Windischgratz, it is true, paid his spies only five florins, when any came to his head-quarters—a short-sighted and niggardly policy, which was of great advantage to the Hungarians, and in the end cost the Austrian state treasury very dear; it is true that Debreczin lies in the heart of Hungary proper, and was guarded by the peasants for miles around; nevertheless it is an ennobling reflection for the Hungarian nation, indeed for the nation at large, that among so many thousands who must have been cognisant of the preparations going on in Debreczin, not one scoundrel was found to betray his country for the wages of sin. The brave peasants risked their lives day after day *in smuggling goods into Debreczin*,—an act proclaimed *capital by martial law*,—the women and children

assisted them under shelter of the night and fog ; not one turned traitor. Poor Jews brought in their packs whatever they could collect from far and near, but not a man betrayed the cause of Hungary. And this, be it remembered, when many a poor fellow might have earned far more by turning traitor than by the sale of the whole contents of his pack, and when many of them knew better the state of affairs than the richly-laced nobles who were lounging about in the streets of Debreczin. They carried away Hungarian banknotes, exchanged them for Austrian notes, and then stole to Vienna with these and changed them for gold ; and not a man abused the confidence placed in him. Honour to every peasant, to every woman and child,—honour to every Christian, Jew, and gipsy, who dwell in that land ! They performed unheard-of and astounding deeds, impelled solely by one great idea, that of freedom, of independence.

CHAPTER VI.

THE HUNGARIAN HEATH—THE HORSE OF THE PUSZTA—DEFEAT OF THE AUSTRIANS—GÖRGEY'S PASSAGE OF THE CARPATHIANS—SCHLIK—GÖRGEY'S CAMP—THE PASS OF BRANESKI—DESTRUCTION OF THE OTTINGER BRIGADE—RETREAT OF SCHLIK—CAPITULATION OF ESSEG—POSITION OF THE HUNGARIANS.

A FULL month had elapsed, and the head-quarters of the Austrian army were still at Buda. A court of flatterers, of all parties, surrounded the prince, extolling him as the greatest general of his time: the emperor called him the saviour of his crown: the members of the proud royal family vied with one another in expressing to the prince the acknowledgments of the house of Hapsburg in the most flattering terms, while he received decorations and complimentary letters from foreign potentates. Windischgratz, the descendant of Albrecht Wallenstein, fancied himself greater than his celebrated ancestor; at his side he had his Illos and Terczkys, but no Duchess of Sagan to shed a sunbeam of tenderness over the night of his gloomy life.

In the royal castle at Buda, he was like a child standing in the middle of a wide plain, gazing on the horizon, where the earth and the gray sky blend into one, and the world appears to terminate. He scarcely anticipated that the world of his enemies only commenced at that eastern frontier.

From Pesth to the Theiss, and stretching thence in *the direction of Debreczin and Grosswarden*, extends

the great Hungarian heath, interrupted by a few hills and large tracts of marshes. The Pesth merchant, who transports his goods to market at Debreczin, speaks with a kind of horror of the roads in this country, upon which he has himself more frequently to carry his own conveyance than to be carried in it, and where after a short period of rain the light Hungarian horse sinks hoof-deep in the bog, marsh, or sand, which in turn render the roads wellnigh impassable. Behind this level barrier the diet had retired from Pesth.

The prince was at this time very generally reproached for not advancing in the direction of the Theiss immediately after the occupation of the metropolis, in order to annihilate the enemy at a blow. Persons who reasoned thus could have known Hungary only on the map, and measured with the compasses the distance from Vienna to Pesth, and from Pesth to Debreczin, which would of course appear thus nearly equal. But if the march to Pesth was beset with difficulties in the depth of winter, that to Debreczin was almost impracticable, presenting all the obstacles and perils of interminable and half-frozen morasses.

It must not, however, be supposed that the natural features of the country presented the same obstacles to the opposed parties engaged in the war. The horse of the hussar is bred and reared in these parts of the country: in a free state he roams at large over the plains, until fit for training, when the Csikoses catch him at the risk of their lives, in order to break him in for the service of the army. As a cat knows every hole and corner in the house where she first saw the light, so the horse of the Puszta knows instinctively every road and path over marsh and moor; and a rider may safely, day or night, leave his steed to find

his own way. He does not, like the mule on the steep mountain-path, pick his steps slowly and cautiously, but he snorts and starts off, frolicksome yet sure in his speed, and combining the surefootedness of the mountain ass with his own native fire and spirit. The horses of the dragoons and cuirassiers may have other virtues of their own, but upon these open plains they are out of their element, like land-rats out at sea ; nor is their Bohemian or German rider by any means a trusty pilot. From this cause the heavy Austrian cavalry regiments have not unfrequently played the part of the pursued instead of the pursuer, when tempted to follow their harassing enemy over such country. For the same reason, likewise, the generals repeatedly complained of the want of light cavalry, which in the imperial army had from time immemorial consisted principally of hussars ; and the want was now more severely felt, as the Uhlans could never be safely trusted when opposed to Polish generals. The Magyars appeared and disappeared rapidly with their artillery, which was admirably masked by their light cavalry ; while the imperial artillery was frequently compelled to remain idle, notwithstanding its acknowledged excellence.

For some time, not only the metropolis, but Kossuth and the government were in entire ignorance of the route which Görgey had taken, although his army was the main support of the country threatened with such imminent peril. About four days after the entrance of the imperialists into Pesth, it was rumoured that Görgey had defeated the Austrians near Waitzen. The truth was as follows :—

On the night of the 4th of January, the last corps of Görgey's army, which had occupied the right bank

of the Danube, abandoned its position around Promontor and the defiles of the Buda Mountains, and crossed the frozen Danube below Old Buda, at Margaret Island, with a view to gain the road to Waitzen. The rear-guard had not yet come up, when the Austrian columns appeared before Buda. From Waitzen, Görgey marched to Ipoly-Sag, and there allowed his wearied troops some rest. The Austrian generalissimo rested at Buda, at the same time sending in advance strong cavalry detachments in all directions, to reconnoitre the enemy and secure Buda from a surprise. One of these detachments followed unawares in the very footsteps of the main Hungarian army, and came to Ipoly-Sag.

Near this place is a wooded height, on the summit of which are situated a chapel and a convent. At its foot extends a narrow ravine, separating the fenced convent-garden from the hill on which the chapel stands; and in this garden Görgey had posted a strong division of Honveds with some cannon. He ordered loopholes to be pierced in this boarded fence for his fusileers and artillerymen, and then had these holes pasted over so as to act as a blind screen.

The ravine was to serve as a trap for the imperialists, and the stratagem succeeded. Their pioneers passed the ravine, and not a sound betrayed the vicinity of the enemy; but no sooner had the chief detachment reached the middle of the defile, than the guns opened a fire upon them from the whole line of fence, and several hundred imperialists fell. Their vanguard was destroyed, and Görgey's rearguard under Benyicky, with their trophies of victory—a cannon and several hundred prisoners—followed the main body of the army, which was advancing by forced marches

in the direction of Kremnitz and Schemnitz. At this last town a bulletin issued by Prince Windischgratz announced the defeat of Görgey, with the loss of five hundred men and eight cannon.

Görgey's intention was now to spread his army, and by a combined mountain warfare to keep the whole force of the Austrians engaged; which would allow the other corps on the Theiss to gain time, and consolidate and organize their forces.

At this point commence the remarkable manoeuvres of this young general, which deserve to rank beside the boldest and most splendid achievements of any period in history. In the depth of a severe winter he led his troops and artillery over the Carpathians, one while appearing on the frontiers of Galicia, at another in the mountain towns and villages,—escaping, pursuing, or pursued. All this, moreover, without incurring any loss; nay, when in the following month he joined the other Hungarian corps on the Theiss, his army was more numerous and better equipped than when he started from the mountains of Old Buda; his officers and troops were better schooled and disciplined than any others in the army, and they followed their youthful leader, whom they idolized, with implicit confidence and devotion. No fewer than three divisions had followed in his track to annihilate him, and a fourth was ready to close the road into Galicia to his advance.

Nearly at the same time that Windischgratz despatched from Buda the main body of his army toward Szolnok, he sent about eight thousand men in the direction of the mountain towns, to pursue Görgey and *at the same time* to support Schlik. This corps pressed *on the rear* of the Hungarian army from the south,

but without coming up with it. The second Austrian corps, sent in pursuit, nearly sixteen thousand men strong, advanced from Tyrnau under Simunich and Götz, driving before it the brave Guyon, who with three thousand men halted at the latter town, gave battle to the Austrians, and came off with the loss of half his men. This corps was consequently advancing from the west.

At the same time that Windischgratz started from Vienna, Count Schlik set out from Galicia, intending to enter Hungary from the north. He had the command of from eight to ten thousand able troops, and is unquestionably the bravest and most skilful of the imperialist generals: his march across the Carpathians is no less remarkable than that of Görgey. These two generals were opponents worthy of one another, and their manœuvres form the most interesting military feature of the whole campaign.

As long as Schlik had to act against the excellent but unskilful Meszaros, he had an easy game to play; he defeated him at Barcza, deceived him by the simplest manœuvres, and advanced up to the right bank of the Theiss at Tokaj. Here, however, he found from experience, and at the cost of a battle, (at Talja,) that the command had been transferred from Meszaros to more skilful hands. It was Klapka who won the first real battle against Schlik, and against the Austrians generally—the same Klapka who fired the last shot against Austria, the most fortunate of the Hungarian generals.

Schlik now experienced one defeat after another; he was obliged to retreat to Kaschau, and halted at Eperies; while Görgey, pressed as he was on two sides, *was effecting his winter marches and countermarches*

over fields and mountains of ice and snow. He turned northward to Zips, his native county,* shut in on three sides; while Hammerstein in Galicia ordered all the disposable troops to the frontier to oppose his fourth and last exit.

Görgey was well aware of the desperate nature of his position; but only the more merriment prevailed in his camp; wherever he halted, he gave splendid balls to his officers, and treated them sumptuously. This was his invariable practice at critical periods: thus at Schemitz he commanded a ball, at the very moment when thousands were busy loading the coined and uncoined money upon wagons, while the miners were filling up the shafts, in order to deprive the enemy of any advantage from those rich mines, and while he was enlisting the miners themselves, nearly fifteen hundred men, as pioneers in his corps, which they entered joyfully. In like manner his officers were dancing at Iglo, and on the 5th of February (the birthday of their young general) at Leutschau, while Schlik at the head of seven thousand men was occupying the Pass of Branisko, with a view to obstruct the enemy's escape eastward.

The only road from Leutschau to Kaschau and Eperies leads through this defile, which winds among the mountains in a steep ascent of four leagues. The Austrians had barricaded the entrance of this defile in the ablest manner, and formed a position which

* Szemere, in his capacity of Hungarian government commissioner, rendered great services at this time. Unaided he organized five thousand guerilla troops, and contributed much to the success of Klapka's campaign against Schlik, by his indefatigable efforts and his influence with the population of the country; he had been at an earlier period Vice-gespann of the Borschod county.

four thousand men could defend for several days against a hundred thousand.

Görgey reached Iglo too late to take possession of this pass. His vanguard had been surprised two nights before, through the negligence of the outposts, and a great portion of his artillery was only saved by the most heroic valour of his troops. This train of guns was halting in the street of a village, when the Austrians unexpectedly attacked them: the rockets flew into the place, and would have destroyed the whole store of ammunition, together with the dwellings of the peasants and Honveds, had not the people run out at the risk of their lives, in a cold winter's night, some in their shirts, and covering the wagons with wet mats, dragged them to and fro, so as to protect the ammunition from the rockets, whose direction could be distinctly traced in the air. The enemy was repulsed, and Görgey's loss was trifling: his outposts were taught caution by experience, and the Austrians cannot boast of having surprised an Hungarian camp a second time.

We left Görgey in the midst of the ball. While the regimental bands were playing Hungarian airs and German waltzes, Guyon, at the command of the general-in-chief, was advancing at the head of eight thousand Honveds toward the Pass of Branisko. The country people around—Germans, like most of the inhabitants of the Zips, but everywhere with Magyar sympathies—conducted him by secret paths to the foot of the mountains which enclose the proper defile. Here Guyon ordered four of his battalions to lay down their arms; and for five whole hours they climbed up steep footpaths, known only to the natives of the country, carrying the dismantled cannon piecemeal on their

shoulders, or dragging them together with the necessary ammunition after them by ropes. From eight o'clock in the evening till one o'clock in the morning, this heroic band were winding up the steep mountain paths, making their way over rocks and snow-drifts, beset with incredible difficulties and hardships, in a cold winter's night; while the rest of the troops at the entrance of the pass were continually making feigned attacks, to divert the attention of the Austrians, and prevent the silence of the night betraying the movements of the troops engaged in the ascent.

It was past midnight when the first cannon-shot came thundering from the heights down into the dark valley. This was the signal for a general attack. Ten successive times did the troops stationed below advance to the assault, braving death, while from above the shot thundered into the depths of the ravine. The Austrians witnessed with terror and dismay the destruction in their ranks: they abandoned one intrenchment after another, fighting as they retreated, and in the utmost confusion attempted to gain the opposite outlet of the pass. A great portion of their artillery and a third part of the troops were lost in this retreat; the slaughter was unprecedented, and the next morning Görgey's vanguard passed through the defile, which Guyon and his brave troops had unclosed to them.

Schlik, who had considered Görgey as buried alive, drew his sabre in a fury, when a major brought him the news to Eperies of the defeat at Branisko. "Dogs that ye are—all of you dogs!" he exclaimed: "that pass I would have held against a hundred thousand men!" He instantly decamped from Eperies, to *escape Görgey's superior forces, and took the route to*

Kaschau. There he heard that Klapka was advancing, who since the battle of Talja had lost sight of him; and he was now fixed in the same position as Görgey had been in the very evening before. But Schlik was acquainted with the northern counties of Hungary, as well as his enemy, and by masterly manœuvres he succeeded in escaping, by Jaszo, Rosenau, and Rima-Szombat, to Losoncz, and subsequently effecting a junction with the main Austrian army. Of the army which he led from Galicia, not one-fourth returned, and yet he might boldly claim the gratitude of the emperor. No other of the Austrian generals would have saved a single horse-shoe—probably not his own person—from the hands of the Hungarians and the defiles of the Carpathians.

The road to the Theiss was now open to Görgey: the Austrian corps of Götz remained behind in the mountains. Hammerstein, according to Austrian reports, had the last few weeks been advancing vigorously from Galicia, but had not yet made his appearance; while the fourth Austrian corps, which had been despatched from Pesth to support Schlik, had already received orders to march back again, for reasons which will be explained by the following occurrences.

Perczel had advanced from Moor direct upon Pesth; and in order to refute the rumour of his defeat, which had caused such consternation at Pesth, he reviewed his troops in the market-place, wishing to prove that he had not altogether lost above five hundred men. We shall not stop to examine the accuracy of his calculations any more than did the citizens of Pesth; they received him with hurrahs, and on the 4th of January he again crossed the bridge to Buda, at

thence proceeded into the counties of the Theiss: for a long time no tidings were heard of him, and all was comparatively quiet on the Theiss.

Prince Windischgratz, who had meanwhile been appointed field-marshal, had despatched the greater part of his troops to the east; the railroad was reopened to Szolnok, and this important point was occupied by the Ottinger brigade. In this position the Austrians were attacked on the 23d of January; and owing to the unpardonable negligence of their commanders, they suffered one of the most signal defeats during the whole war. The Csikoses were the very men for such daring attacks,—bold and energetic in their movements, and rushing into the very midst of the enemy. They were close at hand before Szolnok, when the trumpet of the Austrian cuirassiers sounded to horse; the generals barely saved themselves by flight, while the officers rode off, mostly without saddle, and the common soldiers were cut down in the stables before they could mount their horses: a portion of the artillery and ammunition-wagons remained imbedded in the morass. There was no battle, but the Austrians sustained a greater loss than in many a regular encounter, where the cannonade continues from morning to night.

The consternation was great at head-quarters; Windischgratz even meditated the possibility of a retreat from Pesth, and despatched all the troops he could spare toward Czegled, with a view to retard the enemy's movements. At the same time, he recalled the corps which he had sent northward in pursuit of Görgey and to support Schlik. The plans of the *Hungarians* did not, however, at that time extend further than Szolnok and the batteries of the Ottinger

brigade: they again withdrew with their trophies across the Theiss.

Simunich also returned from the north together with the Götz brigade, leaving only small garrisons in the deserted towns. After the fall of Leopoldstadt, (February 2d,) he had been ordered to assume the chief command of the Komorn corps of observation, which was greatly thinned by sickness and sorties, and constantly required to be recruited.

The fortress of Esseg likewise capitulated to the Austrians, who, under the Lieutenant Field-marshal Theodorovich and Trebersburg, had invested it with a considerable force. The lower town was taken by storm, and Casimir Batthyanyi, the commandant of the fortress, fled: favourable terms were granted to the garrison, and they returned to their homes. Thus in the course of a fortnight the Hungarians lost two fortresses, which would afterward have proved of great advantage to them. Austrian troops would not have surrendered them so easily; but the Hungarians always fought better in the open field than behind walls and fortifications, and they often erected these at a great cost, to abandon them again after a slight struggle. This was especially the case at a later period at Raab, and finally at Szegedin. Leopoldstadt is in itself a place of no great consequence, although it acquires importance as a *point d'appui* on the river Waag; added to which it is the nearest Hungarian stronghold on the Austrian frontier. What would Kossuth have given to possess this fortress, when Görgey, in May, 1849, sacrificed his Honveds by thousands to establish his position on the right bank of the Waag, after he had remorselessly allowed the *Austrians and Russians* time to extend their forces!

Had Esseg not been surrendered so quickly, where would Jellachich, after Welden's retreat to Pressburg, have found any position in the south which could have disputed the possession of all the steamboats with the Hungarians? Austria owed this surrender to her Lieutenant Field-marshal Count Nugent, who facilitated the terms of the capitulation. This is the most advantageous treaty for Austria, made by an officer highly educated, but slow and unskilful, during the whole war.

Temeswar and Arad were better defended against the Hungarians by the imperial generals Rukawina and Berger. The plans of the former general—of penetrating as far as Grosswardein and sharing actively in the operations from the south—were never carried out; but Rukawina heroically defended his isolated post against Vetter and Vecsey, who were better able to meet the hangman Haynau courageously in the field (Arad, October 6th, 1849) than to besiege fortresses. Berger held out with equal bravery at Arad for many months; and had it not been that his artillerymen were more mercifully disposed to the town at their feet than himself, (they had their old love-affairs and friends in the place,) there would not have remained one stone upon another; for the town was bombarded no less than ten times from the fortress. This place deserves to be noted in the history of Hungary as one of the most faithful and devoted to the national cause.

Peterwardein, Komorn, Munkacs, still held out. The first two may be considered impregnable. Between the Drave and the Danube—between the Danube and the Theiss—to the right, to the left—now pursuing, now pursued, conquering or defeated—espe-

cially opposed to Nugent—Perczel and Damianich marched to and fro with their corps, until at length Görgey, about the middle of February, drew their forces toward his army, with a view to aid in striking one great and general blow. They had to cover the southern passages of the Theiss, and formed the extreme left wing of the centre Magyar army, where we shall afterward meet one of them, together with Guyon, in the field against Jellachich.

Such was, in short, the position of the Hungarian army at the end of February. With the exceptions of the expeditions of Schlik and Görgey in the north, no operations of importance had taken place. Windischgratz published bulletins of victories, equally devoid of sense and truth. His army was scattered, whereas the Hungarian generals had concentrated their forces with a view to assume the offensive.

CHAPTER VII.

BEM—HIS POSITION AT VIENNA AND ESCAPE—MEETING WITH
KOSSUTH—TRANSYLVANIA—BEM'S ARMY AND ARTILLERY—CAM-
PAIGN AGAINST THE FOUR AUSTRIAN GENERALS AND THE
RUSSIANS.

BEM, the Polish general, had disappeared from the stage of public life during the eighteen years of peace that followed the insurrection in his native country. On the field of Ostrolenka his fame as a great military genius was established. Yet Europe had forgotten him when the revolution of October occurred in Vienna. He then presented himself to Messenhauser, the commander-in-chief of the national guard, and when a proclamation of his character and fame had won the confidence of the people, he was invested with the chief command of the insurgents. Bem's extraordinary energy, courage, and presence of mind excited the wonder of the Viennese, and they obeyed his orders with a sort of awe. But all his exertions of heroism and military skill were of no avail against the numbers and discipline of the enemy, and the city fell into the hands of the imperialists. Bem, with a ministerial passport, lent him by Pulsky, left the city when all hope had fled, and, meeting Kossuth on board the steamboat at Komorn, accompanied him to Pesth. At that place the Polish hero obtained permission to *attempt the conquest of Transylvania.*

The first day of Bem's stay at Pesth, an attempt

was made on his life by a young Polish fanatic. He was alone in his room when the man entered, and said, "I believe I have the pleasure of addressing General Bem?" With these words he drew a pistol from his pocket, and fired it at the general. Bem received a shot in his cheek, and for a long time he wore a large black plaster, which covered half his face, and was certainly no improvement to his looks. The young man escaped without punishment: he had been possessed with the fixed idea that Bem had betrayed Vienna, and was now seeking to play the same game in Hungary.

On the 26th of November, a large crowd was collected before the hotel in which Bem was staying. At the door stood a light carriage-and-four. It was said that the general was setting out on a journey, and there was a great curiosity to see him. He came down, and, without heeding the eljens of the crowd, he stepped into the carriage, taking with him a small bundle, which constituted his whole baggage. Thus did Bem sally forth, to conquer Transylvania.

In that country he found not a single fortified place in the hands of the Hungarians; but the more he felt their importance, the more anxious he was to gain possession of them. He found no infantry, but a brave and resolute population,—no cavalry, but excellent horsemen,—no army, but all the elements to create one. A few companies of Szekler soldiers of the frontier, and about seven thousand Honveds, with two well-horsed batteries, were to form the nucleus around which the genius of Bem was to assemble an army.

The great difficulty was not to obtain men; the warlike Szeklers came thronging in masses to join his *standard*; of horses, likewise, there was no want; a

arms could be procured at need. But the whole of Transylvania may properly be called a fortress, enclosed by lofty, romantic mountains, in the place of walls, the few narrow passes in which are so many gates of rock, incapable of being forced or destroyed by the art of man.

The Austrians, it is true, had not more than twenty-five thousand men, a force which would never have been sufficient in any other country of similar extent but of different natural features; on the other hand, they had only to defend the open side. There was nothing to fear from the Bukowina; on the east they were backed by the principalities occupied by the Russians, and the Turks ventured at most to extend a secret sympathy to the Hungarians. On the west, however, where the country opens more on the large plain of Hungary, the Cserna pursues a meandering course, the Sebes flows from north to south, the wild Maros winds through the defiles to the entrance of the valley, the Aranyos appears in different places on its way to join the Maros, and the rapid Szamos with its numerous little tributaries flows through the northern part in many thousand bendings, completing the net of rivers which covers the country in the west.

Thus Transylvania lies like a splendid jewel encased by magnificent mountains, whose summits are reflected in the clear streams which they send forth, showing to the inhabitants of the plain, in every grain of gold they carry down, the treasures that lie buried in the great mountainous district from which they descend. Gold and silver, iron, lead and copper, salt and saltpetre, are found, together with rocks and stones in which the garnet, amethyst, and opal sparkle in the *most brilliant* colours.

Kossuth's selection of Bem to conquer Transylvania is a proof that in this instance, as after the battle of Schwechat, he possessed the discernment to choose the most able man from among the multitude,—that he understood equally the importance of the task to be achieved, and who was the proper man to accomplish it. Bem conquered Transylvania with the speed of lightning; he justified the confidence of Kossuth, and confirmed the reputation he had won at Ostrolenka. His campaigns against the Austrians and Russians have been hitherto known more in the general features of their extraordinary success than in the details of its achievement, just as we are better acquainted with the devastating phenomena of volcanoes than with their elementary causes. We are in a position to give only the general outline—the rest is left to future historians to supply.

Besides the allied races that flocked to his standard, many Poles, who had stealthily crossed the mountains, sought service under Bem. The Polish corps and the German legion—which latter was originally from two to five hundred men strong, but had repeatedly to be recruited—were the bravest of his troops. He knew the valour of his countrymen of old; the heroic courage of the German youths he had still to learn and to appreciate. Kossuth also sent him three complete batteries, but without horses or attendance; these he had himself to provide. The artillery was the service for which Bem's genius was peculiarly adapted, and his chief manœuvres were executed with this force, which, terrible in its very nature, was much more fearful in his hands.

The "rebel-chief" attached great importance to his batteries, and although he occasionally intrusted his

cavalry and infantry to subordinate officers, he always superintended the service of his artillery himself. Previous to a battle he appointed the positions they were to take up, and examined and levelled them, usually with his own hands, whence he received from his German legion the nickname of the "Pianoforte-player."

In general it may be remarked that there was any thing but a jocose spirit in his corps: the quiet, grave, and reserved demeanour of the general extended its influence to his officers: every one was eagerly on the watch to miss nothing, to forget nothing; for Bem was a strict disciplinarian, and never showed indulgence to any fault or oversight. During the first few days he held the command, he ordered two young Hungarians of good family to be shot, for seeking to continue their Jurat life in the camp, and playing at cards while on duty at the outpost. Ever since this example, the rest yielded implicit obedience to the iron spirit of the general, who, when facing the enemy, saw in the man only the obedient soldier. Hence it was, that the young sprigs of nobility usually preferred service in other corps, where more consideration was paid to their pedigree, and camp life wore a more cheerful aspect. But although Vekey, one of Bem's aides-de-camp, never rode to battle without new white kid gloves, polished boots, and a silver-mounted riding-whip, he was not a whit the less intrepid for this whim, and the numerous wounds which this young *élegant* received sufficiently attest his valour.

After spending four weeks in completing and organizing his army, Bem advanced on the 20th of December, and was in Klausenburg at the time when *the imperialists* entered Pesth. His first advance was *overpowering*: Lieutenant-fieldmarshal Wardenner was

driven back to Klausenburg, and Colonel Urban to the Bukowina. Klausenburg was taken at the first assault; Urban, who, in conjunction with Malkowsky, had again advanced up to Bistriz, was a second time forced back into the Bukowina. Bistriz, Klausenburg, Thorda, with the surrounding country, were all occupied, and established as a gathering-point for men and arms of the Szeklers. In the course of a few days two Austrian corps and three generals were driven out of the country, and the passes were secured, so as to oppose their return.

Bem now marched southwards into the Saxon land, where Puchner and the German population, who had been called to arms, were expecting him. On he advanced, overthrowing every obstacle that opposed his march from Thorda to Radnoth and Megyes. In the latter town the fugitives made a stand, in order to retreat to Hermannstadt, after a short but murderous conflict. Here Puchner was awaiting him with the whole of his forces. Bem's troops attacked him, and fought from morning till noon for the possession of this capital, which was heroically defended by the Saxon national guards. Bem was compelled to retreat, and took up his head-quarters at Stolzenburg, two German miles from Hermannstadt.

On the 4th of February, Puchner assumed the offensive. The two armies met at Salzburg; Bem's artillery, which he had posted on the line of hills, repulsed all the attacks of the enemy, who again retreated for shelter to Hermannstadt. Bem followed them, renewed the battle a second time before the city with an enemy whose force was three times as strong as his own, and was repulsed with considerable loss.

He returned by the same road, but did not halt until

reaching Szasz-Varos, in order not to have the strongly fortified imperial castle of Karlsburg in his rear. But here likewise he was unable to stop, and marched to Deva, destroying the bridge over the Strehl, after he had passed.

Close to this bridge lies the village of Piski. On the 9th of February, the Austrians and Hungarians fought one of the bloodiest battles of this campaign, for the possession of this village and bridge. Never had Puchner's columns advanced to the attack with greater valour and perseverance,—never had the Hungarians, Poles, and the German legion faced them with such determination and cool contempt of death. Bem was victorious. An anecdote is told of a stratagem practised by the Hungarians, who are said to have approached the enemy with white flags, and then suddenly to have parted like the waters of the Red Sea for the passage of the Israelites; while through the alley thus formed by the troops, Bem's cannons swept down whole ranks of the Austrians. This story, however, is so inconsistent with all usual or practicable field manœuvres, that it must be rejected as untrue. It would be impossible for large columns, close enough to mask any batteries, to march actually up to the enemy's front in the midst of battle, and then suddenly to divide and march off in two opposite directions, opening a passage for the play of the artillery in their rear. Bem's peculiar tactics, which were to employ his cannon against the enemy less in flank than in front, may have given rise to this story.

The Austrians here learned for the first time the superiority of their antagonist's tactics, and the effect of *the concentrated* fire of his artillery; their storming *columns*, notwithstanding all their valour, were swept

off before this sea of fire and hail shot: the Bianchi regiment was overthrown and cut to pieces. Piles of dead bodies, literally, covered the field of battle; and Puchner was compelled to retreat with great loss. He retired to Hermannstadt: his right wing was no doubt glad to make a halt at Karlsburg, for the impetuous attacks of the Szekler hussars had cut them off from the main corps.

Eight days before the battle of Piski, the first Russian columns set foot on the soil of Transylvania. Cronstadt was garrisoned with 6000 men, and Hermannstadt with 8000. General Luders and Freitag were ready to march on the first invitation; so that there can exist no doubt that they received orders direct from St. Petersburg. The fact that the invitation was made in the name of the threatened towns of the Saxon-land, and *accepted*, can be regarded at the present day only as the effect on Austria and Russia of the suspicious aspect of French and English diplomacy. It is now quite superfluous to adduce proofs that the Vienna cabinet, in spite of all their protestations, had at that very time already entered upon negotiations with Russia and sought her assistance. That this was insufficient, and only amused Europe with the spectacle of a Russian defeat, is a fact which the czar will never forgive either Luders or Bem. Even the issue of the war, to which the colossal armies of Russia so largely contributed, can never wipe out the first disgrace at Hermannstadt.

The news that Russia had at length thrown her sword into the balance caused the greatest excitement throughout Europe. All parties were alarmed at the new alliance entered into by the emperors, although *it had for a long time been anticipated and talked of*

in every part of the world; all parties crossed themselves with a devout shudder before such a prospect of the restoration of peace; and only those anointed heads, who live in the belief that they are superior to the rest of the world, hailed the long-desired champion of absolutism with silent satisfaction and good wishes.

On the other hand, the confidence of the imperial Austrian generals in Transylvania, which had forsaken them in the last encounter with Bem, now revived. Colonel Urban ventured out from his intrenchments at Bistriz, with a view to annihilate the Hungarian Colonel Ritzko and his little band. Although he did not succeed, Ritzko was driven from his position at Baiersdorf, and fell severely wounded into the hands of the enemy on the 18th of February. Urban himself was obliged to return immediately to Bistriz. There he remained, until Bem drove him back to the Bukowina, from whence, in company with Malkowski, he had an opportunity of seeing the last Austrians and Russians turn their backs on the fair land of Transylvania.

Bem now for the third time attacked Hermannstadt, and came up with the Austrians at Megyes, (Mediasch.) The battle lasted (March 3d) from morning till late at night, and ended with the defeat of the Hungarians. They retreated toward Maros Vasarhely, the Austrians quickly following up their advantage. But whenever the Austrian generals endeavoured to execute rapid manœuvres, they invariably failed. While intending to pursue Bem, they followed only one division of his army; Bem himself, by a masterly flank march, turned from Megyes along the river Kukullo toward Mühlenbach, and coming from the west appeared before Hermannstadt on the 14th.



Bern.

The garrison left in this town consisted of 8000 Russians and 2000 Austrians: Bem had 9000 men and the requisite artillery. With this force he stormed the town, after having in vain summoned the garrison to surrender. The defence of the Russians was not such as to inspire the inhabitants with any great respect for the black eagle: after a short fight, they abandoned the place in a disorderly flight. Bem took several hundred Russian prisoners and eight cannon, and sent them to Debreczin, to show Kossuth that the Russians were mortal like other men.

"The taking of Hermannstadt," he wrote to the government, "was of inestimable advantage to us; a large quantity of weapons fell into our hands, while the life-nerve of the enemy has been cut through."

The hubbub raised by the official and semi-official Austrian journals about deeds of horror perpetrated by Bem's troops in Hermannstadt was probably intended to drown any reproaches on the defeat of the double eagle.

The "Wiener Zeitung" itself afterward stated, that Bem maintained the strictest discipline among his troops, and ordered the first thief to be hung in the market-place, as a warning to the rest. In fact, ample proof is afforded that Hermannstadt suffered less than Vienna, Raab, Zombor, and numerous other towns which fell into the hands of the Austrians.

From Hermannstadt Bem sent the two following despatches to Debreczin, which throw the best light on the course of his next operations, and may properly be given here.

"March 15th.—In my despatch I had the happiness to mention, that I had sent a corps against the *Rothenthurm Pass*, in order as effectually as possible

to cut off the communication of the enemy with Wallachia. The division could not however advance far as the whole Austrian army was in Freck, and consequently separated only by a mountain-ridge from the defile, and thus my troops were threatened on the flank as they advanced. Nevertheless I got possession of this defile by a circuitous movement; and I shall not only defend this, but at the same time press the enemy in the direction of Cronstadt, from whence they will have great difficulty to pass the Carpathians in case they endeavour to fly to Wallachia.

“I shall commence these military operations this very day, etc. etc. BEM.”

“Head-quarters, Rothenthurm, 16th of March.—My operations yesterday, for driving the Russians from the Rothenthurm Pass, were crowned with such success, that the same night at eleven o'clock, we dislodged the Russians from this strong position. The 15th of March, the birthday of national freedom, could not be celebrated more worthily. At five o'clock this afternoon the Russians took to the wildest flight, heels over head. Four Austrian generals, Puchner, Pfarsman, Graser, and Jovich, have fled with three companies to Wallachia. I have myself very carefully inspected the Rothenthurm Pass, and made such dispositions, that the Russians will find a difficulty in re-attempting to force their way through it. I have despatched another division of my army in pursuit of the Austrians, who, according to the reports given by the prisoners we have taken, have fled dispirited and in disorder toward Cronstadt. Their main force is at Fogarasch, but the rearguard has only just quitted Freck. The enemy broke down the bridge over the *Olt* behind them, which checked our pursuit for a

time. Now, after the bridge has been restored, I shall continue the pursuit with all possible vigour. I hope to take Cronstadt in the course of three or four days, whereby the imperial Austrian army will be in part annihilated, in part dispersed, and at all events rendered incapable of disturbing the internal rest of this country. It will then be an easier task to reduce to obedience the single Wallachian bands, which still make their appearance.

“Postscript.—After the taking of Cronstadt I shall immediately set out with a division for Hungary.

“BEM.”

Four days later Cronstadt was in his hands. The Russians fled through the Tömös Pass, and the Austrians through the Törzburg Pass, into Wallachia,—twenty-one thousand men strong, according to official reports, with three thousand horses and fifty cannons, the Russians not included.

Thus was Transylvania, with the exception of Carlsburg, in the hands of the Hungarians. Bem had accomplished the most astonishing and incredible exploit. With a newly-raised army, but just come from drill, and which never equalled the numerical force of the enemy, he had in the space of ten weeks defeated, and driven out of the country, five corps of the enemy, twice traversed the mountain-ranges from north to south, seized a great number of strong positions, taken cannon, arms, and horses, made about five thousand prisoners, occupied the passes of the country from the interior, and at the same time raised and organized an army comparable to any in Europe.

CHAPTER VIII.

DEMBINSKI AND GÖRGEY—BATTLE OF KAPOLNA—CAMPAIGN OF APRIL—
—DAMIANICH IN SZOLNOK—THE BATTLES OF HATVAN, ASZOD,
TAFJO-BICSKE, AND ISASZEG—KOSSUTH AND GÖRGEY AT GODOLLO—
WAITZEN AND NAGY-SARLO—WELDEN ASSUMES THE COMMAND.

ANOTHER Polish hero and military genius now came to the aid of the Hungarians in the person of Dembinski. This general was at one time the idol of his countrymen, and considered a commander of extraordinary skill. His previous history will be found in another part of this work.

At the instigation of Count Ladislaus Teleki, he left Paris, and repaired to Hungary by way of Galicia, through the county of Zips. His arrival was immediately published, with a sketch of his biography, in the "Közlöny," (Advertiser.) The other Hungarian newspapers copied this account, and the news reached Görgey, (who, on his expeditions into the northern counties, was often cut off from any direct communication with the government,) that Dembinski had been appointed by Kossuth commander-in-chief,—Dembinski, who was on all sides called the first strategist of his age. This was enough to excite Görgey's jealousy: he was Dembinski's enemy even before he had made his acquaintance.

After the storming of the Branisko Pass, there was no further obstacle to Görgey's joining the main army; he met Klapka, in whose head-quarters he made the

acquaintance of Dembinski. The Polish general had been for some time at Debreczin, where he consulted with Kossuth and the principal generals on the plan for the spring campaign. He fully approved of the defensive manœuvres on the Theiss, as they had been commenced and executed throughout the last two months, and only awaited Görgey's arrival to assume the offensive.

Görgey was received with that respectful deference which his talents had a right to claim. Dembinski, above all others, was capable of appreciating the masterly execution of the last manœuvres of the young general. But Görgey was reserved, and surrounded himself with a party who were ever after actively opposed to Kossuth and Dembinski.

This disunion was for the first time manifest in the battle of Kapolna. Dembinski had made the plan of the battle, and commanded the centre in his own person; Damianich commanded the left wing; Görgey with his picked troops the right. He had raised objections to Dembinski's dispositions in the general council of war, but he yielded to the majority of voices, and took up his appointed post. Had he persisted in his objections, and in withholding his assent to the plan of battle, he would have acted more honourably. But he led on his troops, merely to let them figure as spectators; the entire right wing, upon whose attack the plan principally rested, remained inactive, and restricted itself to a defensive position: the troops of Damianich and Dembinski in vain stood the fire of the Austrians, and were forced to abandon the field to the enemy. The loss on both sides may have been equally great, (the accounts on this point are very contradictory,) but the Hungarians lost the battle, and

were obliged to retreat toward the Theiss. This was on the 26th, 27th, and 28th of February.

Much blood flowed on both sides, and in vain; for Windischgratz was not skilful enough to follow up his advantage after the battle of Kapolna. He sent a pompous bulletin to Vienna, whence it was forwarded to Olmutz. This was the long-expected signal for the Schwarzenberg-Stadion ministry. The battle of Kapolna gave no decisive turn to the Hungarian war, but assisted the *octroyée* constitution of the 4th of March through the pangs of birth, and annihilated the diet at Kremsier. After such a victorious bulletin as that which was issued by the chancery of the field-marshal, there was nothing more to be feared from Hungary and the other provinces. The battle was lost through Görgey: the gain of Austria was a paper charter, and the advantage of being thenceforth governed by ordinances.

Great confusion reigned in the camp of the Magyars. Kossuth trembled at the consequences of such a division among the chief generals, which must peril every thing. He exerted himself to the utmost to reconcile the opponents; but each one adduced proofs, reasons, witnesses, for the correctness of his conduct. Kossuth, who on this occasion had for the first time a glance into the fathomless abyss of ambition which Görgey concealed under a quiet, simple, unpretending exterior, took him aside, and said to him as friend to friend, "Brother, confess to me what thou desirest and wouldst have. Let me into the secret of thy wishes, and I will labour to satisfy them. Wouldst thou be dictator of Hungary? thou shalt be it through me. Wouldst *thou possess the crown of power*—thou shalt have it,—*only save our country!*"

Görgey protested that his only wish, his only prayer was for the welfare of Hungary; and for this reason he could not consent to intrust it to foreign hands, who were less formed for the task, &c.

The story that Görgey, at his first interview with Dembinski after the battle of Kapolna, said to him, "General, were I Dembinski, I would order Görgey to be shot!" appears, after the above authenticated statement, to be a fiction, which, like many others of this period, went the round of the world.

It is equally untrue that Dembinski, in consequence of these dissensions at Debreczin, was thrown into prison. His opponents, the friends of Görgey, would like to have seen him summoned before a court-martial; but Kossuth, to the very last, never withdrew his high opinion of this well-trying man. Dembinski behaved in the same high-minded and noble manner to Görgey as on a former occasion toward Skrzynecki. From his considerate conduct, he had then to share in the disfavour which Skrzynecki had incurred with the patriots; in the present instance he voluntarily retired in the background, and resigned the chief command to Görgey. The latter, in conjunction with Dembinski, Guyon, Klapka, and Damianich, fought the following battles. They were conducted with youthful ardour, circumspection, great strategical skill, and well-founded confidence in the valour of the Hungarian troops: they have immortalized Görgey.

After the battle of Kapolna the Hungarian army again retreated toward the Theiss, and during the next few weeks there was a suspension of the military operations of the two main armies. The prince had moved back his head-quarters to Buda on the 5th of *March*, with a view to co-operate in the projected

organization of the country. He considered his presence more necessary there than in the camp; for, notwithstanding the imposing force which he had seen assembled before him within the last few days, his pride was unwilling to acknowledge the enemy's superiority and the impending danger. His generals shared this unpardonable contempt of the enemy, and thus it happened that on the same day, (March 5th,) the Karger brigade, through the unaccountable remissness of their commander, was surprised at Szolnok by Damianich, and suffered a loss still more terrible than that of the Ottinger brigade, of which we have before spoken.

Karger was superseded; Szolnok was again occupied with a stronger force, and the field-marshal prepared, as he did after every defeat, to assume the offensive. The Götz brigade was advanced to Tokay, Jablonowsky was posted at Miskolcz, Schlik in and around Erlau, and the main body of the army was distributed from that point to Szolnok. On the extreme right was posted the ban; but the head-quarters were in Buda, and the field-marshal himself did not advance to Gödöllő till the 3d of April.

On the 23d of March, the day of the battle of Novara, the Hungarians began to advance slowly from all sides. The first blow was struck against Baja in the south, and the passage of the Danube forced at that point. In the course of this campaign Baja was alternately taken and lost ten times: on the 1st of April it was finally abandoned by the Austrians, who did not return until supported by the Russians.

The forces of the Hungarians were now deployed *along the whole line* of the Theiss, from Tokay to *Szegedin*. All the operations that had been planned

and prepared on the further side, were to be carried into execution on this side of that river. The general advance of the troops commenced from east to west, and overthrew every obstacle that opposed their progress. No mention has hitherto been made either of the Hungarian or Austrian bulletins of victory; they were both uncertain in their statements, and no decisive result could be gathered from them. From the moment, however, when the entire Hungarian army—both the corps on either wing and in the centre—simultaneously assumed the offensive, the plan of the campaign, its conduct, and consequences became at once manifest. The bulletins of Prince Windischgratz are no less amusing than remarkable in point of style; as relates to the history of the campaign, they have not a tittle of importance.

From the end of March until the 10th of April,—that is to say, from the beginning of the main attack upon the imperial army until the taking of Waitzen,—the Hungarians fought their most famous battles under the command of Görgey. Properly speaking, these engagements constituted only one great battle, which lasted fourteen days, and in which the ground was every day shifted; every hour the Hungarians advanced toward Pesth, every hour they won point after point from the Austrians in hand-to-hand fighting. These battles, which began at Szolnok, and had first a short suspension behind Dunakess, which comprise the glorious days of Nagy-Sarlo, Pacs, and Komorn, terminated with the taking of Pesth, the relief of Komorn, and the complete retreat of the imperialists.

Against Windischgratz, Götz, Schlik, and Jablonowsky, were arrayed Görgey, Dembinski, Bepassy,

and Klapka; to the Croat Jellachich was opposed the Serbian Damianich.

On the 2d of April, the Csorich division, which was concentrated in Waitzen, set out for Hatvan. It came too late; Gyöngyös was already in the hands of the enemy. Schlik, who had been stationed at Hatvan, was unable to save his corps from a complete defeat; Captain Kalchberg was his protecting angel, and with a few companies defended the bridge at Hatvan, over the river Zagyva, thus covering the retreat of the fugitives. Csorich, who had been ordered to support him, had no course left but to retire by the same road he had come. Jellachich, who was to have advanced to Hatvan with the right wing, in order to maintain the connection with Schlik, was overtaken by Damianich at Czegled, and driven back to Alberti; but Schlik could not regain a firm footing until he reached Gödöllő.

A second time Jellachich received the command to move north toward the main army; a second time Damianich defeated him at Tapjo-Bicske, and threatened Windischgratz on his right flank, while the ban ran the risk of being completely cut off. Jellachich fought heroically at the head of his Croats, amid the thickest shower of balls, but the result proved that he did not remain master of the field at Tapjo-Bicske, as announced in the thirty-third bulletin of the Austrians.

The prince, meanwhile, (on the 3d,) reached Gödöllő; he brought all his disposable reinforcements with him, and moved toward Aszod, as Görgey made a show of turning aside toward Iklad. At Aszod a *murderous battle* was fought, which ended in the *complete defeat of the Austrians*, who retreated toward

Gödöllő. Tapjo-Bicske, Isaszeg, Gödöllő, and Aszod formed in succession, from south to north, four of the finest imaginable positions for awaiting the attack of a superior enemy with a certainty of victory. The ground of Gödöllő, intersected by a large, wooded chain of hills, offers to an army all those invaluable *points d'appui* which are of greater importance than thousands of troops,—heights for the artillery, woods for the sharp-shooters, plains for the infantry and cavalry; in short, no strategist could have pictured to himself any ground more richly favoured, according to all the rules of art and science. Isaszeg and Tapjo-Bicske are no less important.

Both parties knew the value of these positions; the Austrian generals called out their artillery, their excellent riflemen, and their best cavalry regiments; the Hungarian commanders summoned the bravest of their Honveds and hussars to the field of battle.

The battle of Tapjo-Bicske, on the 4th of April, lasted from six o'clock in the morning until nine at night, and ended in the most disorderly flight of the Croats to Pesth.

The battle of Isaszeg, on the 6th, was the bloodiest of the series. Whole ranks of Honveds were cut down by the Austrian artillery, but new ones sprang up as if out of the earth, and continued the fight. The hussars performed incredible acts of valour. Thus only could Isaszeg be won. Aszod had fallen, and Gödöllő, the most dreaded, was now abandoned by the imperialists after an unimportant resistance.

Kossuth and Görgey embraced: "Now for the first time it is clear what the army is able to perform,—now Hungary is saved!"

Kossuth, followed by many representatives of the

army, remained for some days in the castle of Count Grassalkowich at Gödöllő, where Windischgratz had repeatedly taken up his head-quarters, and slept in the very bed which the prince had left on the morning of the same day. This is a known fact. The following circumstances, however, are probably less known, and might seem to place the relationship between Görgey and Kossuth in a more friendly light, were it not for the darker shadows of later events.

On the day when Gödöllő lodged Prince Windischgratz and Kossuth, several spies came, bringing the news that a strong corps of the Austrians was in movement in the immediate vicinity, and that the place was not sufficiently protected from a surprise. Kossuth communicated this to Görgey; but the latter quieted his fears, and insisted on sleeping at the door of Kossuth's room for his friend's greater security. Not until after many entreaties was Görgey prevailed on to spend the night on a camp-bed in the apartment.

Kossuth now issued a proclamation, calling upon the country to look forward with hope and confidence to the future. Prince Windischgratz, on the other hand, despatched a bulletin to Vienna, the composition of which is so remarkable that some passages deserve to be immortalized.

"A glorious engagement," he says, "which Lieutenant-fieldmarshal Baron Jellachich fought at Tapjóbicske has convinced the fieldmarshal of the superiority of the enemy, especially in light cavalry, in a completely open country; and he has accordingly given the command, in order to draw together his reserves following from all sides, to unite the first and third corps as well as the second, which has been hitherto posted in reserve near Waitzen, in a concentrated di-

rection toward Pesth, until this city is surrounded in a large circle, stretching from Palota and Keresztur to Soroksar. The enemy followed this movement in great haste," &c. &c.

Never did a "glorious engagement" bring more miserable fruits to an army than the conviction of its own weakness. Never was a retreat more gently expressed than by the words "to draw together his reserves, following from all sides, in a concentrated direction toward Pesth." Never was a flight mentioned in more delicate terms than "the enemy followed the movement in great haste."

The merit of this masterly piece of composition belongs to Lieutenant-fieldmarshal Baron Welden, commandant of Vienna, whose literary talents were so often assailed in an unmerited, spiteful, and invidious manner.

In strict accordance with this bulletin, the imperial army was drawn up in a line from Palota to Keresztur and Soroksar,—consequently in the immediate vicinity of Pesth, with a view to cover that city. The road to Waitzen was guarded by the brigades of Götz and Jablonowsky.

Whatever reproaches may have been directed against Prince Windischgratz for his conduct of the war in Hungary up to this time, his chief error was, that after his retreat from Gödöllő, he contented himself with encamping before Pesth, and concentrating there his whole force, without sufficiently covering the road to Waitzen. This is the most unpardonable because the most palpable error, since no apprehensions were entertained for the safety of Pesth so long as the guns remained mounted on the ramparts of Buda; not a single Honved would have set foot in the faubourg

of Pesth, from a fear lest that beautiful city would immediately have been laid in ruins; the occupation of Pesth without Buda could be of no importance to the Hungarian general, and it was clear as day that the road from Waitzen and the relief of Komorn were the main objects of the whole movement.

The Austrian general seemed struck with blindness. Day after day the Hungarians made feigned attacks along the extended front of his army, retreating as soon as the Austrian artillery approached within range of them. For a whole week Windischgratz allowed himself to be duped by Aulich, who kept an entire army occupied with his insignificant division, having watch-fires lighted up at night for miles around by the peasants, in order to mislead the enemy as to the extent of his encampment.

At length came the fearful news that Waitzen had been taken. Old Götz had fallen in the engagement before the town on the 9th of April: Jablonowsky's brigade, too weak to offer any effectual resistance, was repulsed; Görgey was in possession of the left bank of the Danube, and threatened to cross to the right bank by the island of St. Andra, (April 11th.)

Windischgratz now perceived the danger of his position; his head-quarters were shifted from the "Swan" in the Kerepess-street to Buda, and Jellachich quitted the hotel of the "Two Lions" in the Soroksar-street. The whole army marched to the right bank of the Danube; and had it not been for Welden's opportune arrival, and Görgey's systematic opposition to the plans of the council of war, neglecting to occupy the island of Csepel, and pursue the Austrians unintermittingly from Komorn, Welden would never have *escaped to Pressburg*, nor Jellachich to Esseg.

But the route along the Danube toward the south was thus opened, and Kossuth's definite orders were disregarded by Görgey. The ban led his corps, with all the steamboats that were lying before Buda, down the river: not a single shot was fired to arrest their flight, and they reached Esseg in safety with their ammunition and artillery.

On the 17th of April, the new commander-in-chief, Baron Welden, arrived at Gran, and there made his dispositions. On the same day Windischgratz quitted the Hungarian soil.

The Austrian army has at all events cause to regard Welden as their saviour, for he extricated it from the fatal position in which Windischgratz had left it, and led it back safely to the frontier. His first glance was decisive,—his first command was a retreat. No alternative was left, and Welden has the merit of having at once taken the necessary course, without seeking first, as is too frequently the case with new-beginners, to win a little glory on the field of battle.

The last two battles in the district of the Upper Danube, were fought at Szony and Nagy-Sarlo. The former reduced the Austrian main army under Welden to that disorganized condition, that pitch of demoralization which renders the largest armies liable to speedy destruction: the second battle annihilated at a blow the army of reserve under Wohlgemuth so completely, that its scattered remains did not reunite for a long time afterward. Engagements also took place at Pacs, and on the river Ipoly; but Wohlgemuth's defeat was the final and decisive blow: Komorn was lost to Welden.

CHAPTER IX.

SIEGE OF KOMORN—RETREAT OF THE AUSTRIANS—FIRST STORMING OF BUDA-PESTH—GÖRGEY—SECOND STORMING—BOMBARDMENT—FINAL STORMING.

KOMORN is the key of Hungary: this is a phrase continually repeated, but perhaps as often misunderstood. An army may be in possession of Komorn without being master of Hungary, but can never be master of Hungary without Komorn. It commands the Danube not far from its entrance into the country, and has the power of preventing the passage of any vessels from Monostor to the Black Sea, thus stopping the main artery of the country at its source.

The old fortress lies in the pointed angle formed by the confluence of the two branches of the Danube, at the extreme eastern point of the island of Schütt; in front of this lies the new fortress and the town; and in a large semicircle before the town are situated the extensive works which sufficiently cover the open side on the west. This is called the Palatinal line,—an extent of ramparts, which, at the instigation of the late Palatine, was completed to a length of three thousand fathoms, at a cost of some millions of florins, according to the rules of modern science. These ramparts protect both the old and new fortress, together with the town, on the land side, leaving large open *spaces between* these works and the town, serviceable *for encampments, parades, reviews, and pasturage.*

More to the north, as far as Gutta, where the Waag joins the upper arm of the Danube, a strong crown-work prevents any hostile attempt to pass the river. Other works—bastions of three, four, and five lines—cover the old fortress on the river side. But a still stronger protection than these artificial works is afforded by the Danube in connection with the rivers Dudvoga, Penna, Waag, and Neutra, the embouchures of which form an intricate net of rivers, extending over a tract of inaccessible marshes. In addition to all this defence, a fortified tête-de-pont on the right bank, opposite to the town, was converted by the Hungarians into a second fortress by means of extensive ramparts; and an island, formed of alluvial deposit in the middle of the stream between this tête-de-pont and the old fortress, was taken advantage of by the military engineer.

Maitheny, Torök, Lenkey, Guyon, Klapka, have all in turn held the military command in Komorn. These men were duly impressed with a feeling of the sacredness of their duty, the importance of their position, of friendship for Kossuth, and a conviction of the right of their cause. None of them held an unlimited command: a council of war had to decide on important points, and the commander-in-chief for the time being had to yield to the majority. During the first siege, this council was composed of Kostolany, Messleny, Torök, Gerlond, Jarossy, Counts Paul Esterhazy and Otto Zichy, Baron Jessenak, and others. The strength of the garrison consisted of eight companies of veterans, fourteen battalions of Honveds, seven hundred of the Honved artillery, and six squadrons, partly hussars and partly Csikoses, amounting in all to twelve thousand men: the fortress was stocked with ammunition

and provisions for above a twelvemonth, and was defended with two hundred and sixty cannons, all in a serviceable state, together with as many more dismounted.

In January, 1849, Simunich undertook an investment of the place on the island of Schutt, between the Waag and Danube; but the winter was very severe, and the siege-artillery not in the best order; while, on the other hand, the garrison were in the highest spirits, and prepared to repulse the Austrians wherever they should attempt to set foot. Simunich moreover had by no means the force necessary to invest Komorn. The operations during the months of January and February were a mere comedy. Despatches, reports, newspapers, passed in and out the gates of the fortress with little difficulty; and even at the end of March and beginning of April, when every effort was made to enforce the surrender, there were always plenty of adventurous persons who kept up the communication with abroad.

According to the accounts of the Vienna war ministry, they did not "seriously" contemplate a siege until the end of March. The weather and the impassable state of the roads had hitherto prevented the transport and planting of the heavy siege-artillery, which was at length conveyed in eight batteries from the Sandberg to beyond the village of Uj-Szőny. On the 24th of March, forty-two twelve and eighteen pounders, mortars and howitzers, were ready to open a resolute fire, which had previously been confined to the destruction of the town, already uninhabitable, and the burning down of Uj-Szőny.

The Austrians had thus spent no less than three months in planting their batteries, with great loss, on

the right bank of the chief branch of the Danube: their guns commanded the town, the old fortress, and part of the Palatinal line.

During this period the garrison made numerous gallant sorties, while many a day was passed by the Austrians in cannonading without any glorious result. On the 19th the Demontir-batteries opened their fire; and on the 20th, at eight o'clock in the morning, the bombardment began from the Kettle-batteries. Up to the 21st probably about four hundred bombshells and grenades had been thrown. On the 29th Komorn was cannonaded with sixteen-pounders; and the same day a sortie was made by Honveds and hussars on the side of Gran, who brought back into the fortress, men, cannon, and several hundred kilderkins of wine.

On the 31st the investment was re-established, or, as the ministerial reports express it, "disposed in full earnest." For this purpose the bridge previously thrown across the Danube at Puszta-Lovad was transported down to Nemes-Oers, in order to establish at that place a shorter communication between the two banks; and at daybreak on the 31st the columns were in motion to take up their appointed posts.

The first division of the Sossay brigade seized and occupied Puszta-Rava, on the left bank of the Waag, and the little wood of Apati, from which however they were soon driven by the fire of the fifth Palatinal rampart. The second column advanced on the right bank of the Waag as far as the destroyed bridge, and under the fire of the fourth and fifth Palatinal ramparts. The third column, commanded in person by General Sossay, advanced further than any other from Nemes-Oers on the left bank of the Danube, and cannonaded *with the howitzers of their horse-battery the fifth*

rampart, which now opened a fire upon this side also : so that the whole line was one continuous fire from ten o'clock in the morning till four in the afternoon, in which the field-pieces of the besiegers played a very subordinate part.

Three other columns of the Weigl brigade had advanced at the same time toward the tête-de-pont of the Waag, and brought back a few of their dead, with a report of the admirable manner in which the enemy's artillery was served,—a fact of which those in the right camp of the Danube had also become convinced, twelve cannons having from this point played upon the fortress and the tête-de-pont without the least effect.

The official reports called this fruitless attack, which was attended with so great a sacrifice of life, “a trial” of the garrison; and having stood this test so well, the fortress was put to successive and more difficult proofs. In the night of the 31st of March, four new twenty-four pounders were planted, with the intention of forcing the tête-de-pont of the Danube, and throwing red-hot balls upon the fortress. On the 1st of April twelve more heavy cannon and two sixty-pound mortars were brought up. On the 2d, a further number of heavy guns arrived from Vienna, and General Dietrich undertook personally the service of the artillery.

At length, on the 3d of April, a decisive blow was struck; Simunich, by command of Welden, issued an order of the day to the blockading corps, which contains the following startling announcements :—“There can be no longer any thought of a capitulation with miserable traitors;” and, “the taking of Komorn is *one of the first conditions of the new campaign.*” To *this the Hungarians answered by a sortie, carrying*

back with them to the fortress four cannon and forty Austrians; for on their side they maintained that one of the first conditions of the new campaign was the capture of the besieging artillery and of the men who served the guns.

All these statements, as here brought together, are taken from the official reports of the Austrian war ministry; but Hungarian and foreign journals, and private reports of the blockading corps, gave even at that time a description of the events of the last days of March before Komorn, which for the sake of truth must be stated, notwithstanding the doubt and obscurity that veil most of the details.

Welden had undertaken the command of the investing troops, and carried off with him all the artillery that had been stored up for years in the imperial arsenals. By his orders the general attack, described above as a strategical "trial," was made on the 31st of March. According to other accounts, this attack was simply a demonstration of insanity, an enterprise of senseless ambition and inhumanity.

Welden is said to have three several times commanded the storming of the fortress; three times in succession columns of riflemen, it is said, were ordered to advance against the ramparts, not a third part of whom found their way back. A fourth time Italian troops were commanded to storm, but these refused to march upon certain death, and Welden ordered a body of dragoons to advance upon their rear and goad them on to the assault. Austrian troops fired upon one another, and attacked each other furiously. Welden returned to Vienna, his life being no longer secure in his own camp. Such was the account very generally related.

Simunich made a fresh attempt, in the beginning of April, to reduce the fortress, by a grand, uninterrupted cannonade. He fired red-hot balls from cannon of the heaviest calibre and sixty-pound mortars from the Sandberg; but the fire was answered with superior force by the old fortress, the tête-de-pont, and the Palatinal line. Some dilapidated old houses in the town were thrown down by the immense concussion of the air and ground, but the works of the fortress suffered trifling injury. These were the severest days of trial to the garrison, and afforded the greatest evidence of the strength of the fortress.

Some Austrian officers, prisoners of war in the fortress, who were allowed to go at large on parole, once ventured an attempt, by a bold *coup de main*, to deliver the fortress into the hands of the enemy. The plan was discovered in time, and they had to expiate this breach of faith in the deepest casemates. At another time the besiegers attempted to gain by stratagem what they failed to win by force. Half a dozen Austrian artillerymen offered themselves to execute a perilous enterprise which one of them had devised. With the consent of their commander, they left their company secretly, and presenting themselves as deserters at one of the gates of the fortress, were admitted. In their pockets they carried tools for spiking the cannon, together with signal-rockets. By means of the latter they intended to give information to their friends outside when they had succeeded in disabling the guns, that a general attack might be immediately made on this point. The project was bold, but not impracticable, and by gaining entrance into the fortress a great part of the danger was already past.

As good Catholics, assured of absolution from their

church, they took the oath to the Hungarian standard, and were enlisted ; but for obvious reasons they showed a repugnance to exchange their uniforms for the dress of the Honveds. This excited suspicion ; the men's pockets were searched, and their significant contents discovered. By threats the secret was drawn from them ; they disclosed it, to save their lives, and at the same time they sacrificed the lives of hundreds of their brethren.

The signal-rockets were indeed discharged on one of the following nights from the plateau of the north ramparts of the Danube. Immediately the Austrian pontooners set to work upon a bridge ; it was completed, and crowded with horses and men, who all pressed forward boldly, on seeing the silence which reigned in the fortress. A portion of the men had already landed on the opposite bank, and the crowd pressed on with increased eagerness, when suddenly a flash from the black earth-ramparts broke the darkness of the night—*there* at least the cannon were unspiked—and the shot carried death into the thickest of the crowd. The first few balls shattered the bridge to atoms, annihilating the brave fellows upon it. Numbers met their death in the river, many from the inaccessible guns of the rampart, while others saved their lives under shelter of the night. Those who had already landed on the opposite shore were obliged to surrender. After this terrible night no further attack upon the fortress was attempted by the Austrians. The discharge of its mortars alone informed the garrison from time to time that the storm was still raging over their heads.

Nearly four months had elapsed since the garrison in *Komorn*, separated from the other divisions of the

army, had been thrown upon their own resources and the protection of the fortress. The latter had proved its strength, and there was no scarcity either of ammunition or provisions, notwithstanding the accounts given in the official reports of the imperial generals. The health of the garrison had not suffered; but that distemper had begun to manifest itself, common to all besieged fortresses—the feeling of isolation, fear, impatience, longing, doubt respecting the fortune of war in the armies of their distant brethren, and the possibility of a speedy relief.

Symptoms of doubt are the forerunners of dangerous dissension, which in turn leads to treason and to ruin. While on the one hand messengers, at the hazard of their lives, had brought the reassuring news from Debreczin, that as yet the cause of liberty had suffered no reverses, and every thing promised victory,—on the other, the dispiriting tidings from Kápolna had likewise found their way across the Danube, and the prisoner has no faith in liberty until he has lost sight of his jailor.

Repeated couriers arrived at Debreczin, pressing for measures to be taken for the speedy relief of the garrison. Kossuth deliberated as to what man he should send into the fortress—one upon whose energy he could rely, and who was at the same time possessed of sufficient authority and influence to infuse spirit into the faint-hearted, to restore confidence to the doubtful, to control the suspicious. His choice fell on Guyon, who readily undertook an enterprise which pleased him from its adventurous character.

The expedition was to remain a secret, in order to *prevent its incurring failure at the outset*. Nevertheless the “*Esti-lap*” in an uncalled-for manner dropped

a mention of the project, and Guyon hastened to Kossuth, complaining to him of the increased danger brought upon his enterprise by this newspaper gossip. Kossuth, who knew from experience the unconquerable passion of a newspaper editor for disclosing all that reaches his ear, vented a few ejaculations against his former colleagues in a body, and Guyon started the very same evening for Komorn. The route *via* Pesth was guarded by the Austrians, and he therefore took the road to the south, leaving behind him all his equipage, together with his costly general's uniform.

Guyon travelled in the disguise of a Jew; and the skill and success with which he acted his part are proved by his safe arrival at Komorn. The story of his having, with twelve hussars, fought his way through the midst of the investing corps of the enemy, is a mere fable. People are never at a loss when inventing marvellous stories of their favourite heroes, and there was no enterprise of danger and heroism which the hussars were not ready to attribute to Guyon.

Guyon's sudden appearance in the fortress, the fame which had preceded him, his resolute character, together with the accounts he gave of the enemy's positions, of the general enthusiasm of the country, and the increased strength of the Magyar army, of Görgey, Bem, and Kossuth, restored the confidence of the officers in the garrison. He remained at Komorn until the siege was raised, and his name is consequently not found among the generals who shared in the brilliant campaign of April.

After the battle of Waitzen the siege of Komorn was virtually terminated; an imperial corps still remained behind, but chiefly for the purpose of saving

the position-cannon, and keeping the road to Pressburg open. The first of these tasks they were in part able to accomplish. The greater portion of the siege-artillery was brought to a place of safety, after the heaviest pieces of ordnance had been rendered unfit for service ; but thousands of hoes and spades, large heaps of sacks of earth, an immense number of ladders and implements of all descriptions, broken gun-carriages, and fragments of baggage-wagons, masses of all the various parts of artillery, were necessarily left behind. With feelings of joy and surprise the besieged garrison, after their deliverance, witnessed the wrecks of all this colossal apparatus, which had been brought together for their destruction.

On the evening of the 25th of April, the enemy had disappeared from the country for miles around. The northern and western sides were open, and the imperial standard floated only from the Sandberg, by the side of its fearful intrenchments. Schlik was obliged to occupy this position, until Welden with the main army had gained the road to Raab and Hochstrass.

Up to this time all the battles had been fought on the left bank of the river. On the 25th the Hungarian vanguard under Knezich, and the corps of Klapka and Damianich, crossed the Danube at intervals of half an hour. At two o'clock in the morning the storming of the Sandberg commenced. The divisions of Knezich and Dipold forced these works the first ; at daybreak Klapka took O'Szöny at the point of the bayonet, and at eight o'clock all the fortifications were in the hands of the Hungarians.

The Austrian troops displayed their accustomed prudence, courage, and heroism in opposing the su-

perior forces of the enemy, who pressed forward with irresistible enthusiasm. Their steady discipline and remarkable skill in manœuvring, which rank them with the first soldiers in the world, might have prolonged the resistance; but the Hungarians were joined by the garrison of the fortress, whom Guyon led out by the tête-de-pont into the open field. The Austrians could not hope to receive succour from the main army under Welden, which had collected again in Raab in the most pitiable condition; while Görgey with all his forces was free to cross the Danube if he pleased, and cut off the retreat of Schlik. The latter therefore retired with his troops to Raab, and there joined the main army, after having suffered some slight loss.

There were great rejoicings in Komorn among the garrison and their liberators: the fortress had still sufficient stores of food and wine to welcome a second army, which moreover brought in its train thousands of wagon-loads of all kinds of provisions. The exultation of the army was unbounded: all the gates of the fortress stood wide open on their half-rusty hinges as in a time of profound peace. The relief of Komorn was the most important achievement of the campaign, and the greatest victory of the Magyar army.

At two different periods of the war the metropolis of Hungary had heard at a distance the discharge of artillery. But the city had not hitherto been the scene of any conflict, and the only blood had been shed by the hand of an assassin, in the murder of Count Lamberg, on the bridge of boats, by an infuriated mob, September 28th, 1848. The imperialists, under Windischgratz, took possession of the metropolis without resistance.

While Buda itself is commanded on three sides, it commands the Danube and Pesth, and in this consists the importance of its position.

It was on the forenoon of the 21st of April,—Austrian bulletins of battles won at Gran and Komorn were placarded on the walls, to amuse the good people of Pesth and quiet their apprehensions,—when the vanguard of the Hungarian army appeared on the Bombenplatz at Buda. Loud eljens arose from the citizens along the quay, which were answered by a cannon-shot from the fortress.

The Hungarians had reckoned on meeting with only a weak resistance, if any; they, therefore, upon the arrival of their first columns, advanced straight to the assault against the palisades on the chain-bridge, setting fire to them in different parts. Presently the Honveds were seen on the further side climbing the hill in small detachments,—but only to meet their death from the musketry of the Austrians. Buda was not prepared to yield so easily the fame she had acquired of old in the days of the Turkish war.

The Honveds were repulsed with great loss. Those collected on the lower declivity of the hill were decimated by the fire kept up from the houses, especially from the monastery of the Misericordians. The inhabitants of Pesth were eye-witnesses of the slaughter, as the dead bodies of their sons and brothers rolled down the hill-side; but Görgey must have seen clearly that a serious tragedy was in preparation in the amphitheatre of mountains around Buda, of which he was anxious to be the hero. “I will show the world that I too can reduce fortresses!” said he to Damianich and *Aulich*; and these words contained all the motives that induced him, in opposition to the orders of Kossuth,

suth, to encamp before Buda with thirty thousand men, instead of pursuing Welden up to the gates of Vienna. A single order of the day, subscribed "Arthur Görgey, from head-quarters at Schönbrunn," would have been of infinitely greater importance to the future prospects of Hungary and Austria, nay, of the whole world, than the reduction of ten such strongholds as Buda.

Görgey knew this perfectly well; but the plan to advance across the frontier had been formed by Dembinski, and approved by Kossuth; and this was a sufficient reason for Görgey to oppose its execution. The siege of Buda was the first step in the fall of Hungary; it saved the Emperor of Austria the remains of his army and his crowns.

A brisk fire of grenades and cartridge was now directed from the ramparts against the city of Buda, which is built outside the fortress-walls at the foot and on the slope of the hill along the Danube, as Hungarian troops were gradually collecting in the streets and buildings. On this occasion Buda suffered severely; many houses were laid in ruins, many burnt down to the cellars; others escaped with only the loss of a roof, while all were more or less riddled with balls. Meanwhile, Pesth, from the opposite shore, sent her eljens across the river, to encourage the combatants, until they were silenced by repeated shots from the fortress.

Görgey by this time saw that Buda was not inclined to surrender without a struggle, that any idea of taking the fortress by surprise was out of the question, and that the garrison were resolved on a stout defence. He therefore withdrew his troops from within range of the enemy's guns, and made every disposition for investing and bombarding the fortress. He turned a

deaf ear to Kossuth's offer of posting one hundred thousand peasants around the place, to prevent any sortie, and give Görgey time to pursue the Austrians. Görgey took up his head-quarters first in a park, which lay not only under the cannon but within musket-shot of the Austrians. He was a stranger to fear, and, like Bem, delighted in seeing the balls fly around him. Whether the position of his head-quarters was betrayed to the fortress by spies, or by the number of couriers and staff-officers going in and out, Henzi's grenades fired the roof over Görgey's head, and thus unceremoniously gave him notice to quit. He removed his quarters to a beautiful country-house on the Schwabenberg, commanding a magnificent prospect over Buda, Pesth, and the Danube, but situated too high for any shot to reach it from the fortress.

The hills all around gradually teemed with life; batteries of mortars, howitzers, and twelve-pounders, sprang as it were from the ground upon the heights. An uninterrupted fire was kept up, but the positions which the Hungarians held were too good for their batteries to be disturbed.

From time to time, the firing was directed upon Pesth; Honveds of Aulich's corps kept guard in the streets, to prevent any one from going upon the quay of the Danube; for a sentinel in the Dorothea-street had his nose smashed, and another his leg, together with the sentry-box. A barrister had both legs shot away in his bed, and in one dwelling-house a whole family consisting of five persons, were killed by a bombshell.

It took Görgey a fortnight to bring together all the apparatus with which he intended to show the world *that he, too, could take fortresses*. During this *fort-night two assaults were attempted and repulsed*, in the

first (May 4th) the Honveds succeeded in forcing their way up to the wall of the Palafinal Garden, but without reaching the plateau itself; in the second assault, a long and obstinate fight took place on the side of the Vienna Gate.

Meanwhile the regular breach-batteries arose slowly and fearfully upon the Calvarienberg and Spitzberg. When these cannon opened their fire, the ground literally shook for miles around; for now that the object was to effect a breach, whole batteries were discharged simultaneously, in order that the concussion of the walls might aid the effect of the projectiles. The Vienna Gate fell in ruins, together with the vaulting; and with this the rampart, and with the rampart the vaults, and the neighbouring houses. So likewise the whole line of the Weissenburg gate was levelled by the batteries of the Spitzberg. The wholespace behind these two gates was one immense yawning breach. At this point the fatal stroke was aimed,—here, along the whole extent of the fortifications, the storming took place.

Görgey left this service to volunteers: the Don Miguel battalion, and the seventh and forty-ninth Honved battalions, were the first that offered themselves for the task, (May 20th.) These troops were also the first upon the ramparts. Henzi died like a hero. Colonel Auer perished in an unsuccessful act of vandalism: he had to hold the post on the aqueduct and chain-bridge, and in order to die with éclat when all was lost, he flung his cigar into a powder-barrel which communicated with the mine beneath the bridge. The traces of the explosion were to be seen six months afterward on the lower rafters of the bridge. The body of the colonel was found burnt to a cinder.

The exultation of the citizens of Pesth was un-

bounded, when they saw the tricolour flag hoisted upon the castle of Buda. On the entrance of the first hus-sars, (a part of Aulich's corps,) mothers, delicate women, and high-born ladies pressed forward to kiss the accoutrements of the heroes; children embraced the horses' knees, men wept, and old men exulted with all the spirits of youth: the tricolour was a token of peace to the unhappy city. For weeks the poor inhabitants had been living crowded together in the little wood close by, and at New Pesth, and had distinctly seen their dwellings burning to the ground.

Pesth was once more a scene of life and animation—more so indeed than ever. The roads to all parts of the country were again open; the streets were filled with foreign visitors and Hungarian troops; people flocked in crowds to inspect the scene of conflict, and all consideration of individual loss was absorbed in that of the advantage gained by the people. It was like a continued fair; the shopkeepers made a great harvest, disposed of all their goods, and grew rich in—Kossuth notes. Then arrived the immigrants from Debreczin, the representatives, Kossuth and the rest. Pesth was at that time the most attractive city in the world.

Meanwhile at Buda thousands were busied in destroying the fortifications, while thousands were also employed in clearing away the traces of devastation in Pesth. Nevertheless, this city bears, down to the present day, the marks of the bombardment upon most of its buildings, but Buda has ceased to be even a "*quasi-fortress*." With the storming of Buda and the relief of Komorn terminated the first campaign against the Austrians. A long cessation of hostilities ensued, during which the Russian armies approached *the Hungarian frontier*.

CHAPTER X.

INTRIGUES AT DEBRECZIN—DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE—
KOSSUTH'S INTENTIONS—A NEW MINISTRY—SZEMERE—THE RE-
PUBLICAN MOVEMENT—DUSCHEK—LADISLAUS CSANYI—VUKO-
VICH—HORVATH—CASIMIR BATTHYANYI—FOREIGN POLICY OF
HUNGARY—THE SOUTH-SLAVISH RACES.

GREAT historical phases of development, besides the outward manifestations which they bring to light, bear within them many dark riddles, the solution of which is indispensable to explain current events. The greatest riddle of the Hungarian revolution is unquestionably the national Declaration of Independence, prompted by Kossuth, and proclaimed by the National Assembly, at Debreczin, on the 14th of April, 1849, —an act which has been interpreted in various ways, for the most part incorrectly, and the real meaning of which is almost universally misunderstood.

At the beginning of April, when Kossuth, quitting the victorious and advancing army, returned to Debreczin, he found there many changes. His absence had given opportunity to some narrow-minded men—such as every revolution produces, like satellites to the great planets—to push themselves forward on the scene of action. Insignificant in Kossuth's presence, they eagerly caught at an opportunity of playing a part when the master's back was turned. Paul Nyary, Gabriel Kazinczi, Louis Kovacs, with a few others, had, on the entrance of Prince Windischgratz into *Pesth*, abandoned all hope of success, and began to

talk of an unconditional surrender. There was at that time logic in their cowardice. Now, when they were again endeavouring to gain proselytes to their schemes of mediation, they were singly animated by a love of intrigue, by the desire of acquiring importance in opposition.

Kossuth returned from Gödölö elated with victory. He had seen his Magyars in battle, and been eye-witness of their heroism, which surpassed the brightest dreams of his imagination. Görgey and he had embraced—Görgey too exceeded all his expectations and hopes; he felt assured that the plan of the campaign would be successful, like a masterly game of chess. Was this a moment to talk of negotiations? Could it be imagined that Austria would in future display better faith toward Hungary than she had done since 1526? Was it possible for Kossuth to allow the ardour and courage of his troops to cool down, by entering on a negotiation for peace at the very moment when victory was certain, although not yet fully achieved? Could he dare to abandon the cause of the Poles, in the very hour when Görgey was on the point of terminating a victory which Bem had so gloriously begun? These are questions which probably suggested themselves to the minds of Kossuth's enemies at Debreczin; but their paltry jealousy would not allow them to give a conscientious answer to their own minds. They must have felt that their time was not yet come. The diet was so accustomed to Kossuth's guidance, that it was no easy task to reconcile it to a policy opposed to his, especially as the men of the greatest talents sided with the governor of their free-will and choice. There was one point only open to attack, *like the heel of Achilles*,—one small party who, tired

of the war, were desirous to be relieved from the continued state of excitement, and to return as speedily as possible to a more easy mode of life ; and this weak side, this knot of a few little-minded men, was worked upon with all the powers of intrigue.

Kossuth while at the camp received information of these secret cabals, which the zeal of his friends exaggerated and described as of the most formidable character. He resolved to put an end to them, by burning the ships of his enemies behind their backs. His fear was greater than the danger, and this fear will explain the reason why the Declaration of Independence was proclaimed before the campaign had attained its object. As to the effect of such a measure Kossuth had not deceived himself, but he miscalculated the time for its promulgation.

On the 14th of April, the representatives of the Hungarian people assembled in the Protestant church, for the purpose of entering the ranks of independent nations, after the example set by the Americans. Eyewitnesses of that assembly assure us that the scene in the plain, unadorned house of prayer was the grandest one in the whole course of the Hungarian revolution. Never was Kossuth's eloquence more electrifying than when dictating the letter of renunciation of allegiance to the Hapsburg dynasty ; his glowing patriotism vied with his impassioned eloquence. The farewell curse thundered from his lips like a cataract ; and as the people beheld the history of their centuries of suffering, the deceptions practised on them, and their unrequited and thankless sacrifices, unrolled before them, and held up to their view like so many warning spirits, their hearts' blood stirred with feverish excitement, *they trembled with irrepressible emotion.* The thrill

of present joy, the intoxicating presentiment of future freedom, could alone adequately recompense the sufferings, the bootless struggles of ages, or efface the remembrance of past griefs.

A thundering shout of exultation broke from that immense assembly, and swelling in its course like an avalanche, it was caught up by the multitude who thronged the streets without, and was echoed far and wide through the country around. The National Assembly had made a call upon the people for fresh heroism, for new self-denial and self-devotion; and the people, in their joyous enthusiasm, vowed to respond to the summons. The petty intriguers had not the courage to open their lips: the Vergniauds of Debreczin were mute.

As we have remarked, Kossuth had never deceived himself in the anticipated effect of this decisive act, but only in the time of bringing it forward. The declaration of independence came either a year too late, or a month too early. The open struggle against the crown was indeed only a month old in April of the year 1848; but the bloodless battles of the Pressburg diets against the encroachments of the crown had for a long time fatally weakened public confidence in the dynasty throughout the whole of Hungary. The blow would at that time have been overwhelming, —perhaps not confined to Hungary; but a *violent* separation was not then in the plan of the victorious party, who believed it possible to bring to a peaceable conclusion what they had begun on the path of right.

A year of sanguinary battles had since elapsed, the gauntlet had been thrown down by the court, the *Magyars* had taken it up with painful resolution, and were now on the point of planting their foot upon

the neck of their perjured foe. Kossuth and his friends, the Hungarians, Polish, and even the Austrian generals doubted not for an instant of seeing the Magyar army press on to Vienna. There in the Hofburg, in the sacred edifice of the cathedral of St. Stephen, in the metropolis of the empire, in the face and in the centre of all the provinces, Kossuth had intended to proclaim to the world the independence of his country. This was resolved upon at the opening of the campaign of April, but impatience put an end to secret dissensions in the diet and hastened the execution of his project. The little bell in the meeting-house at Debreczin had not the majestic clang of the great bell of St. Stephen's; its sound died away over the interminable plains of Hungary, or reached the German races only like an echo from fairyland. Kossuth had suffered himself to be allured by phantoms into taking a premature step,—one of sad and important significance for the future.

To risk a measure pregnant with such momentous consequences as the separation of one state from another, can be justified only by a well-grounded assurance of success. The configuration must be favourable, in time and place, to be able to fix the horoscope with confidence. Count Teleki, who, removed from the scenes of the revolution, could follow its progress with a clear eye and correct judgment, had perceived the full importance of this truth: and on the first news of the brilliant successes of the Hungarian arms, he despatched a trusty courier to Kossuth, entreating him to fix his whole attention upon Vienna. He urged him to disregard all brilliant achievements, all present *advantages*, and to think only of pressing on to Vienna, *even if the force at his command for this object was*

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not of an imposing character. But Kossuth *dreamed* himself already in Vienna, in the midst of an oppressed population, welcoming him as their saviour. Could he at that time have doubted Görgey's truth and honour? Assuredly as little as any one could have believed that a general of Görgey's calibre would have suffered himself to be caught in so clumsy a trap as that of Buda.

The measures of the diet were restricted to the declaration of independence, and the determination of the future form of government was left to depend on the conjuncture of events in Europe; it is clear therefore that Kossuth meditated nothing more, than that the army as well as the National Assembly should work on to the end indefatigably. He had a right to infer that even the most irresolute must, after such a step, give up all hope of any retreat. In fact the opponents of this decisive measure themselves, when they witnessed the universal exultation with which it was hailed by the nation, joined the new policy in the warmest manner. They were at heart glad to have got over a step which was inevitable, and congratulated themselves on having passed the difficulty.

The new president governor had, immediately after the declaration of independence, to proceed to the formation of a new ministry. Szemere undertook the presidency, together with the portfolio of the interior.

This person, whom we have before met in the Batthyanyi ministry, had since that period gained in efficiency and importance. He belongs to the better known and more influential class of politicians in Hungary; but he wants the power of organization on a *grand scale*, and is deficient in those comprehensive *views, that deep insight*, which mark the statesman.

In the former ministry under Batthyanyi, he one while inclined to the president, at another to Kossuth; at the same time he had frequent intercourse with the Archduke Stephen, and acted since the month of September as a member of the committee of national defence, in which sphere he worked with untiring zeal and activity. In April, 1849, the new president of the ministry avowed himself an advocate for a republic, and openly announced to the House of Representatives his government as democratic and republican.

This change in the ministerial programme was necessarily calculated to prejudice the government in the eyes of the nation, since it was not in unison with the Declaration of Independence itself. It is difficult to judge of the motives which led Szemere to this premature avowal, for he might have been a very good republican, and yet have adhered to the provisional form of government declared by the diet. It seems that a personal mistrust of Kossuth, even at that time, with respect to the foreign relations of the country, induced him to this unfortunate policy. Kossuth erred in neglecting to come to an understanding with his ministers as to their views, before presenting the ministerial list to the house; but Kossuth was deceived in Szemere, as he was in Görgey. The president of the ministry had never been a friend of the governor; indeed, people were so convinced of his hostility to Kossuth in Debreczin, that some even talked of a secret understanding between Szemere and Görgey, and Perczel in particular is said to have repeatedly alluded to this. But Szemere's conduct toward Kossuth has nothing in common with the paltry jealousy of a Görgey; he may have drawn up his programme with an honest conviction of its necessity; but his mistrust was

unjust, his policy unsuited to circumstances. Szemere moreover possesses a greater administrative than statesmanlike talent. Even his speeches, brilliant as they are, and rich in thought, bear the stamp of diligent study, rather than fervent inspiration. In his political views he is too much influenced by questions of detail, and falls far short of that height which the leaders of so mighty a revolution had necessarily to occupy.

Duschek, the minister of finance, a clever bureaucrat, had the tact to render himself indispensable by his intimate knowledge of the financial relations of Hungary. A master in the art of dissimulation, he possessed the confidence not only of Kossuth but of all the leaders of the movement up to the final catastrophe. At that period we shall meet him again.

Ladislau Csanyi, minister of communication, a genuine Magyar, was thoroughly imbued with the spirit of the revolution. Possessing an iron will, united with indefatigable perseverance, he was an ardent patriot, an excellent man, but of no statesmanlike talent.

Sabbas Vukovich, minister of justice, one of the most honourable men, far removed from personal ambition and petty jealousy, working indefatigably toward the grand final object in view, resolute in principle, a mediator among his colleagues, with a character formed in the mould of antiquity, to whom it would have been the greatest delight to sacrifice limb and life for the good of his country.

Michael Horvath, minister of instruction, was formerly professor of history in the Theresa College in Vienna, afterward Prior of Hatvan, and nominated by Eötvös to the bishopric of Csanad, in which dignity he *was confirmed* by the Emperor Ferdinand. His history of Hungary has given him a high reputation, while his

enlightened ideas as a priest gained him friends. At the breaking out of the war he requested of the primate, his spiritual superior, paternal counsel with respect to his future conduct in the politics of his country. The advice seemed sufficiently pious: the bishop was to pray at the altar of his church for the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. This inspiration appears to have been of a revolutionary nature, for Horvath immediately afterward proffered his services to the Hungarian government. A sworn foe to priestcraft, he possesses elevated notions of the true vocation of the clergy. Hungary would have been indebted to him for many useful reforms. As a statesman he has yet to earn his spurs.

Count Casimir Batthyanyi, minister of foreign affairs, and *ad interim* also of trade, is one of the noblest characters that the Hungarian revolution has produced. His great cultivation of mind and extensive reading render him an able man, but unhappily he is deficient in that power of forming a general survey of events, that knowledge of the world, that quick insight into the relations of men and things, without which no one can be a really great statesman. Self-devotion, patriotism, diligence, and many other brilliant qualities, which distinguished him in the highest degree, were not sufficient for his position and times. As minister of foreign affairs, the count's attention required to be devoted mainly to directing the policy of his country in such a manner that the efforts of the Hungarian embassies might be attended with success; and in this respect the republican programme must likewise in part be laid to his charge. Could Hungary at that time calculate on sympathy from other quarters than *France and England*, or mediate through these from

the Porte? Should not Batthyanyi have seen that by this programme he was placing the Hungarian envoys in an embarrassing position? By the Declaration of Independence it was at all events to be imagined that France and England might be moved to an intervention, since Hungary had *de facto* ceased to be a portion of the Austrian monarchy. The semi-republican declaration on the Theiss alarmed the French statesmen on the Seine, and the Tories in England had on their side an easy game to play with Palmerston. Teleki in Paris, and Pulszky in London, endeavoured to correct this evil, by declaring that they both adhered solely to the act of independence; but in so doing they found themselves in the no less fatal position of being obliged to disavow the policy of their own government. These envoys, as the English and French journals of that time clearly show, endeavoured to represent that the form of government for Hungary was to be considered an open question, and that this country could meanwhile be as little designated a republic as a monarchy. But with the overpowering conservative elements in England and France, which readily seized on a pretext for remaining neutral with a good grace, the position of the Hungarian envoys was by these measures needlessly embarrassed.

A far greater error, which must be laid to the governor and his ministers, was the misapprehension of their task in reference to the question of nationalities. The Declaration of Independence had no meaning unless the perfect satisfaction of all the wishes of the Croats, Serbs, and Wallachs followed immediately. The separation of Hungary from Austria ought at the *same time* to be a bond of union with the *South Slavish* races. That this was not easy of accomplish-

ment, must be admitted ; indeed, it was extremely difficult to enter into any kind of peaceable and conciliatory relations with those nations. Austria moreover had cunningly prevented this, by placing its creatures at the head of the hostile races. It had always been impossible to enter into negotiations with these men ; Jellachich, Rajachich, Suplicacz, Theodorovich, and the rest had received far too decided orders, far too brilliant promises, to allow this.

But seeing that an understanding with the *leaders* of the Sclaves was impossible,—and knowing that numerous voices among these races were beginning to raise the question of an alliance with Hungary,—the government ought, for this very reason, to have disarmed the power of the leaders, by issuing a proclamation, and at once conceding all the demands of the Hungarian Sclaves, however exaggerated. No attempt ought to have been made to negotiate with the leaders, but the diet should have addressed themselves directly with this explanation to the people. By such a step the Declaration of Independence would have gained in significance and grandeur. It would have been befitting a nation like Hungary, in the moment of triumph, to have shown herself high-minded and generous toward her armed but vanquished brethren,—to have granted as a free-will offering to the conquered, what could never be conceded in point of right to the conqueror.

This was the policy which circumstances peremptorily demanded. It was not a case that admitted of negotiation, postponement, or half measures. This was the only safe policy for Hungary, after she had thrown off the yoke of Austria : from that moment it was the more imperative on her to unite her cause

with that of her nationalities, and to attach their interests indissolubly with her own. The Hungarian government would by this measure have dispelled the last appearances of any misapprehension of her views, and the antique heroism of this noble nation would, by such unparalleled and generous advances, have acquired a new and brilliant lustre. Batthyanyi especially in his position ought to have reflected, that such an act would have produced a much greater impression upon the world than any protestation, however eloquent, against Russian intervention. For we must not deceive ourselves: the question of Hungarian nationalities is such a tangled one, that other countries can scarcely be brought to conceive how Austria had succeeded in gaining the Slaves on her side. A great many statesmen, from ignorance of these relations, were inclined to listen to the Austrian notes, which craftily spoke merely of a "handful" of malcontents in Hungary. Such a designation of the great revolution was at least comprehensible, and for the policy of many statesmen the most convenient.

The act of independence might have been the cradle of Hungary's freedom: it was wrecked, on the false policy of the ministry, on the overthrow of Kossuth, and on Görgey's treachery.

CHAPTER XI.

ADVANCE OF THE RUSSIANS—GÖRGEY ON THE WAAG—HAYNAU TAKES THE FIELD—EXECUTION OF MEDNIANSKI, GRUBER, AND RAZGA—KOSSUTH, GÖRGEY, AND DAMIANICH—PLAN OF OPERATIONS OF THE HUNGARIANS—BATTLE OF PERED AND SZIGARD—FLIGHT OF GÖRGEY—POSITION OF THE WAR IN THE SOUTH AND EAST.

Two full months elapsed between the great battles on the Theiss and Danube,—the result of which was the retreat of the Austrian main army,—to the moment when the united Russians and Austrians opened the second decisive campaign. In May the siege and storming of Buda took place; June was wasted by Görgey in purposeless battles on the Waag and Danube.

In vain Kossuth adhered to the plan of Dembinski and Vetter, according to which the victorious Magyar army was to divide into two great halves,—one to invade Austria or Styria, and the other Galicia, with a view to transfer the field of battle and the revolution beyond the frontiers of Hungary. In vain was Görgey urged to lead forward his army resolutely, in order to gain a decisive step before the Russians invaded the country; all orders and entreaties were thrown away on the obstinacy of this general, who, while professing his readiness to obey, never executed the commands that issued from Debreczin.

On the 2d of May, General Legedics announced by beat of drum in Cracow, that the Russians were on *their march*, to enter the Austrian territory as allies.

The weakness of Austria was proclaimed with a certain pomp. The drummers were ordered to beat the death-march, as at the last moments of a criminal led out to execution. The Austrian government had pronounced its own sentence.

On the 4th of May, seventeen thousand Russians crossed the frontier *via* Cracow; on the following day twenty-two thousand, with eleven thousand four hundred and fifty horses. On the 8th, fifteen thousand crossed the frontier to Tarnograd, and twenty-six thousand to Brody, with nine thousand eight hundred horses. On the 9th, seventeen thousand men entered Wolosezys, and on the 11th followed nine thousand by way of Hussyatyn. At the same time the Russian columns from the Bukowina and Wallachia were set in motion in the direction of Transylvania. In all, Paskiewitz advanced at the head of one hundred and six thousand men, with twenty-three thousand cavalry. Under him commanded the generals-in-chief Rüdiger and Tscheodajeff. At the same time (May 5th) the young Emperor Francis Joseph went for the first time to Vienna, and formally assumed the command-in-chief of the army.

On the 12th of May, the emperor issued a manifesto to the Hungarians, announcing the Russian intervention, and again summoning them to an unconditional surrender. In answer to this, the Hungarians advanced the same day to Sommerein, after scattering to the winds an Austrian brigade. But Görgey on this occasion played with human life for the mere sake of sport on the following day he recalled his troops from Sommerein. The whole of the Large Schütt island, the *left bank of the Waag* and the right bank of the *I nube*, up to Raab and Hochstrass, were in his power

in his rear not a single soldier of the enemy, before him a defeated army, which had great difficulty in collecting again and recruiting its ranks. Thus stood Görgey, we might say, before the castle of Pressburg, before the gates of Vienna, and wasted in criminal wantonness his most favourable and precious time, and the finest forces of his country.

On the 30th of May, Baron Haynau was invested with unlimited powers. He came still hot from the slaughter at Brescia—heralded by the worst reputation of his age. At the storming at Brescia he observed a priest, who from a barricade had fired several shots at him. “The fellow will not hit me,” said he; “I shall not fall by the hand of the enemy, but by assassination.” He now came from the land where murder is naturalized, to a country of open, honourable warfare; here he had no cause of apprehension from the assassin’s blow, and he has shown his ability to make the most of his power after his own fashion.

The traveller in mountainous regions often stands upon the edge of an abyss, so deep, and dark, and fearful, that he shudders to look down into the chasm. With a similar feeling humanity recoils before the character of this Haynau, scarcely daring to cast a glance into its depths, so frightful is every outward and visible manifestation of the influences there at work. Hardly had he received the command, hardly had he time to muster his forces, to reconnoitre the ground upon which he was to begin the war in earnest, hardly had he issued a single order of the day, when already two sentences of death had received his signature. Baron Mednianski died on the gallows, and with him Gruber, on the 5th of June at Pressburg. *The former as commandant, and the latter as artillery-*

man, had taken an active part in the defence of Leopoldstadt. A cry of horror rang through the whole empire, a wild cry of revenge echoed through Hungary, when people saw the manner in which Haynau passed sentence on his prisoners of war; and hardly had the pale look of horror disappeared from men's countenances, when the sentence of death was passed and executed (June 18th) on the priest Razga. In vain had the citizens of Pressburg supplicated mercy for this universally honoured man: he was doomed to the gallows, and ever since that time the hangman has had full employment wherever Haynau's courts-martial have been held. But with all his bloody sentences Haynau could only create martyrs,—to intimidate, to terrify, to disarm, to convince, he was unable.

The battles between the opposed armies continued with brief intermission. The Hungarian generals carried on the war upon a small scale with alternate success, but attended with a great sacrifice of life, and the clear stream of the Waag was too often reddened with the blood of the slain.

In the middle of this cold mountain-stream arise here and there hot springs, coming and disappearing according to secret laws of nature; from out the blood-red water a white column of steam arose, curled on the surface, and passed away. This was frequently to be seen in the month of June at Ujhely, Pischtyan, and Szered.

At the last town the Austrians attempted, after repeated and fruitless attacks, to effect a passage. Their scouts met with no enemy on the further bank; it seemed as if the latter, alarmed at the approach of the Russians, had abandoned the defence of the Waag, and retreated in the direction of Komorn. A

battalion of infantry, two companies of riflemen, and a foot-battery crossed the river on one of the hastily-constructed pontoon-bridges. But the left bank of the Waag proved fatal ground to the imperial generals, —it was this time the grave of a battalion. Hardly had they reached Sempste, when the Hungarians charged impetuously out of the forest, which borders the chain of the Carpathians. The last corps of the Austrians succeeded in regaining the bridge, and reaching the other side; but the greater portion of the troops, together with their cannon and standard, were lost. Even those who afterward escaped to the river could not get over, for the first body of fugitives, thinking only of their own safety, had destroyed the bridge behind them. The Waag is deep and rapid, and most of the soldiers trusted themselves rather to the mercy of the Hungarians than of the river-god.

Of all the engagements which were fought at this time at different points, and in which both parties suffered considerable loss, the battle on the Rabnitz, near Csorna, caused by the rashness of an Austrian staff-officer, was the most important.

Colonel Zesner of the imperial regiment of Uhlans had been appointed to command the Wyss brigade, which was to join the first division under Schlik. On the 13th of May, Wyss had orders to advance upon Csorna, to cover the right flank of Schlik's army, who was moving toward Raab. The evening before Colonel Zesner wished to reconnoitre the enemy's positions, and for this purpose hired a peasant's cart, pointing out to the driver the road he was to take. The Magyar peasant knew the country well, and must have been aware that Hungarian outposts were advanced far in *this direction*; nevertheless it did not enter his head

to call the colonel's attention to this circumstance, nay he even exceeded the request of the latter, and conducted him not only within the Hungarian line, but into its very centre. Zesner suddenly found himself in the village surrounded by peasants and hussars. Resistance was evidently vain, nevertheless he used his *pallasch* for some time against the peasantry with success. An old captain of hussars, who probably felt interested in the brave officer, likewise laid about him with a stick, and forced his way through the crowd to the cart, against which the colonel stood leaning to defend himself. The hussar called on him to surrender,—a sabre-stroke was the reply. Colonel Zesner was now a lost man—he fell bleeding from a hundred wounds. In his pocket was found the order of the day for the morrow, and thus the plan of the advance was betrayed.

At daybreak on the 13th a strong Hungarian column debouched across the Rabnitz at Marczaltö, and attacked the brigade on the right flank. Its force had been unwarrantably weakened, the passages of the Rabnitz had been insufficiently manned, and in addition to all this was Zesner's disaster with the order of the day. These circumstances combined led to the defeat of the Wyss brigade,—the severest blow which the Austrians had experienced for some time.

Four battalions of infantry, two companies of riflemen, three divisions of Uhlans, and three batteries, constituted the force of this brigade. But distributed as it was, (the outposts were already on the Lake of Konyi,) its single divisions were unable to resist a concentrated attack. The peasants of Csorna and the surrounding villages, who were prepared for the blow, *did their part*: more than a third of the brigade was

lost. The Uhlans fought with superhuman bravery, to cover the retreat as effectually as possible: General Wyss himself held out in their ranks, until he fell from his horse, severely wounded, into the hands of the pursuing enemy.

But, as was invariably the case in such discomfitures of the Austrians, the fault of this occurrence was laid to the charge of Hungarian spies. The chaplain and schoolmaster of the village of Siplan were arrested under suspicion and conducted to Edenburg. And yet this time at least the whole treason was found sticking in the pocket of the unlucky colonel, and in the false dispositions of the commander of the brigade.

A week later, these disasters of the Austrians were fearfully paid back, and the petty warfare gave place to greater battles. But to form a correct conception of the following events, and a fair estimate of Kossuth and Görgey, a few preliminary remarks are necessary.

The reader will recollect that Görgey encamped before Buda with 30,000 men, in direct opposition to the command of the government. After this error had been committed, which Görgey endeavoured to palliate by a courteous excuse, Kossuth could only insist that Buda should be taken as speedily as possible; for to raise the siege of this *quasi*-fortress would have produced too mischievous an impression on the army and throughout the country. Meanwhile Kossuth was meditating to remove Görgey from the command. He valued him as a brave general, but considered him a better tactician than strategist, seeing that a series of such brilliant victories had been turned to no better account. Repressing any suspicion of intentional treachery, as often as it arose in his mind, he offered Görgey the portfolio of the war ministry, and ap-

pointed Damianich to the chief command of the army of the Danube.

Görgey accepted the offer, and spoke of Kossuth's choice as the best possible. Nevertheless he did not leave the army, but wrote word that he must first take Buda. Meanwhile he endeavoured to remove from his side those generals who adhered to Kossuth as the highest expression of power, and at length even prevailed on Damianich to go in his stead to Debreczin and join the ministry. Damianich started, but met with a fall from his carriage and broke his leg.

Kossuth was greatly alarmed by Görgey's disobedience, no less than by the accident that had befallen Damianich. He now saw no possibility of finding a worthy successor to Görgey. Dembinski and Vetter were both out of the question: Bem had enough to occupy him in Transylvania, and Damianich, the only man who could be measured with Görgey, was *hors de combat*,—Damianich, whom Kossuth prized above all others, whom he trusted the most. And rightly too; it was Damianich to whom, after Görgey, belonged the glory of all the battles from Hatvan to Komorn.

In consequence of the unfortunate accident to Damianich, Görgey retained the command. He made Kossuth the proposal to transfer it to Bem, well knowing that Kossuth would not consent to such a step; and thus he remained minister of war and commander-in-chief of the finest division of the army. To fulfil the duties of the first office he went frequently to Buda, meanwhile intrusting his corps to the chief of his staff. This officer, named Bayer, was his favourite; he commanded the movements on the Waag, behind *the line of operation*, and was the cause of the losses *which the Hungarians sustained in that quarter*,—

losses which Görgey always repaired in a brilliant manner on his return from Buda. No wonder that his soldiers worshipped him, or that he appeared to them a being of a higher order, coming to the relief of his sub-officers, whom he everywhere exposed from motives of remorseless vanity. Görgey henceforth paid not the slightest regard to the general plan of operations which had been agreed upon at Debreczin. According to this plan, he was to have moved with 50,000 of the choicest troops to the right bank of the Danube. The road was open to him. With Komorn as a *point d'appui*, he was to have given battle to the Austrians, if Haynau accepted it. If victorious, he was to have marched direct upon Vienna; but if Haynau avoided a battle, he was then to have driven him over the frontier. In case the Hungarians were defeated, they would have had in Komorn support enough to venture a second battle, aided by reinforcements from the Upper Theiss and the Banat. The war against the Russians would only then have begun, and if successful the Hungarian generals would have been enabled to transfer the scene of the war to Galicia or Austria.* But in the worst event—as had been agreed—50,000 to 60,000 men would still have remained together, to force the road by Fiume into the territory of Trieste

* According to Kossuth's statement, the number and distribution of the Magyar forces were at that time as follow:—

Görgey's corps (after all losses)	45,000 men.
In the Banat.....	30,000 "
In Transylvania	40,000 "
On the Upper Theiss (county of Saros)	12,000 "
In the Marmoros	6,000 "
In Peterwardein	8,000 "
	141,000 men.

and come to the aid of the Italians,—a turn of affairs which might have been of the greatest importance to the whole of Europe, especially when it is reflected that a large portion of Radetzky's army consisted of Hungarian regiments.

Austria, alone, would not have been able to withstand this shock, and the advance of Russian troops so far into the west would have set Europe in flames.

Görgey's conduct since the battle of Szöny can only be designated as the insubordination of stubbornness and self-will, amounting, in fact, to treachery. No court-martial in the world could possibly put a milder construction upon his actions. He allowed Welden quietly to depart, Jellachich to escape; he allowed the Russians time to invade the country. What shadow of a reason can be alleged for such conduct in a military point of view? And yet, after all, there was still time to resume the original plan of operations, and to attack the Austrians on the right bank of the Danube. Again he promised this, in a despatch to the government, and again he broke his word. Instead of adhering to the concerted plan, he led his troops across the Waag, and was beaten.

This was the battle at Pered and Szigard, the first in which the Russian troops of the Paniutin division took part—the battle which compensated the Austrians for their defeats at Szered and Csorna—the first battle in which Görgey's troops fled.

With thirty thousand men and one hundred and eighty cannon, he crossed the Waag, which had hitherto been the line of separation between the two armies. Here he was opposed to Wohlgemuth, whose inferior *forces were obliged to yield before the impetuous attacks of the Hungarians.* This brave general re-

treated fighting from one position to another, with astonishing regularity; but his troops were harassed with fatigue, his cannon were silenced by Görgey's superior artillery, his cavalry could no longer stand their ground against the hussars, his columns of infantry began to fall into disorder, and he would have been doomed to a second day of misfortune like that of Sarlo, had not the Russian Paniutin division appeared at the right moment on the field of battle. Its columns advanced in the midst of the heaviest fire, like walls, set in motion by an invisible power, and every gap in their front ranks was instantly filled up. Vain was the bravery of the Honveds, the self-devotion of the hussars; they stood here for the first time opposed to Russian troops, arriving fresh from the camp to the field of battle. Wohlgemuth, meanwhile, gained time to lead his troops again into action, who took courage when they saw their allies stand their ground. Görgey's army was threatened in flank, and his troops began to be harassed; the tables were turned,—he was now the weaker, and his left wing fell into disorder. He was obliged to retreat to Negyed, which he effected with great loss of men and cannon. The burning of the bridges hindered the enemy's immediate pursuit, but Görgey was compelled to retreat to Gutta with his flying army, to recover his lost ground on a better opportunity. This never presented itself.

In the south, the tricolour waved far and wide—in the Banat, on the Theiss, on the windings of the Danube, as far as Orsova. Szenta had already fallen in March, and the Serbs cried "treason," and threw all the blame of their disaster upon Herdi, a staff-officer. On the 30th of March, Nugent was likewise obliged to evacuate Zombor, and the Bacska was entirely freed

from the Austrians. On the 2d of April, Perczel took the dreaded fortress of St. Thomas; Captain Bosnicz was unable to save this venerable monument of Serbian bravery, which was converted into a heap of ruins. Peterwardein stood firm as the rock on which it is built; four battalions guarded this key of the Danube, to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy. Temeswar was invested by Vecsey, Arad by Vetter and Gaal, with a view to prevent any offensive operations from those quarters. In the middle of April, Perczel advanced victoriously with the Tschakist battalion; he found Csurug, Zabalj, Gjurgjevo, deserted by all their inhabitants, and left behind him in burning ruins Kacnadaly, Kach, St. Ivan, Gardinova, Upper and Lower Kovily. On the 10th of April, he entered Panchova, and the South-Sclavish journals unite, to extol the moderation and humanity of this impetuous man, who never had faith in a victory unless his enemy was laid in the grave.

Meanwhile, the ban was endeavouring to push forward to the north and west, without succeeding for any length of time, although he was able to regain a footing between the Danube and the Theiss, and to invest Peterwardein; in the course of the campaign, however, we shall see him again in retreat to Ruma and Mitrovicz. Theodorovich had been driven beyond Panchova, and Knicanin remained fixed in the strong positions on the Theiss. Stratimirovich—one of the youngest and most able commanders of the Serbs, but the most fickle, ambitious, and faithless of all the hundred thousand armed men fighting on the Hungarian soil—occupied the Roman intrenchments with his troops.

The din of war had ceased in Transylvania, since the Russians and Austrians had been driven beyond

the passes and out of the country. The fields were all under cultivation, and shone in the brightest green; the passes were barricaded under the personal directions of Bem, who indefatigably sought to take advantage of this pause in the campaign to assist the Magyar generals on the Theiss and Maros, in the cabinet and the field.

Kossuth readily sought counsel at different periods of the war from the experienced Polish general, and Bem always spoke with reverence of the genius of the great Magyar. When, after Görgey's April campaign, Bem was present at the general council of war in Debreczin, he and the governor were mostly together. They were destined not to meet again until before Arad. Bem had himself barred the gates of Transylvania; he declared that with ten thousand legionaries he would from that time hold the country against a world of enemies; but the brave German legion was dead, a portion of the army he had employed elsewhere, and he himself was absent when the enemy pressed forward simultaneously on all sides. The brave mountaineers defended the positions assigned to them with heroic devotion; but the Russian generals had received orders not to spare human life; the passes and hollows were filled with dead bodies, and the Cossacks entered the soil of Hungary amid slaughter and desolation.

CHAPTER XII.

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vent him; nor did he for an instant lose the hope of retaining possession of a country which had become endeared to him as the battle-field of his fame, his genius, his hate.

The ban had for two months played a similar part in the south to that which Hammerstein and Vogl had previously played in the north. He marched continually upwards, while he read in the newspapers of his imaginary heroic deeds against Peterwardein, Szegedin and Theresiopel, without having advanced a single step. At O'Becse, indeed, he attacked Perczel's rear on the 25th of June, with double the force of the Hungarians; the battle, which commenced hotly, promised to be a decisive one, but Jellachich on the same evening retired toward St. Thomas and Földvar. Together with his self-confidence he had lost all resolution of action. Equally undecisive was the battle which the Magyars fought at Titel against Knicanin; they were unable to force the passage of the river: in vain the Serbs sacrificed their lives before Perlass,—the Theiss remained the basis of operation to both armies.

Peterwardein was meanwhile invested on one side, and although this colossal fortress had as little to fear from storm as from bombardment, yet its relief was necessarily, for strategical reasons, the main object of the Hungarian generals in the south. The Austrians under Lieutenant-fieldmarshal Berger had evacuated Arad, the grayheaded commander and the brave garrison having been dismissed with honourable conditions. The investing corps was thus able to join the Hungarian army of the south, which it considerably reinforced. Its commanders had for a twelve-month past an opportunity of learning something,

Bem had himself drawn out the best plans of operation, Perczel had been rendered circumspect by experience, and Guyon commanded under Vetter—Guyon, the bravest of the brave, who was himself a host.

Guyon was at Hegyes, in the county of Bacs, when Jellachich formed the plan of annihilating him by a great nocturnal surprise. Jellachich is no man of calculation: this was evident at the commencement of the war, when he marched into Hungary with the firm conviction that all the Magyar imperial regiments would go over to him; he has also proved this as a politician, no less than on the field of battle, where he was frequently beaten at the very moment when he thought himself sure of victory. So likewise at this time. Informed by spies of the position of the Magyars, he set out on the 14th of July, with the intention of surprising them in the darkness of the night; but the arrow recoiled upon the marksman. Guyon, having received timely information that the ban, whom he usually called "the perjured jack-pudding," contemplated to honour him with a visit, made his arrangements quietly though hastily to receive the uninvited guest in a becoming manner.

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retreat through the cross-fire of the Hungarian batteries. The flight lasted without intermission to the Francis Canal, to Verbasz, to Ruma; nay, even here the ban did not feel secure, and removed his headquarters to Mitrovicz.

He there mustered his troops; not a third remained of those whom he had led over the canal in that night of horror: the rest had fallen, been taken prisoners, or were scattered to the winds. To the undaunted valour of the Ottinger cavalry, which protected his retreat as well as they were able, at the sacrifice of their own lives, the Ban of Croatia alone owed the remains of his boasted army of the south. He attributed the failure of his enterprise to the "knavery of a traitor;" a successful surprise he would have doubtless called "the heroic act of a patriot." But for Jellachich to talk of knavery when opposed to a Guyon! why, the character of the ban, under its best aspects, can never be placed in comparison with the habitually honourable spirit of Guyon, which is the more admirable from its disinterested character.

The consequences of the victory were most important. The Bacska was freed from the enemy, the Francis Canal, his most important line of operations, was lost, the army of the south decimated, its remains driven into a corner, scattered and demoralized; the fortress of Peterwardein on the contrary was relieved, and supplied anew with provisions, ammunition, and men.

Thus the opening of the second campaign could not be called unfortunate for the Hungarians either in Transylvania or the Banat; in the former country nothing was lost—in the latter, all was won; at both points a pause in the war ensued, during which the

and come to the aid of the Italians,—a turn of affairs which might have been of the greatest importance to the whole of Europe, especially when it is reflected that a large portion of Radetzky's army consisted of Hungarian regiments.

Austria, alone, would not have been able to withstand this shock, and the advance of Russian troops so far into the west would have set Europe in flames.

Görgey's conduct since the battle of Szöny can only be designated as the insubordination of stubbornness and self-will, amounting, in fact, to treachery. No court-martial in the world could possibly put a milder construction upon his actions. He allowed Welden quietly to depart, Jellachich to escape; he allowed the Russians time to invade the country. What shadow of a reason can be alleged for such conduct in a military point of view? And yet, after all, there was still time to resume the original plan of operations, and to attack the Austrians on the right bank of the Danube. Again he promised this, in a despatch to the government, and again he broke his word. Instead of adhering to the concerted plan, he led his troops across the Waag, and was beaten.

This was the battle at Pered and Szigard, the first in which the Russian troops of the Paniutin division took part—the battle which compensated the Austrians for their defeats at Szered and Csorna—the first battle in which Görgey's troops fled.

With thirty thousand men and one hundred and eighty cannon, he crossed the Waag, which had hitherto been the line of separation between the two armies. Here he was opposed to Wohlgemuth, whose inferior forces were obliged to yield before the impetuous attacks of the Hungarians. This brave general

treated fighting from one position to another, with astonishing regularity; but his troops were harassed with fatigue, his cannon were silenced by Görgey's superior artillery, his cavalry could no longer stand their ground against the hussars, his columns of infantry began to fall into disorder, and he would have been doomed to a second day of misfortune like that of Sarlo, had not the Russian Paniutin division appeared at the right moment on the field of battle. Its columns advanced in the midst of the heaviest fire, like walls, set in motion by an invisible power, and every gap in their front ranks was instantly filled up. Vain was the bravery of the Honveds, the self-devotion of the hussars; they stood here for the first time opposed to Russian troops, arriving fresh from the camp to the field of battle. Wohlgemuth, meanwhile, gained time to lead his troops again into action, who took courage when they saw their allies stand their ground. Görgey's army was threatened in flank, and his troops began to be harassed; the tables were turned,—he was now the weaker, and his left wing fell into disorder. He was obliged to retreat to Negyed, which he effected with great loss of men and cannon. The burning of the bridges hindered the enemy's immediate pursuit, but Görgey was compelled to retreat to Gutta with his flying army, to recover his lost ground on a better opportunity. This never presented itself.

In the south, the tricolour waved far and wide—in the Banat, on the Theiss, on the windings of the Danube, as far as Orsova. Szenta had already fallen in March, and the Serbs cried "treason," and threw all the blame of their disaster upon Herdi, a staff-officer. On the 30th of March, Nugent was likewise obliged to evacuate Zombor, and the Bacska was entirely freed

from the Austrians. On the 2d of April, Perczel took the dreaded fortress of St. Thomas; Captain Bosnicz was unable to save this venerable monument of Serbian bravery, which was converted into a heap of ruins. Peterwardein stood firm as the rock on which it is built; four battalions guarded this key of the Danube, to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy. Temeswar was invested by Vecsey, Arad by Vetter and Gaal, with a view to prevent any offensive operations from those quarters. In the middle of April, Perczel advanced victoriously with the Tschalkist battalion; he found Csurug, Zabalj, Gjurgjevo, deserted by all their inhabitants, and left behind him in burning ruins Kacnadaly, Kach, St. Ivan, Gardinova, Upper and Lower Kovily. On the 10th of April, he entered Panchova, and the South-Sclavish journals unite, to extol the moderation and humanity of this impetuous man, who never had faith in a victory unless his enemy was laid in the grave.

Meanwhile, the ban was endeavouring to push forward to the north and west, without succeeding for any length of time, although he was able to regain a footing between the Danube and the Theiss, and to invest Peterwardein; in the course of the campaign, however, we shall see him again in retreat to Ruma and Mitrovicz. Theodorovich had been driven beyond Panchova, and Knicanin remained fixed in the strong positions on the Theiss. Stratimirovich—one of the youngest and most able commanders of the Serbs, but the most fickle, ambitious, and faithless of all the hundred thousand armed men fighting on the Hungarian soil—occupied the Roman intrenchments with his troops.

The din of war had ceased in Transylvania, since the Russians and Austrians had been driven beyond

the passes and out of the country. The fields were all under cultivation, and shone in the brightest green; the passes were barricaded under the personal directions of Bem, who indefatigably sought to take advantage of this pause in the campaign to assist the Magyar generals on the Theiss and Maros, in the cabinet and the field.

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two imperial invading armies in the north and west, according to the concerted plans of the two cabinets, pushed on their operations with energy.

On the 18th of June, the Russian main army, under the command of Prince Paskiewitsch, crossed the natural boundary between Hungary and Galicia. The third corps of infantry, under Rüdiger, had advanced its vanguard to Hethars, and was the first that encountered the Hungarians. But the adverse forces were too unequal for any serious battle, and the Hungarians retired to their head-quarters at Eperies. Rüdiger marched against that town on the 23d; the second infantry corps, under Lieutenant-general Kuprianoff, advanced in the same direction, while the fourth, under General Tscheodajeff, remained at Bartfeld. On this demonstration, which was intended for the left wing of Dembinski's army, the latter retired in the night of the 22d to Kaschau, abandoning Eperies without striking a blow to Tscheodajeff, who took possession of the town on the following day.

On the 25th, the newly concentrated Russian army set out for Kaschau, and, contrary to their expectation, found this place likewise deserted. It was evident that Dembinski wished to draw the Russian generals on to a precipitate pursuit, but the difficulty of provisioning the army from Galicia rendered it impossible for the Prince of Warsaw to advance rapidly. He allowed his troops a day's rest on the 25th, and (28th) divided his army into two columns at Kaschau. One of these divisions, under Rüdiger and Kuprianoff, took the direction to the south, and on the 30th reached Miskolcz; while Dembinski, still retreating, marched to Gyöngyös, and Lieutenant-general Sass with the rear of the main army occupied Eperies, from whence he

was ordered to reinforce Rüdiger's corps. The other corps, under Tscheodajeff, took the road by Tallya to Tokay; and on the same spot where Schlik had been beaten by Klapka, a small number of hussars and Honveds stood their ground to try the fortune of battle against the invaders. They were driven back to Tokay without much trouble, where they joined a strong Hungarian corps, intended to cover the passage of the Theiss at its junction with the Bodrog; but a few hundred Cossacks swam through the river above and below the point of passage, and put the Hungarians to flight, who had but just time partially to destroy the bridge. This occurred on the 30th of June at noon, and the same evening the Russian outposts occupied the left bank of the Theiss, having thus crossed the line of separation which the Magyars had hitherto succeeded in maintaining against their Austrian foes.

Tscheodajeff encountered no enemy on his road to Debreczin, where he arrived on the 3d of July, and quartered his soldiers in the houses, whose melancholy aspect exhibited no appearance of their having so long been the residence of Kossuth and the great Hungarian nobles. Tscheodajeff's corps remained here until want, and probably likewise the vicinity of ten thousand Hungarians encamped at Püspöki, obliged them to retreat. The Russian general was in such want of provisions for his troops, that he could not even carry off the arms taken from the citizens of Debreczin, and was obliged to destroy them. The motives of this isolated, purposeless expedition may partly be found in the vanity of the Russian fieldmarshal, who wished to be the first to march into Debreczin,—a point which

the Austrians had as yet failed to reach,—partly ~~in~~ his erroneous belief that the capture of this town would destroy the courage of the Hungarians. The Russian general had forgotten the history of Moscow and his own country; nor did he know that Debreczin without Kossuth was worth to the Magyars no more than any other town in the kingdom.

• We have hitherto observed three Russian divisions in their combined and isolated manœuvres in the north; further to the west we meet the fourth, under the imperial General Grabbe.

This general was to have covered Cracow, but he afterward received orders to advance from Jordanow, and on the 19th he took up his head-quarters in Also-Kubin. His destination was to press forward from the counties of Liptau and Arva across the Waag, in the direction of the mining districts, in order thence to effect a junction with the Austrian main army, and direct his march towards Pesth, Komorn, or Trentschin, according to circumstances. Crossing the Waag at Miklos, he reached Rosenberg; but the whole country swarmed with guerilla-bands, which prevented his obtaining provisions, seized on his ammunition-wagons, endangered his operations, and annoyed him in every way; while Benitzki, with a portion of the Polish legion, was strong enough to hinder a forced advance. Under these circumstances Grabbe could only retreat to Kubin, where he was nearer to his resources; and here he remained closely beset, in a state of inactivity, until Benitzki, more punctually obeying the orders of the council of war than Görgey, followed the Hungarian main corps in the direction of the Theiss. Grabbe now for the first time succeeded in occupying Krem-

nitz on the 8th of July, and Schemnitz on the 10th; still later, by means of his vanguard under Major-general Betancourt, he effected a junction with the Austrian General Csorich by Kis-Tapolcsan.

Thus the net of the enemy was drawn continually closer and closer. The Hungarians, as had been determined in the council of war, retreated from the north into the interior of the country, in order to form a junction with Görgey's corps at a given point; for it was easy to foresee that Görgey would be pressed from the west, whence Austria, together with her own collected forces, likewise led the Russian Paniutin division to the scene of action.

On the 27th of June, a few days after the battle of Pered and Czigard, Haynau assumed the offensive, and directed his army in three columns concentrically upon Raab. The right wing under Wohlgemuth, with the Benedek brigade as van-guard, was ordered to advance from Enese, to threaten the left flank of the Hungarians; the centre under Schlik was to follow the highroad from Pressburg to Raab, and the left wing to pass through the Little Schütt by way of Dunas. The Russian Paniutin division and the Bechtold cavalry remained in reserve at Lebeny and Sovenyhaza.

Francis Joseph commanded the Paniutin division to defile before him, and led the first *corps d'armée* in person toward Hochstrass. Görgey, threatened in his left flank by Wohlgemuth, withdrew his troops, after an unimportant resistance across the Alda-bridge. Here Schlik joined Wohlgemuth, while the third Austrian corps advancing from Papa had already crossed the Raab at Marczaltö, and threatened Raab.

itself on the left flank. Görgey could not possibly hold the town against such superior numbers, and he had therefore withdrawn in the night of the 27th with his main force towards Acs, leaving behind only a rearguard of 8000 men in the intrenchments of Raab, to cover his retreat. These likewise abandoned their position after a fruitless resistance, and followed the main corps. The young emperor entered the city as a conqueror at the head of his troops.

CHAPTER XIII.

ADVANCE OF HAYNAU—THE BATTLE BEFORE KOMORN—SCHLICK, BENEDEK, PANIUTIN—GÖRGEY—KLAPKA—GÖRGEY AND NAGY SANDOR—BEM'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN TRANSYLVANIA—BATTLE AT HATVAN—GÖRGEY ON THE SAJO, HERNAD, AND THEISS—PERCZEL'S STRATEGY.

SOON after the taking of Raab, Haynau removed his head-quarters to Babolna; Görgey's troops were encamped at Acs, opposite to Komorn. Here he remained, protected by the newly-erected ramparts, which may be considered as the completion of the fortress on the left, to check the masses of troops which Haynau was leading on the Buda road toward the metropolis. Under him in command were Pöltenberg, Knezich, Nagy Sandor, Bayer, and Leiningen. Klapka had assumed the command of the garrison in the fortress.

The Austrian lieutenant-fieldmarshal showed, at the very commencement of the operations, that he was on his guard against falling into the errors of his predecessor. All his manœuvres from Pressburg to Temesvar were evidently directed to the object of ending the war by great and rapid strokes. He was moreover unwilling to leave much for the Russians to do, as was proved by the haste with which he advanced toward Buda, Szegedin, and Arad,—a haste which, in spite of the fortunate issue, cannot be strategically justified, since it endangered all; whereas by a less

hurried advance, and more in concert with the Russian operations, little or no risk would have been encountered. But Haynau appears to be a man of extremes, in the field as in the cabinet; he wanted to press Görgey to open the road to Buda, and for this purpose he resolved to make a general attack on the intrenchments.

Haynau's centre was posted at Nagy-Igmand, his left wing in the direction of Acs, his right at Kisber. On the 1st of July he ordered the reserve corps under Wohlgemuth to advance from Igmand toward Puszta Chem, followed by the Paniutin division. The attack commenced on the 2d from these positions. The Benedek infantry brigade, the Bechtold cavalry division, and the Simbschen horse brigade, stormed toward O'Szöny, and were repeatedly driven back. Benedek vindicated his ancient claim to the epithet of the brave, and himself headed his troops. Without firing a shot, they pressed forward at the point of the bayonet over their dead and wounded comrades; but the heavy artillery of the Hungarians mowed down their ranks, and forced them to turn, followed by the hussars to Mocsa, and leaving behind them many dead. The Hungarians lost a field-battery, which, having advanced too far, had been taken by the Lichtenstein light-horse, after a sanguinary struggle.

Meanwhile Schlik led his troops to the scene of conflict, and the Reischach brigade received orders to take Uj-Szöny. In the vineyards surrounding this village far and wide, they fell in with some light-armed Honved battalions, which successfully attacked them. Now began a confused conflict on the narrow paths and among the vines, which at this season had put forth their first leaves. A hand-to-hand fight



was waged, with ball or bayonet, and often decided by the mere strength of arm and activity of limb. At length the Honveds quitted the ground, and withdrew toward the village into their intrenchments; but the Austrians on the first assault took the foremost line of fortification, and with a general hurrah planted the black-yellow standard in the earth, without the cannon of the second line, which completely commanded the first, opening their fire. Not until the rampart was covered with white uniforms, did they commence their regular cross-fire, the murderous effect of which forced the Austrians to abandon the advantage they had just won. Both sides allowed themselves a momentary rest,—they had both earned it.

Görgey on this day wore, contrary to his usual custom, the splendid red and gold-embroidered general's uniform, and his white heron's feather was seen at every point where any thing was to be disposed, ordered, or executed. The handsome, manly, but hard features of this remarkable man never wore the full expression of his soul until facing an enemy in battle: that was the moment when his face exhibited the excitement, enthusiasm, thirst of fight, and passion of his nature. Whoever has seen Görgey in battle will never forget him: no wonder that his troops worshipped him as a god.

Görgey saw the best forces of the imperial army wasting away before his Honved artillery, and it rejoiced the soul of this proud man to confront the first nobility of Austria as an enemy of equal rank—he, a man but lately without position, name, property, or ancestry, although gifted by nature with a consciousness of his own power, and nevertheless neglected, passed over in favour of young puppies of rich and

noble families. He now saw them again, these proud cavaliers of Austria, marching at the head of their companies, battalions, and brigades—he saw them fight, bleed, fall.

Görgey was perhaps, on the 2d of July, undetermined in his own mind as to his position and future course of action. Whether it was the result of cool calculation, or that the heat of battle carried him away, we know not, but, after repeatedly repulsed attacks of the Austrians, he assumed the offensive, and attempted to break through the enemy's masses. With this view he ordered his bravest divisions of cavalry into the field; at Uj-Szöny the battle raged fiercely, and extended far and wide: Pusztá-Herkály, originally occupied by the Austrians, was repeatedly won and lost, and the Reischach and Parma brigades were decimated. At Acs twelve thousand Hungarians attempted to outflank the left wing of the Austrians; both sides fought with desperation, the one to force a passage, the other to prevent it. The endeavour to outflank the left wing was frustrated by the Bianchi brigade, who were masked by a wood; but the centre was in the utmost danger, when suddenly Paniutin, the saviour at all moments of need, advanced with his Russians from Pusztá-Csem. The Hungarians, too exhausted to recommence the battle against this new enemy, withdrew into their intrenched positions. Haynau himself, in a bulletin, acknowledged "the timely appearance" of the Russians. The victory remained undecided, but the Austrians suffered far greater losses than their enemy. Haynau had become convinced by experience that Görgey's positions were unassailable, while the latter perceived that Haynau's masses of troops were too compact to be broken.

The most fearful thing in the great tragedies of war is, that the experiments of the generals are often attended with a greater sacrifice of life than their most brilliant successes.

The battle of the 2d of July was claimed by the commanders of both armies as a victory. They were both right and both wrong. Each had failed in the attack—each had made a brilliant defence. But the Hungarian government must have learned to perceive, that such victories are nothing else than brilliant preludes to an inglorious end. The original plan of operations adopted by the general council of war had been frustrated by Görgey's obstinate self-will, especially after his announcing laconically to the government that he was no longer able to cover their position, and advised them to remove to some other town. The terror created by this message spread through Pesth with the rapidity of lightning. Csanyi, Vukowich, and Szemere remained longest in the metropolis; Kossuth preceded them to Czegled, to adopt the utmost possible means of defence.

The diet had already been dissolved: the pressure of the times allowed not of fine speeches. This Debreczin parliament moreover did not respond to the greatness of its task: it aimed at effecting important reforms, yet shrunk back from a great crisis, waiting to have this forced upon it, instead of anticipating its approach. The diet comprised eloquent speakers and true patriots, but no heroes in thought, most of these men following implicitly the dictates of the governor. A parliament may be induced to pass resolutions by the force of eloquence and argument, but it ought also to have the courage to carry those resolutions into effect.

But the government at length resolved upon a decisive step, and appointed Meszaros, seconded by Dembinski, commander-in-chief of the Hungarian armies, at the same time directing Görgey to obey his orders. Görgey received this announcement on the 2d, just as he returned heated, exhausted, and wounded from battle. It might almost be imagined that he had this day sought death: the words he is said to have addressed to his Honveds seem to imply this: "Forward, my children! the ball to-day hits me alone!" and his splendid general's uniform, visible from afar, appeared intentionally worn to serve as a target to the enemy's balls.

Fate, however, spared him; the wound in his head was trifling, but the mandate of the government rankled in his heart. Only three days before he had given an assurance to the Minister Csanyi, Generals Kiss and Aulich, who were sent by Kossuth to his camp, that he would carry out the plan of the council of war, obey the instructions of the government, and lead his troops to the Theiss; nevertheless, on the evening of the 2d of July all these promises were forgotten. He announced briefly to the government that he would no longer subject his brave troops to their decrees, but would employ them in accordance with his own views, and fight, uncontrolled by any commands, for the independence of his country. At the same time he remained quietly in his intrenchments, notwithstanding the daily arrival of couriers, announcing the advance of the Russians by the mining districts. He knew that every hour of delay on his part was one of despair to Kossuth, and he wished to show that the cause of Hungary rested no longer upon Kossuth's lips, but on the point of Görgey's sword. Lamentable vanity, which devoted Görgey himself, Kossuth, and his country to destruction!



Aulich.

Görgey again endeavoured to force a passage through Haynau's ranks; it seemed the last act of despair—the only alternative to his being compelled to lay down his arms on the open field, wedged in between the Austrian army of the Danube and the advancing Russians.

It was on the 10th of July at noon—storm and rain obscured the horizon, mist from the river and marshes lay spread out upon the lowlands which were intersected by undulating chains of hills—when the Hungarians debouched from their intrenchment in great force, and simultaneously advanced to the attack on different points. Görgey, having learned that Haynau had despatched a great portion of his forces on the road from Bicske to Buda, sought to take advantage of the error of his enemy, who appeared to him to be pressing forward with rash precipitancy, while the finest division of the Magyar army remained in his rear. He was fated soon to discover his error. The Austrian fieldmarshal had not weakened his troops inconsiderately. After having removed his headquarters on the 5th to Igmand, and on the 8th to Dotis, he merely detached the third corps under Lieutenant-fieldmarshal Ramberg toward Buda. The vanguard of this corps, consisting of Imperial Uhlans under Major Wussin, occupied the ancient metropolis on the 11th without drawing the sword; Ramberg himself entered the city on the 12th. The Austrian generalissimo was able to communicate to his lord and master the welcome intelligence that Austrian, not Russian troops, were the first that approached the ruins of Buda, for he still felt strong enough to hold Görgey fast in his self-woven net.

Görgey exhibited on the 10th, as before on the 2d,

the masterly skill of a great general and the self-devotion of a brave soldier at the head of his troops. In the wood at Acs the Honveds fought in close masses, and saturated the ground with their blood. The imperial generals themselves were struck with admiration at the national infantry, so much decried, who pressed forward with lowered bayonets, their muskets still loaded. They fought with all the ardour of young soldiers, and the cool self-possession of grayheaded heroes; but they found an iron foe in the Bianchi, Sartori, Reischach brigades, and the Ludwig Cavalry brigade. The loss was great on both sides, and night saw each army in its former position.

The Hungarians had not better success on the other points of attack. The hussars were repulsed before Mocsá by the Bechtold division of cavalry. At Pusztá-Herkály, indeed, Görgey for a long time had the advantage; the enemy's columns were overthrown; the Austrian infantry began to stagger and fall back in confusion; the fortune of the day was on the point of being decided, and the valour of a Benedek and Herzinger (these two generals had both their horses killed under them) would hardly have been able to save the battle to the imperialists, when once more Paniutin, Görgey's evil spirit, appeared, with his living walls of troops and his powerful park of artillery. At five o'clock the battle was terminated on all points. The huzzars rode downcast into their quarters; but Görgey exhibited a cheerful face; he trusted in his brave troops and his own genius to find another outlet.

Görgey's object now was to break through the Russian army on the east, having failed in this attempt upon the Austrians in the south. He ordered Klapka, with all the forces which were destined under

his command to form the garrison of Komorn, to make a general attack upon the Austrian main army. Klapka executed his commission with that bravery and circumspection which have distinguished this general from first to last. Sparing of human life, but the more lavish of powder and shot, he conducted his attack so skilfully, employed his comparatively weak force with such prudence and management, he divided his artillery and the few squadrons of cavalry that remained to him in so masterly a manner, that the head-quarters at Dotis were seriously threatened, and the Austrian generals led to believe that they were opposed by Görgey's entire army, who intended to venture a decisive battle for a third time.

Görgey meanwhile, unperceived, marched along the left bank of the Danube on the road to Waitzen, to meet the Russians. He encountered their first outposts at Parkany; they retreated hastily to Waitzen, which was occupied by a Mussulman regiment under Prince Bebutow. The latter begged and received immediate succour from General Sass, at Hort and Hatvan, and on the 15th commenced a hot engagement, fought principally with artillery and cavalry. Nagy Sander's corps had formed a junction with Görgey, who, after all the losses he had sustained on the Waag and Danube, had still under his command an army of 45,000 of the choicest troops, together with a park of artillery of seventy to eighty guns. At Waitzen, Görgey for the first time encountered unmixed Russian troops, and his admirably-served artillery kept possession of the field. The following day the Russians renewed the battle, having received strong reinforcements; Ramberg had hastened to their aid from Pesth.

The heights of Waitzen now became the theatre of

a murderous conflict. The fight raged into the streets of the town, and the walls of the houses were battered by the grenade and cartridge-fire of the Russians; but in the midst of this iron hail the Hungarians retreated slowly, as if intending to hold Waitzen to the last man. Here too Görgey commanded in his splendid uniform, in the thickest fight. Was it by mere accident that for some days past he had exchanged the plain green hussar dress with which he at other times rode out to battle for the red dolmany, or did he really wish a ball of the enemy to put an end to the conflict within him? Who can say? He was however long out of reach of shot, and on his march toward Balassa-Gyarmath with the greater part of his army, when the din of battle still continued in and around Waitzen. As Klapka at Acs, so here Nagy Sandor fought to cover the tardy retreat of his general-in-chief. Every drop of blood that was shed on this and the preceding days was Görgey's fault alone; the brave hussars joyfully sacrificed themselves for him,—at their head Nagy Sandor, the Murat of the army. This man was a soldier from top to toe—daring, obedient, self-devoted: the best cause could not have a better champion. Görgey disliked this general: he could not endure his openness, his frank manners, nay, even his valour; and certain it is that he ordered him and his corps to every post of the greatest peril. Nagy Sandor complained to Kossuth that he was purposely exposed to danger, the cause of which he believed to be his having on one occasion openly declared in the council of war, "If any one of us ever attempts to play Cæsar, I will be his Brutus."

Nagy Sandor with 12,000 men now made a stand against an overwhelming force, as long as he deemed

it of any avail; he then followed the main army, the enemy not daring to pursue him. The latter did not discover until afterward that they had merely been engaged with the rear-guard; and the Russian general openly acknowledged this in his bulletin, thereby testifying to the bravery of the Hungarians as it deserved. "General Perczel," said Kossuth, "was during the battle of Waitzen only a few miles distant with 26,000 men at Nagy Kata, but Görgey neither wrote nor sent. He had merely to have said one word, and we should have taken the Russians between two fires and annihilated them—but he was silent."

Thus had Görgey himself broken the first mesh of the great imperial net which surrounded him; he now lost himself in his well-known mountain paths, and for a long time no one knew where he was wandering. We will leave him to develop at leisure his skilful manœuvres, and turn our attention to other points.

In Transylvania, all the horrors of war raged in the valleys, on the mountains, in the wild ravines, at the gates of the most flourishing towns. After the mountain passes had once been opened, the united forces of the enemy poured incessantly, like a flood, through the broken-down sluices, threatening to overwhelm the defenders of the country from all sides. Bem's battles had been fought in vain, and even his conciliatory conduct, by which he hoped for a time to efface the hatred and jealousy of the different races, was thrown away. The presence of the imperial armies, their manifestoes and promises, and on the other side the straitened position of the Polish general, had the effect of arousing old hostilities, old recollections, claims, and hopes among the wild Wallachs, who in that country are called Motzen. The hordes of these mountaineers

were stirred, and thousands crept from their hiding-places like reptiles awakened to new life by the sun's rays. Bem saw the numbers of his enemies increase fearfully on every spot of ground he had to defend. A disproportionately small army was under his command, and although the Szeklers were ever ready for the fight, yet many of his officers longed for rest, and the pay of the troops began moreover to fail, since on the flight of the government from Pesth the banknote-press had been stopped.

On the 15th of July, Clam-Gallas had led Puchner's former corps from its quarters in Wallachia to Transylvania, (the Turkish government had not ventured, according to international right, to disarm this corps on their territory,) his main object being, in conjunction with the Russians, to relieve Carlsburg, which was hard pressed. But Bem still felt himself strong enough to enter the field against the united imperial generals. He collected his Szekler troops at Haromszek, defeated the Austrians who had ventured to advance so far, and threatened Cronstadt and Hermannstadt at the same time. The Russian generals, who had gained lessons of experience from their first unsuccessful campaign, remembering that they had once possessed the two capitals only to lose them again, would not sacrifice their honour and that of the Russian arms a second time; they prudently withdrew before Bem's army, carrying away their military chest and stores in the utmost haste from Cronstadt, after being compelled by two successive defeats to retreat to Illyefalva and Aldoboly. Bem took advantage of this weakness of the enemy to advance into Moldavia by the Ojtos Pass, (23d.) He hoped by his presence to put in motion all the revolutionary elements which had

accumulated for years past in the principalities; and as Transylvania was half lost, he sought to gain in Moldavia a field for new battles. In this he deceived himself. His rapid advance to Roman failed, equally with his proclamations, to raise the people of Moldavia, and he consequently had no alternative but to retreat hastily into Transylvania. Here, as early as the 26th, General Hasford, after taking the chief town in the Saxon-land, had driven back the Szeklers to Reismark. Bistriz had also again fallen, the Szeklers having fled like cowards before Grotjenhelm.

Lüders had advanced to Schassburg, and Bem, who appeared before this town on the 31st, could hold it no longer. He quickly marched to Mediasch, with a view to unite with Kemeny Farkas, who brought him four thousand men and twelve cannon from Klausenburg: strengthened by this reinforcement, he was anxious to make a bold *coup-de-main* upon Hermannstadt, in order if possible to drive Hasford back into Wallachia. His attack on Hasford's column leaves no doubt as to this intention; he repulsed him impetuously from the Salzburg and Reismark side toward Hermannstadt, which the Russians were obliged to evacuate, and were pursued to Talmasch. Hasford's corps would not have long been able to withstand the impetuosity of the Szeklers, the Rothenthurm Pass would have again seen the Russians flying from the country, Bem would have occupied Hermannstadt, and have had one enemy less to contend with, had not Lüders, who saw through the plan of the enemy, operated on his flank with a view to relieve Hasford. Bem, compelled to maintain a front against this second enemy, attacked the latter in his excellent position on the heights of Grosscheuern; but the Russians made

a stand, and their cavalry rendered it impossible for Bem to outflank their left wing, while the right was sufficiently protected by the hilly nature of the ground. The Polish general vainly exerted all his skill in manoeuvring; vain was the daring valour of his cavalry, who defied all obstacles of a hostile soil and the enemy's batteries; vain was the self-devotion of isolated detachments of Honveds, who, at the risk of being cut off, stole forward through the thickets on the acclivities, to harass the Russians on all sides. Bem was that night indebted to the clumsiness of his enemy alone for being able to lead his troops toward the Maros, which he crossed—never to return. We too shall now take leave of the mountains of the south, cast a rapid glance over the plains and marshes between the Maros and the Theiss, which at that time lodged no enemy, and direct our view to the valleys of the north, where we left the Russian main army.

The Russians were still encamped on the 5th of July before Miskolcz; Dembinski had withdrawn to Gyöngyös; the Prince of Warsaw had removed his head-quarters to Abrama on the 9th, and we do not find him in Aszod until twelve days later. Dembinski and Paskiewitsch—the Pole and the Russian, the general of the autocrat and the patriot of a world, the two old foes grown gray in battle,—here stood watching one another with that circumspection which testified their mutual respect. The Prince of Warsaw could only advance slowly, being obliged above all things to keep channels open for the supply of provisions. Dembinski, on the other hand, must have welcomed every hour of delay, as favouring the possibility of a final concentration of all the Magyar forces. He remained inactive, but ready for instant battle when

Görgey should appear from the east, to place the Russian main army between two fires.

Görgey did not make his appearance ; Visocky and Dessewffy were therefore obliged to remain on the Theiss, instead of reinforcing the army of the south, as had been determined in the last great council of war. It was to be feared that the Russian main army would take the route to the south, in order to unite with the ban ; Vetter would have been too weak to face both enemies, the Bacska would have been lost, and with it the last hope of a great concentration between the Theiss and Danube. Dembinski, in consideration of these circumstances, was obliged to relinquish his Fabius-like system ; and being informed by spies that his enemy was preparing for a great battle on the 23d, he resolved at once to anticipate his movements.

The Dessewffy and Visocky brigades had two days before threatened the right flank of the Russians, and repulsed a division of Uhlans, intended to cover it, upon the vanguard under Tolstoi ; but afterward, when Tolstoi developed his superior strength, they discontinued the fight, still retaining a position in immediate connection with Dembinski, to afford a powerful support to all his manœuvres. On the 23d of July, at two o'clock in the morning, three hours before Paskiewitsch had determined to break up his quarters at Hatvan, Dembinski's centre stood before this place, (Paskiewitsch, deceived by spies, believed him to be retreating toward Erlau,) and took it by storm on the first assault. The Russian soldiers had the previous night received a great allowance of spirits, and slept more soundly than usual ; their columns formed but slowly, so that, according to Dembinski's report, many of them ran off, or were taken prisoners in their shirts.

Paskiewitsch himself now brought up the reserves from Aszod, but was driven back at the point of the bayonet by the Hunyady regiment; and before he could attempt a second attack, the appearance of Colonel Bottner from Pata obliged him to retreat. The centre and left wing of the Russians were thus pressed together, and the right wing was also forced to abandon its position at Jasz Bereny, and retire to Sorokcar. The Russian general now united all his disposable forces, and drew them out of their confined position. At nine o'clock in the morning, the battle was at its height, at ten it was decided; the Hungarian cavalry and the Polish lancers turned the scale. The Russians lost all their baggage, twelve cannon, and eight hundred prisoners. Under different circumstances, this victory would have been important; but Hungary could now only be saved by a war of annihilation; there was no longer any question of winning or losing positions, but of the existence or non-existence of armies. The possibility of success was, at all events, opened to the Hungarians; but Görgey had only one object in view, that of overthrowing Kossuth; and to effect this, he sought to lower him in power, step by step, in order that, at the decisive moment, when Kossuth should confess his weakness, he might place himself at the head of affairs, as the only man capable of holding the helm.

We meet him again after the battle of Waitzen, on his route northward. At Retsag, on the small lake formerly known by the name of "Ocellum Maris," an insignificant Russian corps made a stand against him; he was content to avoid it. At Vadkert he again fell in with the Russian troops, but here also, like a lion, he despised inferior prey, continued his march toward


Balassa-Gyarmath, and took up his head-quarters, on the 19th, in Ludany. He now stood, on the river Ipoly, which, rising a few miles to the north in the Oztrosky Mountains, rushes with impetuous force through the valley; here, on the Raros Pass, extending between the river and the wooded mountains, he had thought to gain a firm footing, but it was too late. Grabbe, who had preceded, drove him still further northward to Losonc. Sass followed in his footsteps, and came up with his rearguard at Losonc, after the main corps had already marched out on the road to Gyöngyös. Nagy Sandor, who commanded the rearguard since the battle of Waitzen, withstood the shock bravely, and after a hot engagement, which spread into the streets of the town, was able to follow the main corps, united with which, he, on the 25th, occupied the strong positions before Gömör.

But the further Görgey proceeded eastward and nearer to the Theiss, the more narrowed became the circle of the Russians, who were pursuing and awaiting him. Sass, who hung upon his heels, daily concentrating the scattered columns, was now in direct communication with Grabbe, and the two generals combined their manœuvres for a great chase in the mountains, while Tscheodajeff in Miskolcz was waiting like a sportsman at his post, until the noble prey was driven within shot.

That Görgey on his way to Gömör did not once attempt to annihilate the inferior forces of Sass, and relieve himself of this disagreeable escort, is one of the most enigmatical points in his tactics. It is said that he kept up negotiations during the march with Dembinski. On arriving at Gömör he was too weak to fight, and thenceforth nothing remained but to avoid a

defeat. For this purpose he ordered Nagy Sandor to hold the positions before Gömör as long as possible, and then to turn aside toward Rosenau, draw the enemy after him, and keep the road to Putnok open to the main corps. Nagy Sandor obeyed these orders, fought with his Honveds before Gömör, engaged before Rosenau an enemy three times his superior in number, who continually imagined that Görgey was before them, and at length with his battalions hunted to death, starving and decimated, reached the main army at Miskolcz.

If what this brave general declared to Kossuth is true, that here as everywhere Görgey, out of mere hatred, purposely exposed him to danger, he had an opportunity at Miskolcz of taking a noble revenge. On his arrival before this town he found Görgey engaged with Tscheodajeff. Already from afar the thunder of the heavy artillery fell on his ear, and with a last effort of his exhausted troops he pressed forward to the field of battle. Miskolcz was speedily evacuated by the Russians; Görgey was enabled to take up the noblest positions from Onod to Zsolcza, to destroy the Sajo bridge, and protected by the stream, wood, and marsh, to undertake the defence of this line. Nagy Sandor and Pöltenberg performed here prodigies of valour on the 25th, at the head of their Honveds; while Görgey conducted the engagement with the whole power of his genius. The battle lasted from morning till late at night; Görgey's superior tactics, and his keen perception in taking advantage of the natural features of the ground, saved him and his army from utter annihilation; and neither his officers nor the Russian generals that evening doubted, that he would at once force the passage of the Theiss at Tisza-





Battle of Aes

fired. Tscheodajeff immediately made preparations to follow him; Grabbe had already marched from Losoncz, (which he had plundered and burnt down to revenge the murder of several Russian officers,) by the shortest route toward Tokay; but Görgey, contrary to all the expectations both of friend and foe, crossed the Sajo and the Hernad, and gave his troops a day's rest at Gesztely. In this position Grabbe attacked him, and was driven back to Onod, (28th.) Another Russian column, ordered at the same time to advance toward Tokay, was likewise arrested in its march at the Hernad. The head-quarters of the Russians were removed to Tiszafüred, and Görgey at length crossed the Theiss.

In following these movements, as here described, we cannot but admire the genius of the man who planned and executed them. His marches and counter-marches, north, south, and east, winding his way through by-roads in the mountains—his power of seizing at once upon favourable points, and the skill with which he took advantage of the mountain-streams, will immortalize Görgey's retreat as one of the most masterly in the whole annals of warfare.

When he remained at Komorn, forgetful of his duty, when he exposed himself at Waitzen to the fire of the enemy, when he wasted his genius on the Eipel, the Sajo, and the Hernad,—then he was a traitor to his country, while he himself perhaps merely intended to undermine the position of Kossuth. On reaching the Berettyo, it must have become clear to him as the sun at noonday, that he had not alone aimed a blow at the top branch, but had struck the axe at the root of his nation's independence. Throughout his whole march he had disregarded the positions of the other gene-

als, never informing them of his movements, and seeking to fight out his enterprise single-handed, that he might be the sole liberator of his country in the moment of her utmost need, and set aside Kossuth as an impotent prattler.

Görgey came too late; he was deceived in his calculation; he had split up his strength, and nothing remained to him save his measureless vanity. Hungary was lost through *his* fault; and he would vainly construct her coffin with his own hands. From that time he entered into actual negotiations with the Russians, which he had previously opened perhaps only in appearance, as Wallenstein did with the Swedes. What was Hungary in future to him, if compelled to join the other stronger corps with an enfeebled army? He loved in Hungary only the battle-fields on which he had won his victories. Ambition had always in his mind taken the place of patriotism. It was still in his power to retire from the scene an unconquered general: he did so, at a price which no man had ever before paid—the sacrifice of his honour, his country, his friends, and the freedom of Europe.

Dembinski and Meszaros, after having in vain waited for a junction with the army of the Danube, according to the general plan of operations, had retired slowly to Szegedin, and the corps of Visocky and Perczel alone remained at Czegled. Perczel still expected Görgey's arrival, and this hope made him stay till the last moment. We have throughout observed in this general the genuine stamp of the Magyar character,—proud, wild, imperious, but brave, patriotic, and true as steel. All injuries, real or imaginary, which he had experienced from the government and the other commanders, were at once forgotten, when

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Flying from the metropolis, cut off from Debreczin by the vicinity of the Russians, Kossuth and the government met again at Szegedin. Troubled by Görgey's fatal disobedience, yet not dispirited, he had done all in his power, "in accordance with his views," for the salvation of his country. "Within the space of eight days," he writes, "we raised, equipped, and armed a corps of fourteen thousand men under General Perczel, at Czegled and Kecskemet, which, united with Visocky, stopped the advance of the Russians; in Szegedin we again raised in one week a corps of seven thousand men, and provisioned Arad." At the same time he held large public meetings, and preached the crusade. Thirty thousand men rose at his call, to be led by him against the enemy: his voice was as ever powerful and inspiring, and his people the most devoted listeners. There was indeed at Szegedin a party in Görgey's interest, for his victories had excited a general spirit of enthusiasm; but the masses of the people lay chained at the feet of Kossuth, whenever

Paskiewitsch himself now brought up the reserves from Aszod, but was driven back at the point of the bayonet by the Hunyady regiment; and before he could attempt a second attack, the appearance of Colonel Bottner from Pata obliged him to retreat. The centre and left wing of the Russians were thus pressed together, and the right wing was also forced to abandon its position at Jasz Bereny, and retire to Sorokcar. The Russian general now united all his disposable forces, and drew them out of their confined position. At nine o'clock in the morning, the battle was at its height, at ten it was decided; the Hungarian cavalry and the Polish lancers turned the scale. The Russians lost all their baggage, twelve cannon, and eight hundred prisoners. Under different circumstances, this victory would have been important; but Hungary could now only be saved by a war of annihilation; there was no longer any question of winning or losing positions, but of the existence or non-existence of armies. The possibility of success was, at all events, opened to the Hungarians; but Görgey had only one object in view, that of overthrowing Kossuth; and to effect this, he sought to lower him in power, step by step, in order that, at the decisive moment, when Kossuth should confess his weakness, he might place himself at the head of affairs, as the only man capable of holding the helm.

We meet him again after the battle of Waitzen, on his route northward. At Retsag, on the small lake formerly known by the name of "Ocellum Maris," an insignificant Russian corps made a stand against him; he was content to avoid it. At Vadkert he again fell in with the Russian troops, but here also, like a lion, he despised inferior prey, continued his march toward

Balassa-Gyarmath, and took up his head-quarters, on the 19th, in Ludany. He now stood, on the river Ipoly, which, rising a few miles to the north in the Oztrosky Mountains, rushes with impetuous force through the valley; here, on the Raros Pass, extending between the river and the wooded mountains, he had thought to gain a firm footing, but it was too late. Grabbe, who had preceded, drove him still further northward to Losoncz. Sass followed in his footsteps, and came up with his rearguard at Losoncz, after the main corps had already marched out on the road to Gyöngyös. Nagy Sandor, who commanded the rearguard since the battle of Waitzen, withstood the shock bravely, and after a hot engagement, which spread into the streets of the town, was able to follow the main corps, united with which, he, on the 25th, occupied the strong positions before Gömör.

But the further Görgey proceeded eastward and nearer to the Theiss, the more narrowed became the circle of the Russians, who were pursuing and awaiting him. Sass, who hung upon his heels, daily concentrating the scattered columns, was now in direct communication with Grabbe, and the two generals combined their manoeuvres for a great chase in the mountains, while Tscheodajeff in Miskolcz was waiting like a sportsman at his post, until the noble prey was driven within shot.

That Görgey on his way to Gömör did not once attempt to annihilate the inferior forces of Sass, and relieve himself of this disagreeable escort, is one of the most enigmatical points in his tactics. It is said that he kept up negotiations during the march with Dembinski. On arriving at Gömör he was too weak to fight, and thenceforth nothing remained but to avoid a

defeat. For this purpose he ordered Nagy Sandor to hold the positions before Gömör as long as possible, and then to turn aside toward Rosenau, draw the enemy after him, and keep the road to Putnok open to the main corps. Nagy Sandor obeyed these orders, fought with his Honveds before Gömör, engaged before Rosenau an enemy three times his superior in number, who continually imagined that Görgey was before them, and at length with his battalions hunted to death, starving and decimated, reached the main army at Miskolcz.

If what this brave general declared to Kossuth is true, that here as everywhere Görgey, out of mere hatred, purposely exposed him to danger, he had an opportunity at Miskolcz of taking a noble revenge. On his arrival before this town he found Görgey engaged with Tscheodajeff. Already from afar the thunder of the heavy artillery fell on his ear, and with a last effort of his exhausted troops he pressed forward to the field of battle. Miskolcz was speedily evacuated by the Russians; Görgey was enabled to take up the noblest positions from Onod to Zsolcza, to destroy the Sajo bridge, and protected by the stream, wood, and marsh, to undertake the defence of this line. Nagy Sandor and Pöltenberg performed here prodigies of valour on the 25th, at the head of their Honveds; while Görgey conducted the engagement with the whole power of his genius. The battle lasted from morning till late at night; Görgey's superior tactics, and his keen perception in taking advantage of the natural features of the ground, saved him and his army from utter annihilation; and neither his officers nor the Russian generals that evening doubted, that he would at once force the passage of the Theiss at Tisza.



Battle of Austerlitz

fired. Tscheodajeff immediately made preparations to follow him; Grabbe had already marched from Losoncz, (which he had plundered and burnt down to revenge the murder of several Russian officers,) by the shortest route toward Tokay; but Görgey, contrary to all the expectations both of friend and foe, crossed the Sajo and the Hernad, and gave his troops a day's rest at Gesztely. In this position Grabbe attacked him, and was driven back to Onod, (28th.) Another Russian column, ordered at the same time to advance toward Tokay, was likewise arrested in its march at the Hernad. The head-quarters of the Russians were removed to Tiszafüred, and Görgey at length crossed the Theiss.

In following these movements, as here described, we cannot but admire the genius of the man who planned and executed them. His marches and counter-marches, north, south, and east, winding his way through by-roads in the mountains—his power of seizing at once upon favourable points, and the skill with which he took advantage of the mountain-streams, will immortalize Görgey's retreat as one of the most masterly in the whole annals of warfare.

When he remained at Komorn, forgetful of his duty, when he exposed himself at Waitzen to the fire of the enemy, when he wasted his genius on the Eipel, the Sajo, and the Hernad,—then he was a traitor to his country, while he himself perhaps merely intended to undermine the position of Kossuth. On reaching the Berettyo, it must have become clear to him as the sun at noonday, that he had not alone aimed a blow at the top branch, but had struck the axe at the root of his nation's independence. Throughout his whole march he had disregarded the positions of the other gene-

rals, never informing them of his movements, and seeking to fight out his enterprise single-handed, that he might be the sole liberator of his country in the moment of her utmost need, and set aside Kossuth as an impotent prattler.

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he addressed them. He had the power of directing them as he willed, but he restricted his efforts to the dictates of his conviction. He wanted the resolution openly to accuse Görgey at the time when this step might still have availed, and even now he only alluded equivocally to men who were no longer equivocal rivals.

Meanwhile the diet was opened at Szegedin, (July 21st.) In the president's chair sat Paloczy, an old man with all the enthusiasm of youth, and a matured understanding, easily carried away himself, and transporting his auditors by his ebullitions of spirit. Of quick intelligence, ready wit and eloquence, learned in the history of his country, a master in citing points of old law and musty formularies of jurisprudence, a living dictionary of the glory and heroic deeds of past times, this man had from the commencement of the great movement gradually adopted its principles; he remained faithful to these in the time of his country's reverses.

At this sitting of the diet, Szemere described the position of affairs, and the line of policy which the government had resolved to follow. His speech was the masterpiece of a minister who was expected to render explanations, but who neither could nor dared to do so. He spoke of schemes of pacification with the hostile races, of past sufferings, of sacrifices still to be made, of peace and war, of the tyranny of the crowned heads, and of national liberty. He spoke on this, as on all occasions, with learning and deliberate forethought; but he skilfully avoided unveiling, explaining, and representing in its true light the open breach of *the government* with their first general; yet this was *precisely what the parliament had just reason to ex-*

pect. Hunfalvi interrogated the ministers on the position of Hungary with regard to foreign powers, demanding information respecting the position of the army of the Danube; but they answered evasively; their silence was construed into envy of Görgey's merits, and the press from that day resolutely demanded that Görgey should be intrusted with the command-in-chief of all the armies.

The parliament held secret conferences, to discuss the great question how the hostile Slavish and Wallachian races might be won over to the Magyar cause. The result was the transference of the command-in-chief to Görgey, (with the proviso that he should render at a future time an account of his conduct,) a declaration of the equal rights of all nationalities, and an amnesty to all who had borne arms against Hungary. (Sitting of the 28th.)

The appointment of Görgey to the command-in-chief of all the armies was hailed with exultation by the people, who had the greatest confidence in his genius, and regarded him as invincible. Perczel alone openly opposed his nomination, and claimed for himself the post which was proposed for Görgey. His violent temper carried him away, and betrayed him into the most intemperate threats and unjustifiable expressions; but in the end he yielded to the order of the minister of war, who even took from him the command of his corps, which he had in part himself raised, and transferred it to Visocky.

Kossuth was at one time in Szegedin, at another with Dembinski and Visocky,—now in Arad conferring with Bem, and again in the council of the ministry; he appeared to have the gift of ubiquity, and at the *same time* redoubled his activity. Working incessantly

to bring into efficiency the machinery of resistance, he yet forgot that the two chief springs of action had refused him service—the army of the Danube under Görgey, and the banknote-press under the finance minister Duschek.

Duschek had formerly filled the post of imperial counsellor in one of the offices of the Vienna ministry. Ever a decided imperialist, his joining Kossuth, and his position in the revolutionary government, created a greater sensation in the circles of the Viennese aristocracy than the defection of many persons of higher station. He remained at Kossuth's side until the end of the war, slowly but surely counterworking all his measures, like his evil spirit, and offering every impediment to his operations silently but perseveringly. Inventive in raising obstacles to the erection of the banknote-press, he skilfully contrived to impede its operation when at work. He could never be prevailed upon to issue gold and silver coinage from the treasury—this he was reserving for Austria—and had ordered the small kreuzer-notes, with which the army was paid, to be printed in two colours, thus retarding their issue. The consequence was, that want of money gradually spread discontent among the troops; Kossuth was besieged by all the generals for arrears of pay, and was unable to meet the demand.

While in this manner the difficulties and confusion daily increased in the Magyar camp, the Austrian generals pursued their plan of operations with irresistible rapidity. Nugent had hastened to the aid of the ban, in order to set his movements free; after the retreat of Dembinski and Visocky, Colonel Korponai *with the landsturm*, could not possibly longer prevent *the passage of the Theiss*. Paskiewitch, after the

unsuccessful attack of his generals Grabbe and Sacken on the remains of Görgey's army, had started with the second and third corps from Csege for Debreczin; while the fourth secured the communication by Tokay and the tranquillity of the mining districts. Haynau marched towards Szegedin, leaving before Komorn a small investing corps under Csorich.

The heat in August was oppressive; in the plains between the Theiss and Danube, through which the Austrian army had to march, all the wells were dried up. The pools of water which remained here and there poisoned the air, from the dead and putrid bodies thrown into them; while dust, sand, and the sun's heat combined to make the want of drinkable water intolerable; the melon, which grows luxuriantly in that country, was strictly prohibited on account of its producing fever, and the water mixed with vinegar, which Haynau brought with his army in hundreds of peasants' wagons, was insufficient for the want of the troops. Nevertheless the Austrian army bore the toil and privations of the march with admirable courage, and strict discipline was maintained. The forces advanced southward in three separate columns, which were to reunite before Szegedin.

Haynau had not yet arrived there, when from the west he received the news of an event, which spread excitement and apprehension throughout the whole monarchy. Komorn had once more set in motion her formidable arms; Klapka had on the 3d of August made a grand sortie, which threw into the hands of the garrison the Schütt Island and the shore of the Danube as far as Hochstrass and Wieselburg. With twenty-four fieldpieces, 8000 infantry, and four *divisions of hussars*, he outflanked Barko's position,

attacked the widely-extended investing troops at Mocsa, Pusztá Herkaly, and Pusztá Chem, and drove them with immense loss through Pusztá Lovad in the direction of Raab. At the same time he ordered an attack to be made on the Austrians on the Schütt Island, in which they lost the whole of their baggage and all their guns, repulsed the enemy on the left bank to Szered, and on the 4th occupied Raab, and threatened Wieselburg, Pressburg, and the frontier.

Besides the enemy's loss of a great number of men, with their whole park of artillery, the garrison captured at Acs 2760 head of oxen, five boats laden with corn and powder, 500,000 cwt. of flour, and forty thousand uniforms.

The terror of this expedition, which was more than a mere sortie, spread to Vienna with the rapidity of lightning. Austrian and Russian fugitives (many only in their night-dress) had fled to Pressburg, carrying the news of the general's carelessness in face of a fortress so manned and provided as Komorn. The Vienna faubourgs, the birthplace and cradle of Austrian democracy, were already making secret preparations for the reception of the Hungarians, by whom they hoped to be freed from the state of siege and courts-martial. In many houses of the nobility, all was in readiness for flight; Haynau himself was alarmed, and ordered a strong column of his army back to Pesth.

But Klapka had set a limit to his enterprise, which, as a general under command, and responsible for the safety of Komorn, he considered himself not justified in exceeding. Among his officers, indeed, there were not a few who longed boldly to march upon Vienna—a step which, from the position of the Austrians at



that time, would have been attended with no great risk; but Klapka set his face against any such proposal. "It was neither his wish, nor within the scope of his orders, to undertake romantic campaigns."

Komorn received its newly-gained booty, and wrapped itself once more in the grandeur of silence. Klapka's expedition was the last bright ray of fortune for Hungary,—the last flicker of heroic resistance before its entire extinction.

CHAPTER XV.

KOSSUTH AND DEMBINSKI—THE SZEGEDIN NATIONAL GUARDS—
PASKIEWITSCH—MAIZE PLANTATIONS—GREAT VICTORY OF THE
RUSSIANS—GÖRGEY—PRINCE LICHTENSTEIN—KOSSUTH'S FINAL
PLAN—DEMBINSKI'S DEFEAT AT SZÖREGH—GÖRGEY ARRIVES
BEFORE ARAD—BUKOWINA—BATTLE OF TEMESVAR—ABDICATION
OF KOSSUTH—VILAGOS—THE NEW DICTATOR—FÖLDVÁRY—POL-
TENBERG—NAGY SANDOR—LEININGEN—SURRENDER OF ARMS—
CONCLUSION OF THE WAR—AUSTRIAN CRUELITIES.

KOSSUTH was resolved to hold possession of Szegedin. On the evening of his arrival, thousands had assembled in the great square under his balcony by torchlight and moonlight, and there sworn to fight to the last. The Theiss in the west, and the troops of Dembinski, Visocky, Vetter, and Guyon, together with the enthusiastic population of Szegedin, appeared to him strong enough to defend the intrenchments, which surround the city in a semicircle on the east. He communicated his views to Dembinski, but this general, who had long seen the impossibility of holding the Theiss at any point after the Russians had crossed *en masse* to the further shore, urged their taking the Maros as the line of defence. In his opinion, Szegedin should only be held until he had made his dispositions on the further bank of the Theiss; perhaps a single day's delay might bring Görgey, who was known to be in the neighbourhood of Debreczin.

On the 29th of July, Guyon, according to the orders he had received, arrived at Szegedin with his victorious

corps from the south. Ten battalions, consisting of eight thousand men, all good and tried soldiers, defiled before Kossuth in the market-place,—the same troops who had defeated the ban at Hegyes and driven him back to Titel. The eighth battalion, which had distinguished itself pre-eminently on that occasion, was addressed by Kossuth, and its standard decorated with the order of merit of the third class: these troops, reinforced by five thousand newly-organized levies, took up their position in the intrenchments. With this force, the whole army amounted to thirty-four thousand men; the national guards had been obliged to deliver up their arms, and were on this account embittered against the government; having in their first engagements with the Serbs shown that they could make a good use of them. But, since it had been resolved to abandon the city after a short resistance, it was necessary to save the arms of the citizens from the enemy's hands, and store them in safety for future struggles.

On the 1st of August the members of the diet quitted the town, from whose towers the Austrian outposts were distinctly visible. The banknote-press had been previously transported to Arad. On the same day the entire Hungarian army crossed the Theiss on four pontoon-bridges, and occupied New Szegedin on the further shore, to oppose the passage of the river by the Austrians. Haynau, who had already removed his head-quarters beyond Felegyhaza, and burnt down Csongrad, whose inhabitants had taken up arms, found to his no small astonishment the intrenchments deserted. Szegedin, which to all appearance should have proved a second Saragossa, was occupied by the *Austrians* without a blow.

Görgey had divided his army at Nyiregyhaza. Nagy Sandor was ordered to advance to Debreczin by forced marches, with a view to reach that town before the Russians, and keep them occupied as long as possible: the other troops were despatched to Nagy Kalto, Vamos Pirts, and Kis Maria, with orders to advance from these positions southward. Görgey knew that the Russian main army had crossed the Theiss without opposition, and was obliged to keep to the left, in order to avoid a dangerous encounter. A remarkable circumstance likewise, which must not be forgotten, was, that during the whole of his memorable retreat Görgey continued to receive accurate information of the enemy's positions; while the Russians, by the admission of their commander-in-chief in the genuine Magyar counties on the Theiss, were unable to obtain a single trustworthy spy.

Dembinski had advanced with his whole forces to Tiszafüred and Csege, but delayed from motives of prudence to penetrate farther into the great Hungarian plain. The left flank of his army was covered by the extensive marshes of Margita, bordered by tobacco-plantations, which, alternating with thickets of gigantic reeds, form the principal vegetation of this part of the country; on his right lay the outskirts of the immense Hortobagy morass, behind him the Theiss, before him the wide plain, the district of the Magyar Haiduck-towns and the Debreczin heath. He sent troops to reconnoitre the country for miles around, and gain authentic information of the enemy's position; but the Hungarians were nowhere to be seen, and the head-quarters were therefore advanced to Uj-Varos, (1st of August.) The Russian main army still numbered sixty thousand men, notwithstanding that

Grabbe stayed behind to watch the mining districts, and a second column remained at Szolnok under Colonel Chrulew to facilitate General Benedek's passage of the Theiss. This powerful army was set in motion on the 2d of August from Uj-Varos to Debreczin. The maize has at this season of the year attained its full growth; while on the lower part of the stem the female flower-bud is already metamorphosed into the fruit-bud, the light yellow male blossoms still crown the plant with their full tufts, giving to the country around the monotonous, tawny aspect of a desert. In a gentle breeze the plain has all the appearance of a yellow sea, while the thick plantations shut out any distant view. A body of troops wishing to turn out of the beaten path, to the right or left, would be obliged to cut their way through the maize fields, as through the tangled and luxuriant vegetation in tropical forests. These plantations, although consisting of such fragile single plants, can thus be used as places of concealment and for other strategical purposes, where extending over a large tract of country. On one occasion, the Serbs in the Bacska took advantage of them in war with as much skill and dexterity as the Indians exhibit when fighting in the primeval forests of the New World. The Hungarian generals had taken a lesson from the Serbs; and Nagy Sandor, on whom the forlorn task had devolved of holding an open town with eight thousand men against an army of eighty thousand, turned the maize plantations to the greatest advantage. His outposts were stationed immediately in front of the town, behind garden-hedges, ditches, and barricades of trees, in such a manner that four squadrons and two cannon only were visible. The Russian cavalry were prevented by

the maize-fields from operating *en masse*, and their attempt to outflank the advanced posts of Nagy Sandor was repulsed by the masked Honved artillery. The prince himself in his bulletin mentions in terms of praise the masterly serving of the enemy's batteries, which could not be forced from their positions without considerable loss. For this purpose he ordered four batteries under General Gillenschmitt to advance against the enemy's left wing; and as soon as the heavy artillery of the Hungarians began to open its fire on this side, four Russian brigades in full battle array, and covered by Cossacks and Mussulmen, marched upon the town for a general attack. Nagy Sandor was to be seen wherever the danger was greatest; he repeatedly sent couriers to Görgey, who was with his army only thirteen miles from the field of battle, imploring him to advance as rapidly as possible. The Russian columns were so much divided, that Görgey's timely arrival might still have rendered the victory doubtful. But to all appearance, on the left bank of the Theiss, the negotiations between Görgey and Paskiewitsch had already assumed a decisive character; Görgey did not stir, but with laconic brevity and coldness merely reminded the brave Nagy Sandor of the orders he had received to evacuate Debreczin after an attempt at resistance.

In consequence of this conduct, no alternative remained to Nagy Sandor. The hussars, attacked in front and flank, galloped back into the streets of the town in disorderly flight, followed by the Honveds in the utmost confusion. Nagy Sandor succeeded in arresting their flight, and led his battalions in good order out of the town; they were considerably thinned, and on their retreat suffered still further loss,

while four pieces of heavy artillery, with a large store of ammunition and baggage were left behind. The prince entered Debreczin on the evening of the same day, accompanied by the Grand-duke Constantine, who had shared in the engagement. On the approach of night the Cossacks relinquished the pursuit of the Hungarians, and encamped before the town, which had witnessed the most decided victory the Russians had obtained over the Magyars (a disproportionately small force indeed) during the whole campaign.

If—as is not improbable—Görgey, even after the battle on the Hernad, had still clung to the idea of effecting a junction with the other corps at the decisive moment, to prove the superiority of his talents and the importance of his service at such a crisis, to save Hungary by a great battle, and at the same time to annihilate Kossuth and his party,—if it is true, that *before* the passage of the Theiss he had still indulged in such illusions, these must surely have vanished, when he sent Nagy Sandor from Nyiregy-Haza to Debreczin, when he remained inactive after the former had entreated his aid, and when at last for want of succour the corps of this brave general fled weakened and dispirited to Grosswardein. Görgey himself passed Debreczin by a circuitous route east of the town; the only road open to him was that to the south, for Grotjenhelm and Lüders had already made their appearance on the western outlets of Transylvania. Necessity compelled him to draw near to the other Magyar generals; the enemy showed to him the road, which duty had from the first vainly pointed out to him, and thus he united before Grosswardein with the *unfortunate remains* of Nagy Sandor's corps, to *take the road to Arad*. On the 7th Rüdiger occupied

Grosswardein, the gigantic storehouse of the Hungarians, and followed in Görgey's footsteps, evidently less with the object of annihilating than observing him, and of being in readiness for battle as soon as the expected moment of inevitable surrender arrived.

In and around Szegedin, in face of the ancient town on the left shore of the Theiss, where a year before the Serbs suffered a sanguinary repulse from the national guards, stood the Hungarian forces, which after the dispersion of the Danube army had the honour of being named the main army, under Dembinski, Meszaros, Guyon, Visocky, Dessewffy, and Kmetty. One division only remained behind to oppose the passage of the Austrians; the rest encamped on the Maros between St. Ivany and Szőregh. The commander-in-chief of the Austrian army allowed his troops but a short rest, and then ordered General Prince Lichstenstein to attack New Szegedin. Two bridges were thrown across the river in the face of the enemy's batteries, but these were destroyed, with all the brave men who had ventured upon them to gain the opposite shore. The yellow, muddy water of the Theiss, scarcely ever fit for drink, was dyed red with the blood of the killed, and for a great distance, even beyond Szenta, no dog would quench his thirst in those waters. The Ramberg corps at Kanisza, who saw with horror the dead bodies of their brethren floating slowly down the stream, crossed the river after a slight skirmish; the Austrian main army took possession of New Szegedin, which was evacuated by Dembinski's rearguard; the ban was pressing forward from the south, joined by Nugent, while the Russian army was advancing from the north. The battle at Szőregh (5th of August) was obstinately and despe-

rately fought, but lost by the Hungarians. Dembinski commanded the right wing, Gaal and Kmetty the left, Guyon the centre. Couriers were incessantly flying to and fro between Arad, whither Kossuth had withdrawn with a part of the House of Representatives, and Szőregh, the head-quarters of Dembinski. Ere long, on the same road, the Hungarian army was seen flying in the utmost confusion, routed, dispirited, scattered in all directions, no longer subject to any command.

The reverses of the Hungarians in this great war were rapid and fearful. Unfortunately, Dembinski was wounded in the shoulder by a shot; he fell from his horse, and was carried into a peasant's cottage; for twenty-four hours the Hungarian army was without a commander. On the 6th of August, Mako was in the power of the imperialists, and thus the line of the Maros was forced. A retreat was inevitable, and Dembinski took the direction of Temesvar, which place was still besieged by Vecksey. Kossuth reproaches the Polish general severely for having marched to Temesvar instead of Arad, and expresses himself as follows in the letter we have before cited on the position of affairs at this crisis:—

“The gain of a general battle might have compensated the army for all its reverses, and consoled the nation under its sufferings. I had therefore formed the plan, that, should Dembinski have been compelled to evacuate his position at Szőregh,—nay, even without this necessity, if the day of Görgey's arrival before Arad were known,—Dembinski should have likewise retreated under the walls of this fortress. Here the two armies were to have united, and, regardless of the advance of the Russian main army, which was pursuing Görgey within two days' march, to have attacked

with their combined forces the Austrian main army in the Banat, whose defeat would have been inevitable. While the fortress of Arad would have hindered the passage of the Russians across the Maros, and compelled them to take a circuitous route, our united army would have driven the Austrians into this furthest corner of the country, pressing them incessantly southward, and leaving them no other means of escape than to seek refuge in Wallachia. Thus we should have driven them out of the country in a single encounter, as Bem did Puchner. Our army then, allowing the Russians to continue their march unimpeded, were to have crossed the Theiss into the Bacska, and passed the Danube at Neusatz. Thence it should have directed its march to Komorn, where Klapka had just gained brilliant advantages over the Austrians, have been reinforced by at least half the garrison of twenty-two thousand men in that fortress, and pursued the struggle with renewed power. I had made all necessary preparations to second this object, and to call into action on the other side of the Danube the immense strength of a people who have shown themselves ready for every effort and sacrifice. Supposing, however, that the most important feature of my plan—namely, the expulsion of the Austrians—had failed, then fifty thousand of our troops should have marched into Transylvania, defended the passes in the most energetic manner, and annihilating the enemy there with an overwhelming force, have attacked the Russian army in Moldavia and Wallachia. A successful result to this campaign would at once have induced the Porte to adopt a decided line of policy. Not *being myself a general*, I could only draw out the *plan of operations*,—their execution rested with others.

Dembinski, defeated at Szőregh, was on the 4th of August compelled to retreat; but, instead of directing his march toward Arad, a fortress in our possession, he went to Temesvar, which was occupied by the enemy, alleging as a reason his desire of relieving our besieging corps. This was a great error; after his defeat he was driven under the guns of Temesvar, and cut off from all communication with Görgey. His army, which altogether amounted to forty thousand men, suffered from the fatigue and privations of an incessant retreat losses quite as severe as those of Görgey under similar circumstances."

It is of the highest interest to hear Kossuth's opinion on the causes of his own and Hungary's fall, and to see how his extraordinary mind retained up to the very last its hope, its confidence, its activity. But this very confidence was the great error in his calculation; he trusted to combined operations with Görgey, who was all the while meditating a general surrender; he speaks of annihilating the Austrians by the concentrated Magyar army, forgetting that the latter, from the heavy losses it had sustained on all sides, was, even *after* the junction of all its forces, still inferior in number to Haynau's main army alone. According to his plan, the Russians were to advance unresisted,—taking for granted that their march would be in a straight line; he speaks of driving the Austrians into Wallachia, as if the Porte had not shown clearly enough, that her territory was rather a rendezvous for the imperial troops than a field for their destruction; lastly, in his calculation he leads the victorious Hungarian army across the Theiss and Danube back to the western frontier of Austria, forgetting that Debreczin, Grosswardein, Szegedin, the mining districts, and Transyl-

vania were in the hands of the enemy, and consequently that those invaluable sources of resistance were lost, which had given life and motion to the grand machinery of the national struggle.

Whether Kossuth's reproach to Dembinski for his retreat to Temesvar (in which others have joined) is well-founded or not, it must be recollected that the Polish general in his operations could in no degree calculate on any junction with Görgey, who, to judge from every circumstance and appearance, took all means of avoiding one. That Dembinski *has been* a great general, is a fact admitted by his most inveterate enemies.

The news of Dembinski's defeat at Szőregh reached Kossuth at Arad. He was sitting, lost in meditation, on a wooden bench in a miserable apartment of the fortress, which everywhere bore traces of the recent bombardment, when a courier brought him the intelligence. Fugitives had already spread the news through the town, and in the streets, where thousands of wagons stood drawn up. The most fearful confusion now arose: civil officers, private families, soldiers, women, children, camp-purveyors, were all rushing helter-skelter, endeavouring to escape from the threatened town. The banknote-press was removed to Lugos, the only place, in Kossuth's opinion, where it could be protected in the rear by Bem, and in front by Vecsey, who was besieging Temesvar. At length, on the 8th of August, the long-expected first columns of Görgey's army arrived before Arad. Nagy Sandor, who commanded them, received from Kossuth the order to march on the 9th at daybreak, to take Vinga and secure the communication with Temesvar; but the troops were worn out by long marches, and dispirited.



by their heavy losses; they suffered a discomfiture at Dreispitz and retreated to Arad, before which fortress Görgey had arrived the same day with the remains of his once splendid army. He yielded an apparent assent to Kossuth's plans, and made all necessary arrangements on the 11th of August with his whole forces to free the road to Temesvar. But the same night arrived the disastrous news of the loss of the battle at Temesvar, in which Bem held a joint command, after having quitted Transylvania on the summons from Kossuth to take the command-in-chief of all the troops.

Temesvar is a strong fortress, and contained within its walls an heroic garrison. Lieutenant-fieldmarshal Bukowina, who held the command, defended every point of the town, resolutely refusing all summons to surrender, until the roofs were fired over his soldiers' heads and the walls fell in ruins. When the Fabrik-faubourg was actually stormed and carried by the Honveds, he withdrew like a hunted badger into his furthest retreat, the proper fortress. Typhus and intermittent fever, cholera and want, shook the courage of the old warrior as little as the red-hot balls of Vecsey, who conducted the siege of the fortress. He remarked that the time for surrender would not arrive until his soldiers had gnawed the last skeleton of their horses, or "when the handkerchief in his coat-pocket should be set on fire." The brave old warrior did not hold out in vain: the garrison of Temesvar had the happiness of opening her gates to their brethren-in-arms. In face of the fortress, at Kis-Becskerek, the last decisive battle was fought; for a long time the fortune of the day remained undecided,—at last it turned in favour of the Austrians.

Haynau's right wing was already repulsed, after the reserve-artillery and the Paniutin division had in vain been brought on the scene of action, and the left wing was in danger of being outflanked by strong detachments of hussars, concealed in the thickets and woods. Bem, who had committed the command of his Transylvanian troops to another general, and hastened *via* Lugos to Temesvar, to assume the command-in-chief, considered his enemy as already firmly in his power, and hoped to crush him at once, while the Austrian central columns vainly sacrificed their lives before the batteries which Bem, taking skilful advantage of the ground, had opposed to their progress. But at the critical moment in the battle, Prince Lichtenstein appeared with his corps from Hodos, whence he had pursued the fugitive Honveds; while Schlik, advancing from Mezöhegyes, was seen advancing at Vinga. The fate of the battle was now decided; Lichtenstein brought a strong reinforcement to the repulsed wing of the Austrians, caused them to rally, and after a short pause led them on to the attack.

The hussars were thrown into confusion by the shock, and Bem broke a collar-bone by a fall from his horse, over which he had for some time lost sufficient control, covered as he was with wounds. The confusion into which the Hungarians were thrown led to their dispersion and flight, such as Hungary had never before witnessed. Lichtenstein's timely appearance on the field of battle and Görgey's non-appearance were the causes that lost to Bem a victory he had so nearly gained.

The immediate result of the loss of this battle was *the relief of Temesvar*. Haynau had the satisfaction *of being the first who, in the evening of that same*

day, (August 10th,) entered the gates of the fortress at the head of some squadrons. The place was crowded with sick and wounded; its outward appearance, and that of its defenders, showed that both had reached the extreme point, when defence was no longer possible.

The morning sun of the 11th of August gilded the towers of two fortresses, distant only a few miles; it shone upon two scenes which wore a remarkable contrast. In Temesvar, the poor, half-starved Austrians crowded joyfully around their brethren and guests,—in Arad, the Hungarians stood gathered in mournful groups, their hearts heavy with despair and melancholy forebodings. On the one side, columns of troops, their friends and allies, entered the relieved fortress, amid joyous songs and warlike music; on the other, all who were able fled out of the gloomy gates. In Temesvar, the Austrian generals, elated with victory, embraced one another; in Arad, Kossuth and Görgey stood at a bow-window in a small chamber of the fortress—met once more after so long a separation—to part for ever.

What passed in those hours between them—their mutual reproaches and explanations—we know not; whether Görgey's guilty conscience cowered before the glance of the governor, we can only conjecture; this alone we know, that Görgey crossed the threshold of that apartment first into the open air, as dictator—Kossuth following him, a hopeless exile.

Kossuth had all along governed in unison with the majority of the National Assembly; he resigned his power when they believed Görgey to be the only man capable of saving the country. Kossuth turned his steps southward, Görgey to the north. *This was not the first time that the paths of these men led in oppo-*

site directions. The new dictator, on the evening of the 11th of August, after being defeated by the weaker corps of Schlik at New Arad, had marched his troops across the Maros back to Old Arad. From this place he announced to the Russian general his determination to surrender, together with the miserable conditions he demanded, and the place where he proposed to carry the act into execution. On the 12th, he marched toward Szöllös, where Rüdiger arrived on the 13th, according to appointment. The act of laying down their arms by the Hungarians took place on the fields between Kiss-Jenö and Szöllös, and this act will be designated in history as the surrender of Vilagos.

On the 13th of August, the sun shone bright and hot ; Görgey's army stood in regimental array, twenty-four thousand men strong, with one hundred and forty-four cannon. In the foremost ranks the infantry, in the rear the artillery, on either side the regiments of cavalry. A deathlike stillness pervaded the army—their looks were bent upon the ground. The soil was sacred—it was the grave of their honour.

From time to time the report of a shot broke the stillness of the scene. Some hussar had fired the last charge of his carbine into the head of his faithful horse, determined that the brave animal at least should not survive the disgrace of its master and the fall of Hungary. Other of his comrades had unstrapped their saddles in the forest, and lain them aside with csako and dolmany, as things which they could no longer call their own ; they had then dashed off on their wild steeds over the plains, to resume their former course of life—the wild, free Csikos of the heath. The hussars too, in rank and file, took the saddles from their horses in silence, piled them in

large heaps, together with their arms and standards, and stepped back to their horses. Here stood the Ferdinand regiment, with its brave colonel at its head, a picture of grief and despair: his sword was gone,—he had flung it with a curse at Görgey's feet, when the latter succeeded in carrying his proposals of surrender in the last council of war. Beside them stood the Hanover hussars—Count Batthyanyi, their commanding officer, at their head, on foot: with his own hand he had killed his charger, the finest in the whole army, that it might never bear a Cossack on its back. Further on, the Nicolaus and Alexander regiments, Görgey's guardian-angels in the Carpathians, Hungary's avenging-angels in the victories of April,—shadows of former greatness, remains of the old regiments, in which but a few still survived to serve as the framework of newly-organized battalions. Close at hand stood the Coburg and Würtemberg imperial hussars. The younger regiments of cavalry were distributed on the flanks; Lehel hussars, which had not yet had an opportunity of emulating the older regiments—the Hunyady corps, which had already won the respect of the veteran troops.

The generals stood gathered in a group, or rode slowly up and down between the battalions. Földvary approached the ninth battalion with tears in his eyes; under his command, in conjunction with the third, it had been the first to storm the ramparts of Buda. The men loved him as a father, and had rescued him from many a danger; for Földvary, one of the bravest of the brave, was short-sighted, and frequently rode into the very midst of the enemy, whence he had again and again been extricated by his brave soldiers. At *this moment when they saw their former colonel*

coming up to bid them a last farewell, as if electrified with one thought, they formed themselves unbidden into a large square; the standard-bearer hands the flag to his neighbour, and thus it passes from one to another up to the colonel. Every man kisses it: then they lay it upon a pile of fagots in the midst of the square, and look on in silence while the flag burns to ashes.

Nagy Sandor—a Murat likewise in taste for costume—stands in conversation with Pöltenberg, dressed in his splendid uniform. Count Leiningen, Görgey's warmest friend, was pacing up and down near them; he was idolized by his comrades, but never made any pretensions to merit, content to assist in adding one stone to the temple of his friend's fame. Generals Lahner, Knezich, Kiss, Colonel Görgey, and others, were on horseback, conversing on indifferent subjects. Damianich, the colossus in stature and courage, had remained as commander in Arad.

The new dictator appeared in the simple dress which he was accustomed to wear when on march. He endeavoured to put on a cheerful face; but his features were more solemn, dark, and iron-bound than usual. He rode up and down before the hussars, murmuring here and there a word of encouragement, and slowly inspected the Honved battalions, the scarred warriors of the former regiments of Schwarzenberg, Franz Karl, Prinz von Preussen, Don Miguel Alexander, and Wasa. He then rode in front of the ranks, and declared himself ready to transfer the command to any one who believed himself capable of saving the army: this he was no longer able to do. A greyheaded hussar officer rode out of the ranks up to the staff, and declared *that it was his and his comrades' determination to cut*

their way through the enemy. But Görgey warned him dryly against any "insubordination, which must be put down by musket-balls;" and so saying he turned his back carelessly upon the officer.

From four o'clock in the afternoon until late that evening continued the surrender of arms, the divisioning of the escorts, and departure of the troops. They were conducted to Sarkad, and from thence to Gyula, where they were transferred to the power of Austria. At ten o'clock the fields before Vilagos were deserted.

The events which took place in Hungary after the catastrophe of Vilagos formed the last convulsive struggle, that desperate strain of every nerve, which immediately preceded the fall of this heroic nation.

The remains of the army of the Theiss separated at Lugos, where the semi-Wallachian population had buried in the earth their stores of corn, to withhold them from the starving fugitives. Bem, now commander-in-chief, could only prevail on a portion of his army to continue the war; the greater number of troops followed Görgey's call to the north, whither he summoned them "to unite with the Russians."

At Facset the army separated. Vecsey's corps, which was still a fine body of troops, and in the greatest strength, as it had taken no part in the battle of Temesvar, marched along the Maros to meet its fate, accompanied by the remains of other divisions. At Soborsin his whole train of artillery was captured; and on the 19th of August he surrendered to the Russians. Bem and Guyon directed their march toward Transylvania; but the Austrian main army pressed them on all sides, and old Dembinski declared to his countryman Bem, that under these circumstances he *was no longer able to continue the struggle.* Kmetty

alone, with about four thousand men, encountered the tenfold superior forces of the Austrians, in and before Lugos, to cover the road to the south; with his brave troops he arrested the enemy's march for more than half a day, and then sought refuge in Turkey by way of Mehadia. Bem and Guyon advanced as far as Dobra with their corps, which then dispersed in all directions into the mountains. The generals remained alone, and there bade farewell to a country endeared to them by so many recollections. (17th of August.)

In Transylvania the Szeklers continued to fight with desperation, defeated the Austrian General Urban at Banffy-Hunyad, and ultimately surrendered to the Russians at Sibó. Lazar, who remained at Deva with his troops, laid down his arms to General Simbschen.

Damianich, in compliance with Görgey's direction, surrendered Arad unconditionally to General Rüdiger; entertaining the firm belief, that now, for the first time, and in alliance with Russia, the real war was to commence. Munkacs capitulated to the Russians on the 26th of August. Peterwardein opened her gates to the Austrians on the 7th of September.

Komorn alone proudly and resolutely rejected every summons for unconditional surrender. Klapka's messengers traversed the country, with a view to obtain correct information on the state of affairs. Fugitive Honveds, single horsemen who had escaped from the enemy, wan and haggard soldiers, brought the news of what had taken place. The black-yellow flags waving upon the ramparts of all the other fortresses, the pale look of despair in every Magyar's face, confirmed the truth of these accounts. Komorn capitulated, *under favourable conditions*, on the 27th of September.

In Hungary, Klapka has been reproached by many

for not including, in the terms of surrender, articles which might have secured the political existence of the country; but this reproach vanishes, when we learn the mean, haggling conduct of the Austrian generals, from whom Klapka had to fight inch by inch for every point he obtained.

Kossuth, Dembinski, Bem, Perczel, Casimir Batthyanyi, Szemere, Kmetty, Guyon, Visocki, Vetter, and Meszaros fled to Turkey, where their residence or extradition was made a question of political debate by the European powers. The finance minister, Duschek, resides undisturbed in Austria, having successfully laboured in her interest. Casimir Batthyanyi, who only a few days before the final catastrophe had advanced to Duschek out of his own pocket the sum of ten thousand florins in Austrian banknotes, vainly entreated him to return to him his money: the finance minister was inexorable, and delivered it over to Austria, together with the other funds in his hands. Horvath and Vukovich fortunately escaped to Paris.

In Bem there was no wavering or hesitation: his inflexible mind was a stranger to all by-paths, on which men of a less firm character often stand, irresolute and doubtful what course to pursue. Bem's guide through life was hatred of Russia,—this was his pillar of cloud by day and his pillar of fire by night. To this hatred, rooted in his very soul, he has a thousand times offered to sacrifice his life, and at last his Christian belief. Dembinski, who on his departure from Paris declared, that his object in going to Hungary was to win by the sword a point of union between his own country and the South-Slaves, has always remained a Pole, and fought on the Theiss for his brethren on the Vistula.

On the 6th of October, thirteen generals and staff-

officers were executed. Four of these heroic men met their end at daybreak, the commutation of their sentence to "powder and lead" exempting them from the anguish of witnessing the death of their companions in arms. Among the rest was Ernest Kiss. His friends at Vienna had interceded to save his life, but in vain. He died a painful death: the Austrian soldiers who were ordered to carry the sentence into effect, and who for a whole year had faced the fire of the Hungarian artillery, trembled before their defenceless victim: three separate volleys were fired before Kiss fell—his death-struggles lasted full ten minutes.

The report of the firing was heard in the castle, where those officers sentenced to be hanged were preparing for death. Pöltenberg had been in a profound sleep, and startled, as he told the Austrian officer, by the first volley, he had jumped out of bed. The unhappy man had been dreaming that he was in face of the enemy, and heard the firing of alarm signals at his outposts:—it was the summons from the grave.

At six o'clock in the morning the condemned officers were led to the place of execution. Old Aulich died first: he was the most advanced in years, and the court-martial seemed thus to respect the natural privilege of age. Distinguished by his zeal and efforts in the cause of his country more than by the success which attended them, Aulich was inferior to many of his comrades in point of talent; but in uprightness and strength of character none surpassed him.

Count Leiningen was the third in succession, and the youngest. An opportunity had been offered him late on the preceding evening of escaping by flight; *but he would not separate his fate from that of his brother-in-law, who was a prisoner in the fortress.*

His youth, perhaps, inspired him with a desire of giving to his elder companions in sorrow around him an example of heroic stoicism in death; and, on reaching the place of execution, he exclaimed, with melancholy humour, "They ought at least to have treated us to a breakfast!" One of the guard of soldiers compassionately handed him his wine-flask. "Thank you, my friend," said the young general, "I want no wine to give me courage,—bring me a glass of water." He then wrote on his knee with a pencil the following farewell words to his brother-in-law: "The shots which this morning laid my poor comrades low still resound in my ears, and before me hangs the body of Aulich on the gallows. In this solemn moment, when I must prepare to appear before my Creator, I once more protest against the charges of cruelty at the taking of Buda which an infamous slanderer has raised against me. On the contrary, I have on all occasions protected the Austrian prisoners. I commend to you my poor Liska and my two children. I die for a cause which always appeared to me just and holy. If in happier days my friends ever desire to avenge my death, let them reflect, that humanity is the best political wisdom. As for" . . . here the hangman interrupted him: it was time to die.

Török, Lahner, Pöltenberg, Nagy Sandor, Knezich, died one after the other. Vecsey was the last; perhaps they wished, by this ninefold aggravation of his torment, to make him suffer for the destruction caused by *his* cannon at Temesvar. Damianich preceded him. The usual dark colour of his large features was heightened by rage and impatience. His view had never extended further than the glittering point of his heavy *sabre*; *this was the star which he had followed through-*

out life; but now he saw whither it had conducted him, and impatiently he exclaimed, when limping up to the gallows, "Why is it that I, who have always been foremost to face the enemy's fire, must here be the last?" The deliberate slowness of the work of butchery seemed to disconcert him more than the approach of death, which he had defied in a hundred battles.

This terrible scene lasted from six until nine o'clock. Nine gibbets stood in a line; for all, there were only one hangman and two assistants. All the victims died with the calmness and composure worthy of brave but conquered soldiers, without a trace of cowardice, without a sign of that enthusiasm which they had sufficiently manifested in life; they could well afford to disdain any outward expression of it in the face of death. But in Aulich's eyes shone forth the spirit of the martyr for freedom: Damianich's features wore an expression of rage; in Leiningen's eyes glistened a tear, at parting with life so young and prematurely.

No day of battle in the annals of warfare ever witnessed the sacrifice of so many distinguished generals as the morning of the 6th of October, and rarely have so many celebrated heads of a nation been struck off at one blow, as here before Arad, by the hand of the executioner.

Many miles distant from Arad, on the morning of this day—one rendered for ever memorable for infamy in the annals of Austria—the sun dawned upon a silent circle of spectators who had been disappointed of an exhibition. Count Louis Batthyanyi, the former president of the Hungarian ministry, had been sentenced *to terminate* his career on the gallows, and in the very *centre of the metropolis* that had idolized him. The



Count Louis Batthyányi

count had wounded himself slightly with a small poignard, and "from considerations of humanity," he was shot at sunset, on the spot where, according to the express orders of Haynau, he was to have suffered the most ignominious of all deaths. His execution had been determined on for five weeks; but there was a dread at Vienna of the desperate feeling which such horrifying intelligence might strike into the garrison of Komorn. This fortress had capitulated on the 27th of September; on the 3d of October the Austrians took possession of it with the usual formalities; that very same day Haynau hurried to Pesth, signed the death-warrant of Count Batthyanyi, and returned the next morning: his task was accomplished—within the same hour the sentence of death was announced to the unhappy nobleman.

"To be hung!—was this their mercy in mitigating my imprisonment?—to be hung!—Oh, base and dastardly revenge!—yes, the person who has sworn to my death—my death—" These were the words Batthyanyi spoke, at short pauses, when he heard his sentence. At the last word he broke off abruptly, bearing with him to the grave a secret which had long found its interpretation in the aristocratic circles of Vienna.

Batthyanyi wrote a letter to his wife, communicating to her his fate, and endeavouring to console her under this blow. Soon afterward the countess was seen hurrying through the streets of Pesth towards the Neugebäude, on foot and in the rain; but Haynau had forbidden a last meeting between husband and wife; and his deputy, Lieutenant-fieldmarshal von Kempen, dared not disobey his orders: he refused the *Countess Batthyanyi* an interview, and it was solely

to the humanity of Prince Lichtenstein that she owed the permission to see her husband. It is said that the count received from her the dagger with which he wounded himself; but recent authentic accounts state that he had it hidden for some time under his pillow.

The more important persons who were executed, besides those mentioned above, were: Prince Woronieczky, Peter Giron, Charles Abancourt, Baron Perenyi, Emerich Szacs vay, Caernyus, Louis Csanyi, Baron Jessenak, Louis Kazinczy.

These executions the politician designates as uncalled for, and unwise; the lawyer terms them unjust; the patriot, deeds at which to weep; and the people exclaim that they demand revenge. Görgey has the merit of restoring peace to his country, but it was the peace of the tomb. From the graves of departed friends arose love, piety, devotion, and reconciliation. In the present tranquil state of Hungary there is the fixed and resolute look of a country burning for revenge for slaughtered heroes and violated rights. Such a people cannot long remain in chains. It is too devoted, intelligent, and patriotic. Every circumstance assures us that if the clarion voice of Louis Kossuth should again be heard in Hungary, armies will spring to light, filled with a holy love of liberty and justice; and that the people, learning from the past, will nip treachery in the bud, and prove the men they trust with high command. May they win their noble object!

LOUIS KOSSUTH.

LOUIS KOSSUTH was born at Monok, in Zemphín, one of the northern counties of Hungary, on the 27th of April, 1806. His family was ancient and honourable, but impoverished. His father served in the Austrian army during the wars against Napoleon. His mother, who still survives to exult in the glory of her son, is represented to be a woman of extraordinary force of mind. As a boy he was remarkable for the winning gentleness of his disposition, and for an earnest enthusiasm, which gave promise of future eminence, could he but break the bonds of low birth and iron fortune. A young clergyman was attracted by the character of the boy, and voluntarily undertook the task of expanding and storing his mind. But this good fortune passed away. Louis's father died; his tutor was translated to another post, and the boy seemed condemned to have his thirst for knowledge rage unquenched. Yet by the aid of some members of his family, he was enabled to attend such schools as the districts possessed. Little worth knowing was taught there, but among that little was the Latin language, and through that avenue the young dreamer was introduced into the broad domain of history. History relates nothing so spirit-stirring as the struggles of some bold patriot to overthrow or resist arbitrary power. Hence the young student of history is always a republican, but, unlike many others, Kossuth never relinquished that noble faith. The history of Hungary especially engaged the mind of the young student. From 1527 to 1715, seventeen of the family of Kossuth had been attainted for high-treason against Austria—for struggling to maintain the elective character of the Hungarian monarchy. These examples were constantly before the youth.

In times of peace, the law offers to an aspiring youth the readiest means of ascent from a low degree to lofty stations. Kossuth, therefore, when just entering upon manhood, made his way to Pesth, the capital, to study the legal profession. Here he entered the office of a notary, and began gradually to make himself known by his liberal opinions, and the fervid eloquence with which he set forth and maintained them; and men began to see in him the promise of a powerful public writer, orator, and debater.

The man and the hour were alike preparing. In 1825, the year before Kossuth arrived at Pesth, the critical state of her Italian possessions compelled Austria to provide extraordinary revenues. The Hungarian diet was then assembled, after an interval of thirteen years. This diet at once demanded certain measures of reform before they would make the desired pecuniary grants. The court was obliged to concede these demands. Kossuth, having completed his legal studies, and finding no favourable opening in the capital, returned in 1830 to his native district, and commenced the practice of the law with marked success. He also began to make his way toward public life by his assiduous attendance and intelligent action in the local assemblies. A new diet was assembled in 1832, and he received a commission as the representative, in the diet, of a magnate who was absent. As proxy for an absentee, he was only charged by the Hungarian constitution with a very subordinate part, his functions being more those of a counsel than of a delegate. This, however, was a post much sought for by young and aspiring lawyers, as giving them an opportunity of mastering legal forms, displaying their abilities, and forming advantageous connections.

This diet renewed the liberal struggle with increased vigour. By far the best talent of Hungary was ranged upon the liberal side. Kossuth early made himself known as a debater, and gradually won his way upward, and became associated with the leading men of the liberal party, many of whom were among the proudest and richest of the Hungarian magnates. He soon undertook to publish a report of the debates and proceedings of the diet. This attempt was opposed by the palatine, and a law hunted up which forbade the "printing and publishing" of these reports. He for a while evaded the law by having his sheet lithographed. It increased in its development of democratic tendencies, and in popularity, until finally the lithographic press was seized by government. Kossuth, determined not to be baffled, still issued his journal, every copy being written out by scribes, of whom he employed a large number. To avoid seizure at the post-office, they were circulated through the local authorities, who were almost invariably on the liberal side. This was a period of intense activity on the part of Kossuth. He attended the meetings of the diet, and the conferences of the deputies, edited his paper, read almost all new works on politics and political economy, and studied French and English for the sake of reading the debates in the French Chambers and the British Parliament; allowing himself, we are told, but three hours' sleep in the twenty-four. His periodical penetrated into every part of the kingdom, and men saw with wonder a young and almost unknown public writer boldly pitting himself against Metternich and the whole Austrian cabi-

net. Kossuth might well at this period declare that he "felt within himself something nameless."

In the succeeding diets the opposition grew still more determined. Kossuth, though twice admonished by government, still continued his journal; and no longer confined himself to simple reports of the proceedings of the diet, but added political remarks of the keenest satire and most bitter denunciation. He was aware that his course was a perilous one. He was once found by a friend walking in deep revery in the fortress of Buda, and in reply to a question as to the subject of his meditations, he said, "I was looking at the casemates, for I fear that I shall soon be quartered there." Government finally determined to use arguments more cogent than discussion could furnish. Baron Wesselenyi, the leader of the liberal party, and the most prominent advocate of the removal of urban burdens, was arrested, together with a number of his adherents. Kossuth was of course a person of too much note to be overlooked, and on the 4th of May, 1837, to use the words of an Austrian partisan, "it happened that as he was promenading in the vicinity of Buda, he was seized by the myrmidons of the law, and confined in the lower walls of the fortress, there to consider, in darkness and solitude, how dangerous it is to defy a powerful government, and to swerve from the path of law and of prudence."

Kossuth became at once sanctified in the popular mind as a martyr. Liberal subscriptions were raised through the country for the benefit of his mother and sisters, whom he had supported by his exertions, and who were now left without protection. Wesselenyi became blind in prison; Lovassi, an intimate friend of Kossuth, lost his reason; and Kossuth himself, as was certified by his physicians, was in imminent risk of falling a victim to a serious disease. The rigour of his confinement was mitigated; he was allowed books, newspapers, and writing materials, and suffered to walk daily upon the bastions of the fortress, in charge of an officer. Among those who were inspired with admiration for his political efforts, and with sympathy for his fate, was Teresa Mezlenyi, the young daughter of a nobleman. She sent him books, and corresponded with him during his imprisonment; and they were married in 1841, soon after his liberation.

It is said that while in this prison Kossuth requested three books; the English Grammar, Walker's Pronouncing Dictionary, and Shakspeare. The request was granted, and by an attentive study of these three volumes, he mastered the English language, in the use of which he has since had occasion to display his power of expression. It was in this prison that his *plans for securing the liberties of Hungary, and uniting the several nations who inhabited it, were matured.*

In 1840 a royal rescript suddenly made its appearance, granting the amnesty, accompanied also with conciliatory remarks, and the demands of the government for men and money were at once complied with. This action of government weakened the ranks of its supporters among the Hungarian magnates, who thus found themselves exposed to the charge of being more despotic than the cabinet of Metternich itself.

Kossuth issued from prison in 1840, after an imprisonment of three years, bearing in his debilitated frame, his pallid face, and glassy eyes, traces of severe sufferings, both of mind and body. He repaired for a time to a watering-place among the mountains to recruit his shattered health. His imprisonment had done more for his influence than he could have effected if at liberty. The visitors at the watering-place treated with silent respect the man who moved about among them in dressing-gown and slippers, and whose slow steps, and languid features disfigured with yellow spots, proclaimed him an invalid. Abundant subscriptions had been made for his benefit and that of his family, and he now stood on an equality with the proudest magnates. These had so often used the name of the "martyr of the liberty of the press" in pointing their speeches, that they now had no choice but to accept the popular verdict as their own.

Kossuth, in the mean while, mingled little with the society at the watering-place; but preferred, as his health improved, to wander among the forest-clad hills and lonely valleys, where, says one who there became acquainted with him, and was his frequent companion, "the song of birds, a group of trees, and even the most insignificant phenomena of nature furnished occasions for conversation." But now and then flashes would burst forth which showed that he was revolving other things in his mind. Sometimes a chord would be casually struck which awoke deeper feelings, then his rare eloquence would burst forth with the fearful earnestness of conviction, and he hurled forth sentences instinct with life and passion. The wife of the lord-lieutenant, the daughter of a great magnate, was attracted by his appearance, and desired this companion of Kossuth to introduce him to her house. When this desire was made known to Kossuth, the mysterious and nervous expression passed over his face, which characterizes it when excited. "No," he exclaimed, "I will not go to that woman's house; her father subscribed fourpence to buy a rope to hang me with!"

Soon after his liberation, he came forward as the principal editor of the "*Pesth Gazette*," (*Pesthi Hirlap*), which a bookseller, who enjoyed the protection of the government, had received permission to establish. The name of the editor was now sufficient to electrify the country; and Kossuth at once stood forth as the advocate of the rights of the lower and middle

classes against the inordinate privileges and immunities enjoyed by the magnates.

Besides the regular supporters of the Austrian government, Kossuth had to contend against the wealthy and popular Szecheny, and the ultra-patricians of exclusive Magyarism. Szecheny was familiar with the political learning and most advanced liberalism of Western Europe, but he lacked the high moral faith which gives its political element to Kossuth's character; and while the latter was bent upon educating his countrymen for freedom by the foundation of schools, the organization of municipalities, and the concession of gradually-extending franchises, Szecheny grudged whatever funds or activity were withdrawn from the task of forwarding the material civilization of the country. On the other hand, the champions of the old Magyar ascendancy contested every step toward raising the Croats and Slovacks to a level with themselves.

Kossuth was not altogether without support among the higher nobles. The blind old Wesselenyi traversed the country, advocating rural freedom and the abolition of the urbarial burdens. Among his supporters at this period also, was Count Louis Batthyanyi, one of the most considerable of the Magyar magnates, subsequently president of the Hungarian ministry, and the most illustrious martyr of the Hungarian cause. Aided by his powerful support, Kossuth was brought forward in 1847 as one of the two candidates from Pesth. The government party, aware that they were in a decided minority, limited their efforts to an attempt to defeat the election of Kossuth. This they endeavoured to effect by stratagem. The liberal party nominated Szentkiraly and Kossuth. The government party also named the former. The royal administrator, who presided at the election, decided that Szentkiraly was chosen by acclamation: but that a poll must be held for the other member. Before the intention of Kossuth to present himself as a candidate was known, the liberals had proposed M. Balla as second delegate. He at once resigned in favour of Kossuth. The government party cast their votes for him, in hopes of drawing off a portion of the liberal party from the support of Kossuth. M. Balla loudly but unavailingly protested against this stratagem; and when after a scrutiny of twelve hours, Kossuth was declared elected, Balla was the first to applaud. That night Kossuth, Balla, and Szentkiraly were serenaded by the citizens of Pesth; they descended together to the street, and walked arm-in-arm among the crowd. The royal administrator was severely reprimanded for not having found means to prevent the election of Kossuth.

Kossuth no sooner took his seat in the diet than the foremost place was at once conceded to him. At the opening of the session he moved an address to the king, concluding with the

petition that "liberal institutions, similar to those of the Hungarian constitution, might be accorded to all the hereditary states, that thus might be created a united Austrian monarchy, based upon broad and constitutional principles." During the early months of the session, Kossuth showed himself a most accomplished parliamentary orator and debater; and carried on a series of attacks upon the policy of the Austrian cabinet, which for skill and power have few parallels in the annals of parliamentary warfare. Those form a very inadequate conception of its scope and power whose ideas of the eloquence of Kossuth are derived solely from the impassioned and exclamatory harangues which he flung out during the war. These were addressed to men wrought up to the utmost tension, and can be judged fairly only by men in a state of high excitement. He adapted his matter and manner to the occasion and audience. Some of his speeches are marked by a stringency of logic worthy of Webster or Calhoun: but it was what all eloquence of a high order must ever be—"Logic red-hot."

Now came the French revolution of February, 1848. The news of it reached Vienna on the 1st of March, and was received at Pressburg on the 2d. On the following day Kossuth delivered his famous speech on the finances and the state of the monarchy generally, concluding with a proposed "Address to the Throne," urging a series of reformatory measures. Among the foremost of these was the emancipation of the country from feudal burdens—the proprietors of the soil to be indemnified by the state; equalizing taxation; a faithful administration of the revenue to be satisfactorily guaranteed; the further development of the representative system; and the establishment of a government representing the voice of, and responsible to the nation. The speech produced an effect almost without parallel in the annals of debate. Not a word was uttered in reply, and the motion was unanimously carried.

By giving all the population in the village a share in the nomination of "the notary," Kossuth had paved the way for a general scheme of election by two degrees. Political privileges were extended to all Hungary and her dependencies, without distinction of race or language. The Serbs were secured in the free exercise of the worship of the Greek church. But Kossuth's crowning glory and most fortunate achievement were to propose, as finance minister in the first Hungarian ministry, the abolition of all seigniorial rights, and the payment by the state of full compensation to the nobility. The probable tactics of the Austrian government were thus anticipated and checked.

Of Kossuth during the Hungarian struggle, it seems somewhat superfluous to add to what we have already related. His every act indicated the man of mighty genius and indomitable energy—the patriot with scarce a selfish thought. But the fol-

lowing sketch of his life at Debreczin in the latter part of 1848, when Governor of Hungary, may prove interesting and instructive.

The anteroom opened into two spacious apartments, where Kossuth received the strangers, and in one of which his secretaries were at work. His dress consisted of a plain black coat, of the Hungarian cut, black trousers, and black or white waist-coat, with the shirt-collar turned over. When walking in the streets, he wore a little Hungarian cap; but he appeared in the full national costume only on solemn occasions.

He usually received strangers standing behind his writing-table, upon which lay a brace of pistols. The attempt to assassinate Bem at Pesth, and the remonstrances of his friends, who feared a design against Kossuth's life, induced this caution; but nothing ever occurred to justify in any degree such an apprehension.

At these audiences Kossuth spoke little himself, and used to say to those whom he saw for the first time, "I beg you to be brief, but for that very reason to forget nothing." He listened attentively, and occasionally made notes upon a sheet of paper which lay before him on a table. His secretaries were continually coming to put some question to him, to deliver a report, or with some paper to receive his signature. Before affixing his name he never omitted to inspect the document, even amidst the greatest pressure of business: at the same time he went on listening to the speaker, who was not allowed to stop.

These hours of audience were at the same time his hours of work, and it was only when he had something of great importance to write, that he closeted himself for a short time. The visits lasted till late at night, and at midnight the anteroom was often as full as in the morning: it was surprising how his weakly constitution could bear such mental and bodily exertion without breaking down. He did not look worse at Debreczin than previously, and his physician assured his friends that he ailed nothing. "These great exertions," he said, "keep him up: he will not feel the physical effects of all this immense strain and effort until his gigantic mind shall be compelled to rest. He is himself aware of this, and sometimes alludes to it." But so long as there was work to do for the cause of his country, Kossuth was never ill.

He usually allowed himself an hour's rest from two till three o'clock in the afternoon, and took a drive with his wife and children to a little wood at a short distance. Here he sought some retired spot, and played with his children on the grass, and was happy in enjoying the fresh air of spring. At these times, stretched on the grass, in the warm sun, watching the young buds and vegetation, he forgot his larger family to share the pleasures of his children around him.

At three o'clock he drove back to dinner, or worked for an hour when there was any urgent business. These short excursions he usually made in the light and open carriage of a friend; for although he had a carriage and pair of his own—the same poor equipage he had kept at Pesth—the vehicle was so cumbersome and the horses so ordinary, that they would have found it a hard matter to struggle through the mud of Debreczin, and might, some fine morning, very likely have left the pride of Hungary sticking fast in the mud.

When his simple meal was finished, Kossuth, with his secretaries, was again at his post, and the anteroom was presently filled with people: this went on till late at night. Variety, however, was not wanting. One while there was a conference of ministers, at another a council-of-war; now he had to invite strangers or general officers to his table, and now to attend a sitting of the chambers, or a review. The latter occurred almost daily, for newly-raised battalions seemed to spring out of the earth, and not one marched from Debreczin which Kossuth did not previously reviewed and addressed. The square in front of the town-hall was kept as clean as possible for this purpose, and here the Honveds were drawn up in file: Kossuth saluted them, and delivered a short address, which, as may be imagined, was received with a thundering burst of eljens. The officers of the battalions about to march, together with a few subalterns and privates, were invited in the evening to supper at Kossuth's table, where many a glass was pledged to the success of the new battalion, to their country, to liberty, the army, and so forth. The governor was always present at these suppers; and an elegant saloon, adjoining his apartments, was almost exclusively devoted to such purposes.

Kossuth attended the sittings of the diet at Debreczin only when he had communications of importance to make, or propositions which he wished personally to lay before the assembly. At these times he was like a king without throne or canopy—the house and the tribune, the hearts of all present, were for an hour's space at his entire command; and we may apply to him the words which Lamartine used in speaking of Mirabeau:—"Des son entrée dans l'Assemblée Nationale, il la remplit: il y est lui seul le peuple entier; ses gestes sont des ordres, ses motions sont des coups d'Etat." Kossuth always went to the House of Assembly on foot, and it was touching to witness the joy and reverence with which every one saluted him in the streets. The women seemed bewitched by his look, and had no eyes for any one else when he appeared, although he cannot be called handsome in the usual sense of that term. Every one stepped aside with the utmost respect, and the children stared with open eyes and mouth. Every now and then a pert little urchin would salute him with his "Eljen Kossuth!" or some

old woman would mutter to herself devoutly a blessing as the governor passed her. The peasant's eye sparkled with joy and pride when he saw him, and standing close against the wall to let him pass, he gave him his blessing—"Isten áldja!" and forgot to replace the fur cap on his head, as he followed the governor with eager gaze until he turned the corner. Kossuth was in his eyes a model of wisdom and goodness, the impersonation of all that was excellent upon earth, the pride of his existence, the hope of his children. For Kossuth every peasant was ready at any moment to face death—to mount the gallows or be slain upon the spot. Nor will this attachment die out among the people; it is rooted too deeply in the heart of the young Magyar, who has been taught to cherish it from the cradle up, and whose first prayer, when he awakes in the morning, and when he goes to sleep at night, is for Kossuth.

"He is too good," said one peasant to another in a tavern in Debreczin; "he is too good, and would not injure any creature, and this will be his death. Why does he treat the prisoners so well, and prevent any harm being done them, while they would exterminate us all, and destroy Hungary if they could? But he cares for his enemies as if they were his own children. Look ye," he continued, pulling an Hungarian two-florin bank-note from his old pocket-book, "here he has had printed, you see, on this note, German, Serbian, Croatian, and God knows what besides, in order that not a human soul should be deceived. But what are the others to us? If I had been he, I would have written on it, 'Eljen Kossuth! Két forint!' (Long live Kossuth! Two florins,) et punctum satis. We should all have understood it, shouldn't we? But no, he is too good. Jesus Christ be with him!"

Touching naiveté this in a mind of nature's own stamp! But thus it is when they come to talk of Kossuth, unbounded in their confidence, when the feeling is once awakened. Were Austria to-morrow to recognise the Hungarian paper-money at its full nominal value, and receive it in exchange for Austrian banknotes, yet thousands of the Kossuth notes would remain buried in the earth; for the peasants look upon them as of more genuine value than Austrian bank-paper, because bearing Kossuth's name. Nay, even if they were for years to come unable to buy a loaf of bread with their treasure, never mind—"Macht Alles nix, muss wieder andersch werden"—It is all one, things must change again some time or another.

The only fault which has been pointed out in the character of Kossuth, and which is said to unfit him to head a great revolution, is indecision in action. His conduct toward Görgey is quoted in support of the assertion. But this is the result of a superficial survey of events and of men. That Kossuth has so large and so generous a heart that he is loath to believe in the

treachery of one of his countrymen is a fact, and that this may have led him to trust too far is probable. It is said that his wife warned him that Görgey would betray his country, and that he rejected her counsel to remove him from power while it was yet time. This, too, is probable. But there was no evidence of Görgey's treachery at that time. He was obstinate, and his enemies asserted he was a traitor. How, upon such grounds, would the governor have been justified in removing a man of such splendid military talents—a man so capable of proving a valuable friend and a fatal enemy—from all command? If he had done so, perhaps, Görgey would have been considered an able patriot, and Kossuth a selfish and ambitious demagogue. When suspicion of treachery was justifiable, it was no longer in the power of Kossuth to remove the traitor from authority. He then exerted himself to win Görgey back to his duty, by gaining him the power of dictator and commander-in-chief, himself becoming an exile. There was no indecision here or elsewhere in the career of Kossuth. In parliament, and at the head of the government, he was ever bold, active, and determined.

When all hope was lost, Kossuth, with his wife and children, Dembinski, Bem, Perczel, and others, fled to Turkey. They placed no faith in Austrian promises of mercy. The young sultan, to his credit be it spoken, braved the arrogant demands of both Austria and Russia in their protection. He refused to deliver up the fugitives; but, as a sort of compromise, agreed to keep them within his own territory for a year. They lived at the sultan's expense, and were treated sumptuously. On the expiration of the term of their detention in Turkey, the United States government tendered Kossuth and his companions a national vessel to bring them to the United States. They embarked on board the steam-frigate *Mississippi*, in September, 1851. Instead of proceeding immediately to the United States, Kossuth and his friends resolved to visit England first. Arriving at Marseilles, they applied to the French government for permission to pass through France. This, the despotic executive of that republican country refused, for fear of giving offence to Austria. But the enthusiastic democrats of Marseilles found opportunities of displaying their love of the great Magyar and his cause, and he issued an address to them, thanking them for their sympathy, stating that he did not regard the conduct of the government as the conduct of the people of France, and bidding them hope for the triumph of the holy cause. At Gibraltar, Kossuth and his countrymen left the *Mississippi*, and proceeded in another vessel to England. On their arrival at Southampton, *they were enthusiastically received, and their progress through England was one great triumph. At every important town, Kossuth was compelled to make a speech to the vast crowds*

which gathered to greet him. These oratorical efforts display an astonishing command of a foreign language and deep political knowledge. As a specimen, we may select the following from a speech made at the Birmingham festival, in which his opinions and hopes were expressed at length:—

“Unhappily the people as well as the government of England have not been well informed about the true nature of the Hungarian war—its high importance to Europe, and to that orient, which in so many respects enters into the dearest interest of Britannia, so as to be nearly its Achilles’ heel. We were hermetically secluded, and chiefly so at the very time when our struggles grew to European height; so either we were not in the case to afford the wonted expectations, or the effect of those we could give was paralyzed by the adopted rules of diplomatic formality. The people of England and public opinion here were not wont to be much occupied with foreign affairs till now. There might have been sufficient reasons for that. The people of England have grown up from within, but it has fully grown up already. This great empire has no more to fear danger from within. Your fate is not depending upon any mortal’s whims. Here you are the masters of your own fate. But in respect to foreign relations, things are somewhat different. Every question has its own conditions—every time has its wants; and I confidently affirm that there is not a single question in your internal relations which outweighs in importance your external relations. Nay, more; I am persuaded that all your great internal questions are dependent upon your foreign office. Danger can gather over England only from abroad. Do not object, gentlemen, that Albion, in its insular position, and with the self-confident knowledge of its immense power, does but laugh at the ambition of all the emperors of the earth. I know that Britannia, with the mighty trident in her powerful hands, is entitled, even more than of yore, to proclaim with the greatest of your poets—

“This England never did, nor ever shall
Lie at the proud foot of a conqueror.”

I know all this is very well. But give me leave to say that that glorious thing which we call the greatness of Britannia is not bounded within these material shores. Freedom, civilization—your Parliament being representatives of whole nations—the principle of free-trade—your due influence in Europe—are not all these as so many arteries on which its life depends? Let but one of these arteries be cut, and Britannia will not only be no more what she is, but it will powerfully react even upon your internal questions. The catastrophe of freedom abroad cannot fail to bring about convulsions which may *seriously endanger your own tranquillity, your own freedom, your own happiness.* To break Britannia, it is not necessary

to conquer these glorious walls. The very moment that Britannia should not weigh so much in the world as it now weighs, Britannia would be broken. This is my humble prayer—that public opinion, which is now roused, not by me, but by the incident of my being the opportunity for the manifestation of that principle, will be expressed still more strongly. I ask the people of Birmingham, who, by their political demonstration carried the reform bill, and who have always supported the principles of liberty, to give their support to my people. Members of that great family of mankind, the tie of brotherhood is strengthened between us by common suffering. My sufferings and the numberless woes of my unhappy land entitle me to entreat you to pay attention to the feeble words which I address to you from the bottom of my own desolation. Take them as the cry of oppressed humanity, crying out to you by my stuttering tongue. People of England, do not forget in thy happiness our suffering—mind in thy freedom those who are oppressed—mind in thy proud security, the dignity of other countries—remember the fickleness of human fate—remember that the wounds inflicted on the nations abroad are so many wounds inflicted on the principles of liberty, which are your boast, your glory, and your happiness—remember that with every down-trodden nation a rampart of thy liberty falls—remember that there is a community in the destiny of humanity; be thankful for the freedom you enjoy, and lend your brethren a helping hand for the future.”

In a reply to some queries of the European democratic committee, of which the wise and eloquent Mazzini is the master spirit, Kossuth states it as his opinion, that the only hope of the people of Europe is in republics based on universal suffrages, and expresses his willingness to co-operate with the committee in the organization of the democrats. This is cheering, and opens a glorious prospect. Let the friends of free institutions unite to secure the one grand object, and determine upon particular measures afterward.

- In reference to the appearance of Kossuth, and the peculiar characteristics of his oratory and actions, we quote from a letter of Teresa Pulszky's:—

“You have asked me for my impressions of Kossuth, and want of space now precludes my complying with your desire, beyond what the limits of a few lines will permit me to convey. I derive these impressions naturally as much from what I have heard and seen of his influence on others as directly on myself. I believe Kossuth, then, to have as profound a knowledge of human nature as his favourite writer, Shakspeare, of whose bust *his features*, in some degree, remind you. To complete his *physical portraiture*, I should, in fact, only add to this description the chin and mouth of Byron, the eye and complexion of

Napoleon Bonaparte, as painted by De la Roche, and beg the reader to suppose the effects of a few years' imprisonment—of his long parliamentary campaign—and of the period of his ministry and presidency. This knowledge of human nature, together with his power of adapting himself to the capacity of those he addresses, is the source of his eloquence; and if the test of eloquence be to move and to persuade, he is assuredly the most eloquent of all men living. The masses admiringly term his style, in addressing them, Biblical, and perhaps do not inaptly characterize it. His enemies reproach him justly with being a poet,—and assuredly his writings and his speeches are filled with poetry of the highest order,—but they fall into the most grievous error when thereby intending to imply that he is nothing but a poet. The distinctive peculiarity in which he differs from all other popular leaders I can remember, who have been gifted with that poetical genius which is so important a constituent of eloquence, is the rare combination with this talent of an equal aptitude for figures, facts, and administrative detail. There are two men in him. The Kossuth eloquent with tongue and pen in half the languages of Europe, who can raise the whirlwind of passion in the masses, and lead the people as Moses did the Israelites; and the logically argumentative Kossuth of deliberative assemblies, the administrator and financier, who writes a secretary's clear round hand, and enters willingly into the most laborious detail. Add to this, the most fervent patriotism, and an integrity and disinterestedness which have never been assailed except by notorious hirelings of Austria, or on the authority of writers whom I could show to be either Austrian *employés*—men owing their bread to Austrian patronage—or ignorant of every language spoken in the country they pretended to describe. You will say from all this, that I who repudiate so energetically the idolatry of hero-worship have fallen into it. It is not so. I am perfectly awake to Kossuth's faults, which are serious and many. He is too soft-hearted. He could never sign a death-warrant; he was hardly ever known to punish. I believe, that if Kossuth had a servant who could not clean his boots, he would never think of superseding him, but clean the boots himself. On this principle he wastes his time and energies in details in which he should have no concern, and wears out, if not his untiring mind, a body which would be otherwise robust."

Kossuth combines two talents, which are rarely found in one and the same individual; he knows as well when to be silent as when to speak. The slight and quick motion of the corners of his mouth, and the raising or depression of his eyelids, betray the degree of interest he feels and his assent to what is said; for he has never known or practised the art of smoothing his features into an impassive and impenetrable expression.

ARTHUR GÖRGEY.

To many the character of Arthur Görgey seems an impenetrable mystery. Some of his comrades, who have witnessed his heroic valour, will not believe in his treachery, and declare that he was deceived by the Russians. Perhaps a careful review of his life may be the surest door to his real nature; and thanks to his friend, Francis Pulszky, we are provided with the necessary facts.

In the romantic valleys of the Carpathians we meet three noble and leading families, who have been settled there for centuries: the lords of Markusfalva, Berzevicze, and Görgö. They are all famed for their family pride, which ill accords with the present state of their fortunes. The Görgeys still boast of the fact, that the sons of Count Elias of Görgö saved the crown for King Charles Robert, on the 15th of June, 1312, in the decisive battle of Rozgony. Jordan, one of the brothers, fell, but Stephen and Arnold decided the victory, after the banneret George had been overpowered, and the king's standard taken by the enemy.

But the splendour of the family of Görgey faded; its descendants at the period of the Reformation embraced Protestantism, and this opposed almost insurmountable difficulties to their success in the service of the state under the bigoted sway of the Hapsburgs. The law of primogeniture exists only exceptionally in Hungary, and as the Görgeys increased in number, the property of each individual member of the family naturally diminished. Nevertheless every new branch was ambitious of erecting a castle on their ancestral estate of Görgö, although few had the means of completing their residence in the style in which it was planned, or of keeping it in a state of repair. Most of these buildings are therefore dilapidated monuments of ancestral pride and hereditary poverty.

Whoever is acquainted with the life and privations of these small landed proprietors with illustrious names—whoever has witnessed the rigid economy they practise, to save the means of sending the boys to college, providing the young ladies with *elegant* drawing-room attire for the dinners and balls of the *season*, and enabling the lady of the house to receive with due *honour* the guests who occasionally share their hospitality—can *form a notion* of the feelings which were awakened in the heart

of young Arthur. Tales of ancestral glory, a long pedigree, and the range of family portraits on the walls of his home, excited the ambition of the youth. His mother, a prudent woman, and a Silesian by birth, educated him sternly, not for enjoyment, but for privations. He saw his relatives proudly withdraw from the costly entertainments of their neighbours, who had in later times enriched themselves by working the mines,—he often heard the lesson inculcated, that wealth does not constitute merit, and that riches frequently lie so deep in the mire that men defile their hands in reaching them. Such were the reminiscences of Görgey's youth. A Spartan education, an innate and carefully fostered stoicism, which at times ran into cynicism, and a manner of thought positive and foreign to all ideal creations of the mind, impressed his character with that striking roughness which was at war with all forms. As a Protestant he had little hope of promotion in the service of the state, and a dependent position in private business did not answer to the views of his family; the ambitious youth was therefore sent to the military academy of Tulln. The circumstance that at this period several Protestants of the Zips were generals in the Austrian army gave popularity to the military service in the county.

Arthur Görgey now entered upon a new sphere, which however had the same influence on his character as his first impressions. The Austrian army is unlike any other in the *esprit de corps* prevailing among the officers. The majority of the officers are sons of Austrian officers. All these men of course have no other home than the army: they are not soldiers of the Austrian realm, but, like the Prætorians in the decline of the Roman empire, soldiers of the monarch, and pride themselves on holding this position. In principle, perfect equality is established in the army; but in practice, favouritism prevails, and the younger sons of the aristocracy are promoted over the heads of their seniors in service.

Arthur Görgey distinguished himself in the military school, on quitting which he entered the Hungarian body-guards at Vienna. Unlike his comrades, who abandoned themselves heedlessly to the gayety of the capital, sacrificing not unfrequently both character and purse, Görgey sought to avail himself of his position in Vienna, to perfect his military knowledge, despising the routine of frivolous amusements.

When Görgey entered the Palatinal hussars as lieutenant, they were quartered in Bohemia. It was always the policy of Austria rarely to assign the regiments stations in their native country. Two-thirds of the Hungarian soldiers were quartered in Galicia, Bohemia, Italy, and Austria Proper.

Prince Alfred Windischgratz was at that time commander-in-chief in Bohemia. The prince was a thorough aristocrat, whose ambition was not to become a great general, but to be

the first gentleman of the realm. Educated in the mediæval ideas, he believed the aristocracy exclusively privileged to receive commissions in the army. He considered the army as the only support of the state, and that its outward splendour should answer to its position, and command the respect of the bureaucrats, the "heroes of the pen." The regiments under his command were accordingly crack regiments, and the officers were led into expenditure above their means.

Görgey was indignant at the prospect of poverty interfering with his promotion; and the more so, as he was aware how much inferior to him in point of talent and knowledge were his superiors in rank. His social life in the army likewise became intolerable; although accustomed to stoical privations from his youth, it was difficult for him to abstain altogether from the amusements of his comrades, whose extravagance he could not equal: his pride was constantly hurt—his military position seemed to him a mere brilliant misery, and he resolved to quit the army. His superiors, Prince Windischgratz among the rest, regretted to lose so distinguished an officer, and assured him of their assistance; but this very circumstance only strengthened his resolution,—he was too proud to owe advancement to such aid. His parents and relatives decidedly opposed his abandoning a career in which he had already overcome the first and chief difficulties; they represented to him how small a fortune he had to inherit, and how insufficient it would be for his future wants. But Görgey adhered to his determination; he severed all the ties that bound him to the society in which he had moved, and even broke off an engagement with an amiable young lady, to whom he had long been betrothed, but who, like himself, having no fortune, could not have married him until he had attained the rank of captain. The allowance granted to him by his family was barely sufficient to clear him from debt, and he stood isolated in the world.

Görgey went to the university of Prague. Familiar from his military education with the exact sciences, he now devoted himself to the study of chemistry, and Professor Rettenbach soon pronounced him to be his best pupil. At this period Görgey was so straitened in his means, that he lodged in a garret and lived upon twopence a day, his dinner usually consisting of a piece of bread and cold sausage. The originality of his character, and the inflexible determination with which he submitted to every privation, won the heart of a young lady of fortune. But Görgey fancied that he discerned in her attachment a mixture of pity, and a love of amusement; nor would he be indebted to his wife to whom he had not, *the means of offering a comfortable maintenance, and he withdrew from the match.* The companion whom Görgey selected was *one who might in every respect look up to him: he married a*

governance, who possessed no more than himself. He soon afterward returned to his native country, and retired to a small estate in the county of Zips, which he had just inherited from an aunt.

When in the spring of 1848 the old system of absolutism was broken up, and Kossuth, then minister of finance, endeavoured to assemble around him the most talented men of Hungary, and develop all the resources of the country, Captain Trángous, the chief of the mining department in the ministry, proposed the employment of Arthur Görgey as chemist of the mint. Kossuth negatived this proposal decidedly, remarking, "This is no place for Görgey—before a twelvemonth he will be minister of war in Hungary." Possibly these words of Kossuth may have resuscitated the military ambition which had slumbered in Görgey's mind. Shortly after this time we find him in office, intrusted with the equipment of the national guards, under Colonel Marziani, who was then at the head of this department. The colonel was an able officer; and the prime minister, Count Louis Batthyanyi, placed full reliance in him, being a relative by his mother's side. The count had no idea that Marziani had an understanding with the Viennese ministry, and was even better apprized of the plans of Jellachich and the Camarilla than the Hungarian ministry. The arming of the guards was continually delayed, and the agreements with foreign gun-manufacturers were such as not to insure the delivery of a single musket; Marziani had shortened by an inch the fourteen thousand gun-barrels in store at Buda, so as to render them unserviceable, at the same time that he prevented any arms being purchased in foreign countries. Görgey soon discovered this treachery, of which he informed Count Batthyanyi; but the count gave no credit to his warnings, until Marziani quitted the Hungarian service; he had done enough for the Camarilla, and proceeded to the Austrian army in Italy.

Hungary was at this time deficient not only in arms, but in troops. A considerable number of the Hungarian regiments were far removed from their country; some were engaged against the Serbs, and the ministry could not rely on the German and Galician troops in Hungary. The diet had passed a bill for a new levy of soldiers, but this had not yet been sanctioned, and the army of Jellachich was already on the frontier. The only alternative left to the Hungarians was to resort to voluntary enlistment; and ten battalions were thus formed, most of whom were soon engaged against the Serbs. The national guards, therefore, were employed against the enemy, and a levy *en masse* was proclaimed. Four of the most distinguished officers—Görgey, Ivanka, Marjassy, and Kosztolanyi—were raised to the rank of major, and sent into the four districts of Hungary to organize levies.

For the first time in his life Görgey had now an independent sphere of action, and he perfectly answered the expectations which had been formed of his skill. The division he organised was soon the best disciplined, and brought into the strictest order; and when Jellachich, in September, approached Pesth, Görgey covered the left wing of the Hungarian army, and occupied the island of Csepel in the Danube.

Görgey was the first who irrevocably espoused the Hungarian cause. On the 3d of October, the Croatian generals, Roth and Philippovics, with ten thousand men, all their standards, two batteries, ammunition, and baggage, surrendered at Ozora to the Hungarians on the open field. Görgey, Perczel, and William Csapo, the commanders of the different corps which surrounded the Croats, were the heroes of the day. The diet conferred on Görgey the rank of colonel as a reward of his bravery, and the committee of defence despatched him with his troops toward the Austrian frontier in pursuit of Jellachich and his demoralized army.

In the battle of Schwechat, Görgey commanded the vanguard, and exposed himself to the hottest fire. On the battle-field he was raised to the rank of general, and two days later appointed commander-in-chief of the army of the Danube; the finest body of the Hungarian troops was under his command. During the month of November and in the beginning of December, Görgey organized his army. He accustomed the troops to stand fire by continual outpost skirmishes, and maintained a strict discipline. The army was ready for battle, animated by the most ardent patriotism and confidence in victory. But Görgey and his officers had no faith in ultimate success; they wished to struggle to the last, to save the honour of the Hungarian army, and if possible to secure an arrangement with Austria,—not to conquer.

This was the temper prevalent among the Hungarian officers when in December Windischgratz invaded the country. Görgey himself appeared to be impressed with a conviction that he should fall in a decisive battle; he summoned his wife to Raab, to bid her farewell, and obtained for her and his cousin a passport to France, her native country, that she might return thither in case of his death. No decisive battle, however, took place; Perczel was defeated at Moor before he could effect a junction with Görgey, and the committee of defence determined on abandoning Pesth, without accepting battle under the walls of the capital. Görgey was ordered to withdraw to the northern countries, with a view to bring into action the resources of that part of the country, to draw Windischgratz to the mountains, and divert his attention from Debreczin. Görgey, however, had scarcely left Pesth when he disavowed Kossuth, and issued a proclamation indicating all those facts which confirmed the *legality of the resistance of the Hungarians*. He was evidently

anxious to enter into negotiations for himself and his army. Prince Windischgratz was aware of this; his troops moreover were exhausted by the rapid march from Vienna to Pesth, and he was consequently unable to advance on the marshy plains toward Debreczin. He despatched some battalions in pursuit of Görgey, but at the same time he also sent a halfpay Austrian officer, a relative of the Magyar chief, with proposals of accommodation. He promised amnesty to Görgey's troops, and their incorporation into the Austrian army, all the officers retaining their rank. The Hungarian army, however, was not prepared for surrender; the soldiers were anxious to fight, not to negotiate; the discomfiture at Schemnitz had not demoralized them, and the enthusiasm which greeted them everywhere increased their ardour. Görgey now led them into the narrow valleys of Zipsen, pressed by the columns of Götz and Jablonowski, while Schlik closed the *débouchés* in the direction of the Theiss. The Hungarian army was in a desperate position; there was but one outlet, the precipitous defile of the Branisko Pass, which was held by Schlik; unless this could be stormed, no alternative remained but to surrender: this was in fact his intention. He did not believe that the Hungarian government could hold out at Debreczin; and in daily expectation of hearing that the town had been taken, he thought this the right moment for capitulation. He ordered Guyon to carry the Pass of Branisko, without at all believing that this could be effected; but the lion-hearted Briton achieved an exploit which Görgey deemed impossible. When the news spread that the road to Eperies had been opened, and that Schlik was put to flight, Görgey dryly said, "We have more luck than brains!" At the same time he resolved to avail himself of the luck; he soon formed a junction with Klapka, and then heard of the defeat of the other Austrian divisions.

When Görgey heard this news his position was naturally changed. Klapka, always straightforward and sincere, asked him what was the meaning of the proclamations in which he had disavowed the government. Görgey replied, that they had been extorted from him by the spirit and temper of his officers, and that various intrigues in the army had compelled him to resort to such measures in order to keep his forces together. This lame excuse satisfied Klapka, who did not conceive the possibility of treachery, but not Kossuth. The Hungarian armies effected a junction, and Dembinski was named commander-in-chief. This appointment wounded Görgey's pride, although he must have been aware that his ambiguous dealings were little calculated to inspire confidence.

The ambitious general now began to intrigue, veiling his own designs under the pretended will of his officers. At length Dembinski was forced to resign. It was then that Beöthy, the

tried and venerable patriot, said to the president, "Put Görgey on his trial before a court-martial, or this man will become the Marmont of Hungary." Kossuth named Vetter the commander-in-chief, and the intrigues recommenced. Vetter fell ill, and the command devolved on Görgey; his ambition might now have rested; but after a series of brilliant victories had driven the Austrians to the very frontiers of Hungary, Kossuth's name still remained the watchword of the country, Görgey's being second, coupled with that of Bem. The general became more and more reserved toward the president; he began to hate Kossuth, at seeing him the first man in the country, placed above himself. The most precious time was now lost by Görgey; he purposely avoided dismembering the Austrian monarchy by a bold march to Vienna, and instead of carrying out the resolutions of the government, he beleaguered Buda. At the same time he was connected with the republican party in Debreczin; his aim was evidently a military dictatorship, by whatever party obtained.

When the tidings came of the Russian intervention, Görgey's ambition took a different turn. Convinced as he was that Hungary could not resist the combined forces of Russia and Austria, his position became very similar to what it had been in the month of December, at the time when Windischgratz invaded Hungary with superior forces. He therefore resolved to pursue the policy in which he had formerly been successful, viz. to isolate his own position, disavow the government, and carry on alone the war or negotiations, as circumstances and the operations of the other Hungarian armies might render expedient.

Görgey of course sought to secure the fullest confidence of his generals and superior officers. Guyon, who for a long time past distrusted him, was with the army of the south; the generous-hearted Aulich was in the government, and Damianich had fractured his leg. The man, therefore, now of chief importance to Görgey was Klapka, the most talented of the younger generals. But the cunning Scæpian soon saw that Klapka was not disposed to break with Kossuth and the government, and from this moment all intimacy between these two generals subsided. The intrigues were carried on without Klapka's knowledge or assent, but he took no notice of this. His comrades even mentioned negotiations, but he remained ignorant of any thing of the kind, nor would he credit them. Görgey was insincere in his conduct, and did not disclose to him his intentions.

At the end of June and the beginning of July, the government repeatedly directed the army to retire to Pesth, and form *a junction* with the corps of Perczel and Dessewffy. Görgey *did not obey*, and sent a contemptuous message to the government, *that it might provide for its own safety, as he was unable*

to protect the capital. At the same time he displayed the most heroic personal bravery in battle, exposing himself to the balls of the enemy—he was wounded. He continued to excite the troops against the government; and when the latter deposed him, his officers expressed a request that he should be retained in the command. Meanwhile the Russian government informed the cabinets of Europe by its ambassadors, that Görgey was unwilling to co-operate with Kossuth and the southern army, that he purposely allowed himself to be cut off from the capital and the other Hungarian corps, and was ready to negotiate. After this treacherous general had long enough wasted time and forces, he left Klapka at Komorn, and departed with his army, alternately fighting and negotiating with the Russians. He led his troops to believe that his object was to form a junction with the other corps, but he always took the most circuitous route. Long and forced retreats demoralized his army: the best battalions were always exposed to the Russians with insufficient support, and after every engagement Russian parleys were held in his tent.

The tidings of the lost battle of Temesvar were a thunder-stroke to the governor. Görgey now called upon him to abdicate, as a general alone could save the country in such a crisis. Kossuth yielded, and Görgey became dictator,—but for no longer a space than twenty-four hours. Suddenly and heedlessly, seduced by vanity and ambition, he surrendered to the Russians unconditionally, not even securing the lives of his friends who had supported him throughout. His last public act was to call upon the commanders of the different fortresses to surrender, signifying to them that he himself had surrendered unconditionally, and explaining this by stating, “that Kossuth had appointed Bem commander-in-chief instead of himself, notwithstanding that the diet had desired him to assume the chief command; this piece of knavery,” he says, “explains all.”

Görgey thus himself acknowledges his motive for the surrender to have been a personal one,—of hatred and revenge against Kossuth, because the governor did not confide in him, and would not make him the arbiter of his country's fate. By this confession he condemned himself, and yet this is the *patriot* of the apologists of Austria! He is now living in Klagenfurt, upon an Austrian pension, while his friends and comrades in victory have ended their lives on the gallows.

poral defended his post to the last man,—whether in truth he never quitted the house, is more than we can say.

There is no doubt that the Viennese fought bravely at many points; but for Bem to have expected from every one of his inferiors the courage and resolution of heroes, was an error characteristic of this general.

Of his great valour and conduct in the Hungarian struggle, we have already given an account. As commander-in-chief, with the forces which Görgey had under his orders, he would have secured a glorious triumph to the patriots. At Temesvar, it was not in the power of any general with the same means as those within Bem's command to be successful. The numbers of the enemy were overpowering, and he was forced to give way. It may be doubted whether Bem was equal to Görgey in power of combination, though he was far more active, and his tactics were somewhat original. In the management of artillery he had no superior.

Bem took refuge in Turkey with Kossuth, Dembinski, and others, when Görgey slew his country. But he went further than most of his companions. He embraced the Mohammedan faith and customs, and became an effendi. It is presumed that this was a matter of policy altogether, as the heroic Pole thereby increased the importance of his position, and exercised very influence upon the councils of the Porte. Bem was not allowed to participate in another uprising of the people. He died in the early part of 1851, retaining his Mohammedan profession to the last. Bem had two passions which coloured his whole life. He loved war, and hated tyranny. Russia he regarded as the great support of despotism in Europe, and Russia ever found Bem in the ranks of her enemies. Such men are, perhaps, necessary for the success of republicanism in Europe, but they cannot be entirely recommended as examples worthy of imitation.



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